The CONSERVATION COUNCIL OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA conducted on the 8th of March '97 a
Public Hearing into Roxby Downs / Uranium Mining.
Their report is due in May '97.

We include the submission of Hans-Peter Schnelbögl (Tel. +61-66-220243) from the BIG SCRUB ENVIRONMENT CENTRE, LISMORE (Tel. +61-66-213123)

Peter Schnelbögl (Diplom Ingenieur, Tech.Univ. Munich), PO Box 1223, Lismore, 2480, Australia
Ph 066-220243

To: Conservation Council of South Australia
120 Wakefield St, South Adelaide 5000

3 March 1997

SUBMISSION TO PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO ROXBY DOWNS / URANIUM MINING

(amended)



“Almost all of the radioactivity from the original ore bodies will be contained in the tailings and … a potential health hazard remains for several hundred thousand years.”

OSS (Office of the Supervising Scientist),Darwin, Annual Report ‘88-89

Fig.1: Estimated death toll per year from Roxby Downs uranium tailings (see section 1.5). The total for the next 500,000 years is 3.4 million deaths from radiation cancer.

CONTENTS

Foreword
Summary

1. Why is the radiation from the tailings so hazardous?
1.1. Health effects of tailings radiation
1.2. Alpha radiation and fine milling
1.3. Particle sizes and wind
1.4. The tailings and their share of the uranium decay chain
1.5. The very long-term effect of the tailings
1.6. The lost knowledge
1.7. Tailings versus toxic chemical waste

2. Tailings storage
2.1. The quantities
2.2. The tailings dam
2.3. Leakage
2.4. Structural life expectancy
2.5. Erosion of the tailings
2.6. Comparison of storage options

3. Aspects and pathways of radiation
3.1. The combined dose limit
3.2. Alpha radiation - inhalation of tailings particles
3.3. Alpha radiation - ingestion of tailings particles
3.4. Inhalation of radon gas
3.5. External radiation - beta radiation
3.6. External radiation - gamma radiation
3.7. Residual uranium content

4. Estimates of radiation doses and death toll
4.1. Pathway distribution model
4.2. The ‘critical group’
4.3. Estimates of the future death toll

5. Economic Aspects
5.1. Cost of tailings storage
5.2. Rehabilitation, reclamation and compensation

6. Regulatory, political and ethical aspects
6.1. The international regulatory body (ICRP)
6.2. The Australian regulations
6.3. Supervision
6.4. Nuclear industry and society
6.5. The ethical background

Conclusion
Appendices
Reference list
add.: COMPARISON ROXBY DOWNS (OLYMPIC DAM) - RANGER - JABILUKA

FOREWORD:

The uranium tailings issue presents an unprecedented challenge to our ethical framework paralleled only by the potential for a nuclear holocaust.

However while a nuclear holocaust affects both our generation and, via genetic effects, future generations, the tailings affect nearly exclusively very distant future generations.

Even then the effects will be hardly visible. According to our estimates, during the worst period some 100,000 years from now, the death toll for humans will be about 15 per year. These deaths will be spread out over a large area, although they will be more concentrated in the region of the mine site. These large scales of time and space perfectly hide the dramatic death toll of millions of future humans due to one big Australian mine.

This situation requires us to develop an abstract understanding and appreciation of ethical values. This is a big challenge for a society which is largely indifferent to the drastic TV footage of starvation in distant Africa – which in turn is significantly caused by the side effects of our industrial society.

The international (ICRP) and various national regulatory bodies, as well as our scientists have failed miserably in this challenge: generally the consideration of the ‘future detriment’ is ‘truncated’ or ignored beyond a thousand years, at best beyond 10,000 years.

According to our estimates, over the first thousand years the death toll from the Roxby Downs mine will be about 1 per year resulting in a total of 1000 deaths. These 1000 deaths as a consequence of the operation of an uranium mine are totally unacceptable, but then there will be another 3.4 million deaths after the ’truncation’ -- seemingly not worth considering or even mentioning in any official study.

There is another Australian uranium mine with potentially similar consequences, and many more mines are being prepared. If we collectively don’t want to be the biggest killers in the planet’s history, we have to wake up and stop uranium mining.

Our industrial culture certainly gave a lot of abilities and powers to the modern human. Unfortunately, our ethical development was not yet adequate to deal with such powers. Power corrupts, and this makes it now, where we are used to those powers, even more difficult to catch up with the development of adequate values.

We are faced with the question whether we as individuals and as a society wish to value short-term economic gain higher than ethical values. Human happiness is directly related to our good-heartedness. A person in a canny or greedy state of mind can have at best some fun relying on drugs, games and fantasies. In contrast, a good-hearted person can experience joy without any artificial stimulants. Actually, just being in nature, experiencing nature can become a source of joy.

The tailings issue invites us to rethink our ethical position and open our hearts for those future people to be affected. If we accept this challenge, then not only can we save millions of future lives, but we ourselves will benefit greatly: the development of more responsible ethics will eventually help us to resolve our contemporary problems as well (unemployment, street violence, pollution etc.), and create win-win situations for the benefit of our communities.

SUMMARY:

This paper shows that the uranium tailings (the waste from uranium milling) will inflict death and suffering on numerous members of more than 20,000 future generations.

These dangers from the tailings, though repeatedly indicated, have not been brought into the public discussion -- not by the various reports, like the Ranger Inquiry and the ASTEC report, and not at all by the various environmental impact statements.

This submission presents some simple calculations and conclusions, that demonstrate that safe management of uranium tailings is both not possible and not economically viable.

The danger of those tailings comes from their radioactivity which interacts with the biosphere and in particular with the human health in a variety of ways.

The radiation problem is severely compounded by the extremely long-term hazard posed by these types of radiation: The tailings remain dangerously radioactive for more than 500,000 years. Safe storage for such time spans is impossible.

These tailings are being produced in very vast quantities: The tailings eventually accumulated by the Olympic Dam mine (Roxby Downs) could cover the whole of Tasmania with a 2 mm film of finely milled particles.

Based on studies by the US Environment Protection Agency, estimates of the radiation cancer deaths for various future scenarios have been made. We conclude that the tailings from the Olympic Dam mine may cause some 3.4 million future radiation cancer deaths!

Roxby Downs, the mine with the worlds biggest uranium deposits, may well be the biggest death factory humans have ever designed.

For each day that mining proceeds at the two current Australian uranium mines, it is estimated that an additional 200 Australians will die due to radiation cancer.

Those to die will be humans of future generations - without any involvement in the decisions and in the profits. Their only fault is that they are our children’s children.

The eventual clean-up cost will many thousand times exceed anything we know from the current asbestos affair.

According to Diehl (1995, p.37) the reclamation of the uranium tailings currently being undertaken in Germany costs considerably more than all the yellowcake ever extracted at those sites ( at market prices of 1995). These reclamation procedures will have to be improved and repeated again and again -- by future generations. However costly those future efforts, the result is bound to be limited.

1. Why is the Radiation from the Tailings so Hazardous?


1.1. Health effects of tailings radiation

The most commonly known health effect due to tailings radiation is lung cancer. It is triggered by the inhalation of airborne tailings isotopes, some of them gaseous, others fine particles. This is the main pathway for the first few thousand years.

Later, when the radioactive contamination has spread from the tailings deposit into the water and soil of the region, ingestion of tailings material becomes gradually the main pathway of contamination. At this stage, the health effects will include birth defects, still births, leukemia, gastro-intestinal cancers, many other cancers, Downs Syndrome, premature aging and heightened susceptibility to diseases.

Where the mining operations are extremely messy, such effects can appear already contemporary to mining, even though at a smaller scale.


1.2. Alpha radiation and fine milling

The main radiation hazard from the tailings comes from the powerful alpha radiation. Unlike beta and gamma radiation it cannot penetrate the skin due to the large size of the emitted particle (the ‘ray’). It is only when the alpha radiating material is inhaled or ingested that it becomes dangerously bio-effective, many times more than beta or gamma radiation.

Therefore, when alpha radiating material is turned into small particles that can become airborne and inhaled or can be assimilated by plants and enter the food chain, then a completely new situation arises: the alpha radiation becomes several million times more bio-effective and becomes very detrimental to human health.

While the natural uranium ore sitting in the ground poses hardly any danger to somebody living nearby, this changes dramatically as a result of the fine milling of the ore: The inhalation of only two grams of Roxby Downs tailings dust per year exceeds the allowable dose limit (see calculations in appendix A1 and A2). This is equivalent to the volume of about 25 grains of wheat!!!


1.3. Particle sizes and wind

The sizes of the tailing particles range between those of fine sand and talcum powder. Such fine particles easily become airborne: According to NUREG-0706 (1980) “particles smaller than 100 micrometres may have a velocity of fall lower than the upward velocity of the turbulent wind. Such particles are carried through the atmosphere for long periods and to great distances from their original location.”

The tailings material fits very well into this category: According to the “WIN-112”(1960) 80% of the radioactivity of acid-leach tailings is associated with particles less than 38 micrometres in size.

It is well known that the wind can carry the red Sahara sand in considerable quantities over a distance of more than 2000 km to central European cities. Australian uranium tailings do not have a striking colour and therefore blend well with the ordinary house dust in Melbourne, Sydney …

Initially, the uranium tailings are being kept down, with water during the mine’s operation, and with a soil and rock cover after decommissioning. But eventually they will be exposed and dehydrated to be picked up by the wind, spread around by floods, taken up by plants, to seep into the ground water, and to be inhaled and ingested by humans (see section 2.5 for more details on the wind erosion of tailings).

This process has already started today at several abandoned mine sites in Australia.


1.4. The tailings and their share of the uranium decay chain

As uranium-238 decays it forms a daughter isotope, thorium-234, which in turn decays into another radioactive daughter isotope etc. There are 14 decay stages and consequently there are 14 radioactive isotopes in the uranium ore. Ten of those decay stages occur in the tailings. Six of those transformations in the tailings are alpha decays. This means at least 75% of the dangerous alpha decays of the uranium decay chain of the original uranium ore will occur in the tailings. This explains why the permissible dose limit for uranium tailings dust is set so low (see section 1.2).


1.5. The very long-term hazard of the tailings

The main problem with the tailings is their very long-term radioactivity.

After 1,000 years 99% of the radioactivity is left

after 10,000 years 91.4%

after 100,000 years 40%

after 250,000 years 10.5%

after 500,000 years 1.1%

Despite the decreasing radioactivity, the detrimental effect actually increases during the first 150,000 years as the tailings spread out and become more and more accessible to the biosphere.

The death toll per year from the tailings dams of Roxby Downs (now officially called ‘Olympic Dam’) could be somewhere --

around 2 during the mine’s operation (design includes partly dry tailings beaches)

around 0.1 after rehabilitation till tailings erosion starts (perhaps from 2020 - 2300)

around 4 while erosion and inhalation are the main aspects (perhaps till 30,000)

around 14 when both inhalation and food chain are major aspects (perhaps till 200,000)

around 3 when the diminishing of the radiation is the main aspect (till 500,000)

around 0.001 while the residual uranium content is the main aspect (till 5 billion)

These rather small annual figures add up to about 3.4 million deaths (see section 4.3 and appendix 5).

Obviously these figures are rough estimates. However, they give some idea of how the various stages are proportioned to each other. The graph on the cover sheet illustrates this further. It becomes obvious that the quality of the mine’s operational management, the stability of the tailings dam and the rehabilitation are of little significance for the long-term effects and for the total death toll, even though they are so important for the short and medium term effects. The vertical dashed line in Fig.1, front page, shows how far our willingness to accept responsibility reaches.

There is no safe containment for such time spans, not even if buried a few hundred metres under the ground (see section 2.6).

The extremely long time spans involved will bring a variety of climatic conditions to the mining area. This can change the remoteness of the area considerably, especially with the Greenhouse Effect. Arid land can turn into agricultural land, the remote mine site can turn into a residential area if not into a city.


1.6. The lost knowledge

The knowledge and understanding of the situation will certainly be lost within a few thousand years if not much earlier. Then it can be expected that humans not only work, grow food and live near the tailings deposits, but also do all these right on top of the tailings.

Already today the information is not passed on, not even to those most affected, but rather encrypted into some scientific reports. The current school curriculum, contemporary to uranium mining, does not contain any information on the dangers of uranium tailings.

Consequently children (and tourists) are swimming in the tailings dam of the abandoned government-owned mine Rum Jungle in the Northern Territory. At Port Pirie in South Australia children have been playing and swimming in uranium tailings dams for years. No ongoing health observation (cancers have a latency of up to 30 years) is being provided to those exposed.

In another example from Bulgaria, a farmer grew radioactive wheat on contaminated soil near an uranium mill (see section 3.3 for details).

This future loss of understanding of the situation will be inevitably combined with a lack of perception for the dangers. Alpha radiating dust inhaled with fresh air or ingested via the food chain will have no immediate effects. The most common consequence, lung cancer, becomes apparent only after some 20 years. Other effects like genetic damage and slightly increased ageing are even more subtle.

These subtle exposures repeated over a very long time span hide the real toll on human life and health -- in stark contrast to the dramatically obvious effects of nuclear bombs and Chernobyl type accidents. During the worst affected period (between 30,000 and 200,000 years from now), the yearly death toll will be according to the presented estimates around 15 deaths per year. While these small numbers add up to millions of deaths from a 50 year mining venture, they remain invisible to those affected.


1.7. Tailings versus toxic chemical waste

Without wanting to defend the currently irresponsible production and disposal of toxic chemical wastes, there are big differences between radioactive tailings and toxic chemicals:


2. Tailings storage


2.1. The quantities

When mining is due to finish at Olympic Dam, as much as 100 million cubic metres of tailings would remain there. These radioactive tailings could cover some 100 square kilometres one metre high, or the whole of the ACT (2400 sq.km) 4 cm high, or the whole of Tasmania nearly 2 mm high.

In section 1.5 it was claimed that there is no safe storage for the tailings due to the enormous time spans involved. Similarly, there is no safe storage for such vast quantities, not even for much shorter time spans. However, the combination of the enormous time spans and the vast quantities makes it obvious, that there is no safe storage.

Accordingly I could not find a scientific study of storage options for tailings reaching beyond 10,000 years, nor an official study of the future effects of the tailings radiation ‘beyond 10,000 years’.

Conveniently our radiation research bodies ignore the distant future and describe such modelling as unscientific or as “not technically supportable”(OECD,1984, p.90). However, the residual radiation of the tailings after 10,000 years (91.4 %) is a scientific fact!


2.2. The tailings dams

The tailings of the Roxby Downs (Olympic Dam) mine are to be stored in four tailings dams with a total area of 4 square kilometres. These dams will eventually be 30 m high, which gives them a net capacity of some 100 million cubic metres plus space for cover and freeboard.

According to O.D.EIS (p. 7-2) “…the retaining embankment will be constructed to a height of 10 m (Figure 7.1). Thereafter, the embankment will be raised in 5 m increments to a total height of 30 m.” This means that the tailings wall increments are to be build on top of the tailings. These tailings are like fine sand and powder and lack any inherent strength. This mode of construction can be seen in Fig. 7.1 (O.D.EIS) in the top left corner. Over time, the 4 increments will simply sink into the tailings material. The same will happen to the 2 m cover of ‘swale material’ and rock on top of the tailings deposit (see O.D.EIS, p.7-21). This could mean the end for the Olympic Dam within a hundred years from its completion!


2.3. Leakage

The tailings are soaked with a highly acidic liquor enriched with radioisotopes and considerable quantities of highly toxic process chemicals. This liquor is admittedly leaking in enormous quantities into the groundwater. This happens despite the scientifically tested claims about the carbonates reacting with any leaking tailings liquor to form gypsum which would then “create a seal limiting further advance of the wetting front” (s.O.D.-EIS, p.18).

The ‘wetting’ is obviously a ‘pouring’ as the South Australian Health Commission notes: “Based on these results, the amount lost might be of the order of 1 Gigalitre” (RDWL, 1996, p.89).

This tailings liquor has a concentration of 1550 Bq/l for uranium 238, and 4833 Bq/l for thorium 230 (RDWL, 1996, p.98), a potent radioactive mix.

The finely milled uranium-238 and radium-226 are both water soluble in the acidic tailings environment. These contaminants will be leached out of the tailings and enter the ground water and eventually the surface water via some springs. Due to the normally dry climate the groundwater might not have enough pressure to move around and form springs. However, the very long time-spans involved will certainly bring a variety of climatic conditions (e.g. the Greenhouse Effect) which can be expected to change this dramatically. Also, in such a case the contaminated aquifers might very well link up (again?) with one of the major aquifer systems.


2.4. Structural life expectancy

The most optimistic estimate for the structural life expectancy of a tailings dam I have ever heard of, was 10,000 years. However, even then the tailings retain 91.4% of their radioactivity.

The Australian regulations require a functional performance of a tailings dam for 200 years and a structural performance for 1000 years. After 1000 years the remaining tailings activity is more than 99%.

The Olympic tailings dam, due to its incremental wall structure (see section 2.2) will have difficulty to survive a hundred years.

Not surprisingly the Olympic Dam draft EIS does not even mention the extremely long time spans involved nor discuss the life expectancy.

Considering these enormous quantities and very long time spans there is no safe storage for the uranium tailings.


2.5. Erosion of the tailings

The wind erosion of the Olympic Dam tailings is initially of little concern as the tailings are being kept more or less saturated with water and later they are covered with soil and rocks.

After a few hundred years, when the tailings cover is partly eroded, wind erosion becomes progressively the main feature of environmental contamination. The most hopeful researchers give tailings dams a survival period of 10,000 years. Even then the tailings have lost only 9% of their radiation. Therefore, the tailings dust blowing across the country will have nearly all of its destructive potential left. Diehl (1995, p.28) writes: “The sky darkened over the villages in the neighbourhood of Wismuth’s uranium mill tailings dams, when storms blew the sands from the dry tailings beach. Consequenty elevated concentrations of radium-226 were found in dust samples from these villages.”

The draft-EIS claims that the surface of the tailings deposit forms a crust (“high strength competent surface”) as it dries and therefore produces very little dust: O.D.EIS (1982, p.7-18 and 9-23). This might be the case to some extent as long as the deposit is void of life like a lunar landscape. Such a thin crust would be broken up by any life form present, by plants (the grasses, shrubs, trees, and the dead leaves and twigs blown across the surface), by animals, by humans and by their technology (four-wheel drives, agriculture…).

Exposed to nature this thin crust is only a temporary obstacle to the wind. The wind tunnel measurements described in s.O.D.- EIS (1983 p.19, 20) must have been conducted with this thin crust on top of the sample in perfect condition. Renewed wind tunnel measurements with the tailings could easily test this point. In OECD(1984, p.40) the wind erosion is assumed to remove initially 0.5 mm and later on 0.1 mm per year from the tailings surface.

This means that the Olympic tailings dam, proposed for a height of 30 m, will be spread out over a huge area within 200,000 to 250,000 years. Each year some 4,000 to 20,000 cubic metres of tailings will be blown off the Olympic Dam deposit. Each cubic metre of tailings contains some 1.9 million grams of tailings particles. Theoretically, if these tailings were all to be inhaled equally, between 4 and 20 billion adults could be lifted above the inhalation dose limit, per year, for 200,000 years to 250,000 years, just from one mine, Olympic Dam. Though this figure would slowly decrease as the radioactivity diminishes: after 77,000 years to 50%, after 250,000 years to 10%.

These tailings won’t be picked up just once by the wind. And each time a tailings particle is moved around by the wind, it is subject to potential inhalation by a human or any other breathing being. Consider the proximity of major population centers (Sydney 1300 km, Melbourne 1100 km and Adelaide 500 km) and the proximity of the coastal area which will always be more densely populated (Spencer Gulf 200 km).

When these tailings particles eventually finish their air journey and find a resting place either somewhere in the topsoil or in the sea, their new destructive work place will be the food chain (see section 3.3).

Even those particles which have already caused the death of a person haven’t exhausted their potential, just like the oceans waves won’t lessen just because they have drowned somebody.

Once the soil cover on the Olympic Dam deposit is eroded (sometime within the next 10,000 years, but more likely within a hundred years), every Australian is bound to carry some Olympic tailings particles in their bodies. Additionally every Australian will then carry Olympic radioisotopes due to the emanation of the gaseous radon from the tailings (see section 3.4). Even though statistically quite a few particles are needed to trigger cancer, a single particle can achieve this.

Coming back to the wind erosion of the Olympic Dam, the speed of this erosion will actually be greatly enhanced by the combined effect of wind and water erosion. The erosion by floods will spread the tailings over vast areas in successive thin layers deposited on everything inundated. These very fine layers on the ground, on the grass, on the bark and leaves of trees, on sealed and dirt roads, on crops etc. can easily become airborne or enter the food chain. The Roxby Downs area does occasionally experience such heavy downpours (1 in 200 year storm: 210 mm) and floods (several over the last 20 years). The very long time-spans involved will certainly bring a variety of climatic conditions with dramatic consequences. The Greenhouse Effect, brought about by our unreflected use of technology, might bring such events within decades.


2.6. Comparison of storage options

There are a variety of storage options:

1. Dumping the waste material next to the mine: This is the historic and later the Third World approach. Obviously the tailings material is exposed to erosion by water and wind right from day one, and phase 3 of the graph in Fig.1 starts right from the beginning of the mine operation, the dashed line of refusal to accept responsibility moves right to the beginning of the time scale. The environmental and health effects become already measurable during the mine’s operation.

2. Storage in a tailings dam: This options is seemingly much cleaner and controlled than the dumping of the waste. The first two phases in the graph are being added. They bring an improvement of the environmental and health situation for the first few hundred to few thousand years. After this the death toll rises steeply – for hundreds of thousands of years. If this improvement wouldn’t actually save perhaps a thousand human lives, one could be forgiven to say that it is purely cosmetic and totally insignificant in the face of the total death toll after some 500,000 years. Compared with the previous option (the dumping of the tailings), the storage in a tailings dam might reduce the death toll by about 0.1%.

3. Storage in open mine pit: This storage option brings a very significant improvement to the long-term death toll from the tailings. There are many parameters making a big difference in the performance of this option:

The death toll with this storage option could be very significantly reduced, maybe by 65 - 95 %.

4. Storage in old or specifically built mine shafts: This is the safest storage option. Compared with the open mine pit it provides greater depth and better ways of sealing the deposit off. The death toll would be reduced by perhaps 90 - 99%. The only remaining transport mechanism for the transfer of tailings particles into the biosphere is the aqueous transport. This option still involves the death of many thousands of future humans and is therefore no suitable storage proposal for any further mining. However, it seems to be the best option for dealing with the tailings that already exist at various dumps, in tailings dams and in mine pits.

5. Synroc and similar technologies: Synroc is very well known and therefore often thought to be a good storage refinement for underground storage of tailings. However the sheer quantity of the tailings makes such a technology unsuitable. The only related storage technology for low level high volume waste is the addition of cement to the tailings and the mixing of the tailings into concrete. Tests have been undertaken with little success. However, some improvement might be possible.

3. Aspects and pathways of Radiation


3.1. The combined dose limit

The dose limit for a member of the public continually exposed to radiation is 1 mSv per year.

Where the person is exposed to different types and pathways of radiation, this dose limit applies to the sum of all components. The radiation from uranium tailings has at least five such components, which are listed in the following sections. The permissible and/or likely exposure from each component will be estimated, as if the other four components were non-existent. Therefore, the permissible quantities have to be further reduced (see section 4.1).

The following investigation of the various components will in particular investigate their dose contribution for the ‘critical group’. The ‘critical group’ is the group of people most exposed to the radiation (see ICRP 42, p. 16). In the case of uranium tailings this would be a future rural settlement establishing on top of the spread out tailings deposit, living from the produce they grow, and drinking the local ground water. (see section 4.2 for details and results).


3.2. Alpha radiation - inhalation of tailings particles

In section 1.2 the maximum permissible quantity of inhaled tailings from Olympic Dam has been specified as 1.9 grams per year. This is just from one source, as if the other pathways wouldn’t contribute any further radiation. Therefore the permissible dose is in fact considerably lower (see section 4.1 for our distribution models).

In section 1.3 the capability of the tailings to become airborne for long times has been shown.

And in section 2.5 the actual mechanics and quantities of the wind erosion have been demonstrated.

It is obvious that the inhalation of tailings particles is one of the main pathways. It is especially significant during the stage of the tailings erosion. At a later stage, when the tailings particles become increasingly part of the topsoil, the ingestion of tailings particles via the food chain becomes the main pathway.


3.3. Alpha radiation - ingestion of tailings particles

After a few hundred years it can be expected that humans not only work, grow food and live near the tailings deposits, but also do all these right on top of the tailings. Consequently, the ingestion of contaminated food will be a huge problem additionally to the inhalation risk. Some examples may illustrate this:

At the uranium mill of Bukhovo in Bulgaria the fences around a contaminated area deteriorated and the area was in part reused for agriculture just 30 years after the mining. (Dimtchev 1991, p.66-74) and ( Vapirev 1991)

Radium concentrations of up to 1077 Bq/kg were found in cereals grown in these areas. Regular consumption (1kg per week) of such a cereal would result in an annual dose of 74mSv, while the admissible dose is 1mSv. Were these cereals grown there some 250,000 years later the annual dose to the consumer would be still some 8 times too high.

In an example from Australia (Ranger mine) the radium-226 contamination of mussels from four different locations downstream from the mine has been investigated (McKay, 1984): On average 260 Bq/kg have been measured for radium resulting in 0.08 mSv/kg if ingested. The annual ingestion of 4 kg mussel flesh, considered to be typical, would already constitute 32% of the permissible annual dose for the public.

Using our pathway model (see section 4.1), this would already exceed the dose limit for ingested food by some 50%. However, the average person in the tropical area consumes probably annually some 1000 L of water and some 500kg of food, much of it contaminated as well.

This indicates that in some areas near the mine and especially for those people living mainly on bush tucker, the legal dose limit for the public is already now being transgressed, while both the tailings erosion and the radon release are still under con trol.

After a few thousand years, when the tailings deposit has been spread over a large area, the contamination will be many hundred times increased. For the critical group we estimate an annual dose from ingestion of 300 mSv per year. This seems an extremely conservative estimate, with an annual dose of several thousand mSv appearing possible.


3.4. Inhalation of radon gas

The most dangerous isotope in the tailings is radon-222, dangerous because it is gaseous and carries four of the six alpha decays of the tailings.

Because of its rather short half-life hardly any radon escapes from the uranium ore in its natural location before mining. Most likely the rock was originally buried deep in the ground. Even the open pit mines at Ranger get the uranium ore on average some 100 m deep out of the ground. The Olympic Dam mine is an underground mine with the ore body being more than 300 m below surface. Even if this ore is only covered by sandy soil, at this depth the radon escape is reduced many million times (BI 1992, p.117).

In contrast, the escape of radon from the tailings will eventually be comparatively unobstructed: While initially the tailings are saturated with water and later covered with soil to reduce the radon escape, eventually they will dehydrate and become exposed by erosion. For somebody living in the vicinity of the tailings dam this could mean an annual dose of about 2.4 mSv, and for somebody living right on top of the eventually spread out tailings, a dose of 80 mSv (see calculations in appendix A3).

Over the very long time spans involved, the deposit in the tailings dam will certainly be spread around the whole Lake Torrens flood plain by the water and carried around by the wind to great distances. These spread out tailings offer very little resistance to the radon escape.

With the radon escape being more or less proportional to the tailings surface, the detrimental effect is obvious.

Uranium and radium are both water soluble, especially under the acidic condition of the Olympic Dam tailings. They can enter the groundwater and the surface water from the tailings dam as well as from any accumulations of eroded tailings. Radon, a daughter isotope of radium and indirectly of uranium, continually arises from any uranium and radium contamination. Therefore not only the tailings but with them the emanation of radon gas spreads with contaminated water.


3.5. External radiation - beta radiation

For people living on the tailings, either the tailings dam itself or on any accumulated erosion deposits of tailings material, the beta radiation, negligible before, becomes a problem:

According to Reif et al. (1993, p.386-389) “the dose equivalent rate to the skin at 1cm from a distributed tailings source of infinite thickness, with a Ra-226 activity of 56 Bq/g, was measured to be 0.024 mSv/h” for beta radiation only. Considering the Olympic Dam ore grade (the ore grade is about 0.05% and the radium 226 content is 5.25 Bq/g), the annual dose of those people would reach about 40% of the dose limit, just from this one source.

In practical terms, ‘infinite thickness’ of the tailings deposit means for beta radiation something like a few millimetres. As the erosion of the tailings dam progresses, an increasingly large area will have a tailings deposit of a few millimetres. The refore many future residents will be affected from the beta radiation.


3.6. External radiation - gamma radiation

The gamma dose for somebody living, working and sleeping on tailings material is about 0.018 mSv/h for the Olympic Dam deposit (for the calculations see appendix A and A2):

Please note that for this dose result it was assumed that the person sleeps on the ground i.e. on the tailings. While this calculation is fraught with uncertainties due to the lack of information, the result is confirmed by the measurements. The future resident would exceed the yearly dose within 91 hours, just from gamma radiation. The yearly dose would therefore be about 96 mSv.

The source definition used in our calculation for the gamma radiating material would apply not only to the tailings in the tailings dam, but to any accumulation of eroded tailings material of more than 5 mm thickness.

Therefore, after a few ten thousand years when erosion has done its job, not just 4 square kilometres but hundreds of square kilometres will be affected, with many people living there.


3.7. Residual Uranium Content

The residual uranium content of the tailings (only about 90% - 99% is being extracted) may well be significant enough to contaminate the area for billions of years (U-238 half-life: 4.5 billion years). The uranium content of the Olympic Dam tailings would stabilise the radiation of the tailings after 1 million years at about 7 times that of uncontaminated material. However, like the rest of the tailings this uranium is finely milled, thereby making the alpha radiation several million times more bio-effective (see section 1.2 ).

The dose from this contamination will certainly not exceed the threshold of 1 mSv per year, especially from the low-grade Olympic Dam tailings. However, due to the extremely long activity times involved, this residue may add significantly to the future death toll.

The effects of this component are not included in our estimates.

4. Estimates of Radiation Doses and Death Toll


4.1. Pathway distribution model

As described in Chapter 3, there are several types and pathways of radiation. The dose limit is set for the sum of those individual components. To derive a dose limit for a particular component, its share in the total dose needs to be estimated first.

The proportionment of the different components varies for different exposure situations. For example, those most exposed to the tailings (the ‘critical group’, see next section) will have a high dose component from external radiation, while those living in Melbourne will be exclusively exposed to radon and the inhalation and ingestion of particles.

Our estimate for the averaged distribution model is 42% radon, 30% inhaled tailings dust, 25% ingested tailings and 3% external radiation.

For the ‘critical group’ we estimate 61% ingestion, 18% external radiation, 16% radon and 5% inhalation of dust.

An example may best illustrate which effect this has on the individual dose limits:

We calculated that 1.9 grams is the permissible quantity of tailings dust that can be inhaled per year (see section 1.2). The averaged distribution model attributes 30% to inhaled tailings dust. This means the average permissible quantity to be inhaled is only 0.3 x 1.9 grams = 0.57 grams per year. Looking at the ‘critical group’, this permissible quantity is reduced to 0.095 grams (5% share). This compares with their estimated inhalation of 40 grams per year.


4.2. The ‘critical group’

The ICRP 42, p.16 requests the consideration of the group of people most affected by the radiation. Obviously this would be a future rural settlement establishing on top of the spread out tailings deposit, living from the produce they grow, and drinking the local ground water. This section will add up all the various dose components for the ‘critical group’ and determine from this how long the tailings deposit would need to be stored safely:

As shown in section 3.5, beta radiation alone will contribute already 40% of the permissible annual radiation dose (i.e. 0.4 mSv). This result applies not only to somebody living right on top of the 4 square kilometre tailings dam but to anybody living on accumulations of eroded tailings material of a few millimetres thickness. Eventually a large area will have such a cover.

Gamma radiation will affect the ‘critical group’ severely. The yearly dose for the member of the ‘critical group’ would be around 96 mSv. (see section 3.6)

And again, after a few ten thousand years when erosion has done its job, not just 4 square kilometres but hundreds of square kilometres will be characterised by such a high radiation, with potentially many people living there.

The radon emanation from tailings deposits (see section 3.4 for details) is probably the best known hazard. For the critical group the annual dose received due to radon emanation could be around 80 mSv.

The inhalation of tailings dust (see calculations in appendix 1 and 2) by the ‘critical group’ is estimated to be between 20 and 150 grams per year, with an average value of 40 grams per year. For the concentration of the Olympic Dam tailings this results in an annual dose contribution of about 20 mSv.

The ingestion of radioisotopes from the tailings via the food chain (see section 3.5) might well be the biggest problem for the members of the critical group: An annual dose contribution of 250 mSv from food and 50 mSv from water seems very conservative.

The total of all those dose contributions for the ‘critical group’ would be 500 mSv. Such a dose would require safe storage for the tailings for some 700,000 years (ca. nine chain half lives!). Even if the total annual dose were only 250 mSv, the requirement for safe storage would still be 610,000 years!


4.3. Estimates of the future death toll

While it is not possible to calculate or estimate the future casualties from the radioactive tailings, it is possible to make such estimates for various scenarios.

The US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) made such estimates for US tailings . Using those together with various future scenarios in Australia we conclude that there may be some 3.4 million future cancer deaths from the eventually 190 million tonnes of Olympic Dam tailings (see appendix 5 for more details).

Using more recent ICRP guidelines (mainly ICRP 60, 1990, p.188), we come to similar or worse results.

Obviously these estimates come with substantial uncertainties which could increase or decrease the estimates considerably. However, we do not have the right to give the credit of the doubt to the mining companies. This is not a murder trial where the murder has already happened, where we have to give the credit of the doubt to the accused. This is rather a proposal for the future indirectly inflicting death and disease. The credit of the doubt has to be reserved for those potentially affected.

5. Economic Aspects


5.1. Cost of tailings storage

The costs of safeguarding the tailings deposits for 500,000 years would be many billion dollars - for future generations to bear. No consideration has been given to this in the EIS.

Assuming for each uranium mine an average of

$40,000 per year for low-level surveillance and monitoring requiring part-time management and part-time surveillance

+ $80,000 per year for corrective measures like earthworks and repair of fences

+ $20,000 per year for preservation of information and related training

= $140,000 x 500,000 years = 70 billion dollars per mine !!!

Obviously this amount could be much higher in the case of flooding, earthquakes etc. However costly those future efforts, the result is bound to be limited.


5.2. Rehabilitation, reclamation and compensation

Uranium mining may not be viable much longer:

Overseas many millions of dollars are being paid out to uranium mine workers to compensate them for the health effects, mainly lung cancers.

A new study on ’Chromosomal aberrations with Namibian Uranium Mine Workers’ (Zaire, 1995), indicates the extent of the genetic damage caused by radiation exposure far beyond the known increase in birth defects and still births. Much of this genetic damage will be passed on from generation to generation to leave a permanent mark on humanity. However, the study may indicate some new avenues to prove health damages from radiation exposure. This might be an incentive for the government and the uranium industry to adequately care for those to be exposed to radiation both during and after the mine’s operation.

The decommissioning and clean-up costs for uranium producing projects in Australia is currently estimated to be some 70 cents per pound of uranium produced. However, a different approach is shaping up with Sweden spending some $AUS 50 per pound of uranium (Diehl, 1996, p.2).

6. Regulatory, political and ethical aspects


6.1. The international regulatory body (ICRP)

The ‘International Commission on Radiological Protection’ is generally accepted as the authoritative body to analyse the available data on the health effects of radiation and then to issue non-binding regulations. These regulations are then expected to become incorporated into the laws and regulations of the various nations.

The members of the commission are mainly medical scientists and therefore credited with a great deal of trust into their motives. Unfortunately, the general decay of ethical values in our society didn’t exclude the medical profession. Now we see doctors all over the planet objecting to previously fundamental ethical principles (Hippocratic oath) or to free cancer screening (breast or prostate cancer). Similarly secondary interests seem to have invaded some of the minds on the ICRP panel.

It seems that nowhere have the rights and the suffering of the human beings of the distant future been considered in the various volumes issued by the ICRP. There is one chapter though, in ICRP46, which is very revealing: Chapter 7.3. ‘Timescales’ on page 13/14 discusses as vaguely as possible the ethical aspect of man-made radiation and offers several options for the national governments to choose from:

The whole chapter is bathed in vagueness and nice phrases (e.g. ‘for careful judgement by national authorities’ or ‘is an issue of an ethical and political nature to which there is no simple answer’). Obviously, the simple answer is: “You shall not kill”

Looking at the regulations of various governments they all decided to truncate somewhere between 1000 and 10,000 years without ever spelling it out. In Australia the structural life expectancy of a tailings dam has to be at least 1000 years. The graph on the front page shows how such regulations receive their deadly implementations: During those thousand years the radiation dose is reduced to a low (comparatively only) value, and afterwards the contamination rises steeply to result in the deaths of possibly many millions.

Coming back to the ICRP: Historically the ICRP dragged its feet in regard to dose reductions needed due to any new data and statistics on radiation effects. The dose limits were continually reduced with a considerable delay. In the moment there is already a ten year delay between new recommendations for a lowered worker’s dose limit and the ICRP amendment. Even worse, since the last lowering of the dose limit (which was frowned at by the mining industry) many of the individual dose conversion factors for the uranium decay chain have been changed, thereby mitigating some of the effects of the dose reduction for the mining industry.

By now the ICRP has developed an extremely complex dose assessment system which inhibits public scrutiny. Even the national radiation research bodies are currently not able to make exact determinations. This will eventually lead to the so- called computer modelling by consultancy firms, which removes the last bit of transparency and is wide open to fraud. Obviously, Third World countries will be completely at the mercy of the multinational mining giants.

The ever expanding scale of potential destruction is so far reaching that one day a signature might cost more future lives than there are currently on our planet (for example a signature on irresponsible regulations by the ICRP).



6.2. The Australian regulations

Some 8 years ago a nuclear consultant with international experience told me that Australia has good regulations for radiological protection, but the supervision was Third World standard. Obviously, good regulations without adequate supervision are useless except if some concerned citizens go to court.

However this last loophole for humanity is to be closed as well. The Australian recommendations for the implementation of the new (1990) outdated ICRP dose limits have watered down those limits even further. Australia is one of the first if not the first country to provide a Third World template for ‘no worries’ regulations. Despite this, at a recent Senate Select Committee hearing I heard representatives from ARL and from ANSTO declare that Australian regulations were top in the world.


6.3. Supervision

The current environmental supervision of uranium mining and milling in Australia is totally inadequate. Naturally there is a limitation in the case of uranium mining and milling: ‘adequate’ supervision of something ‘that should never happen’ is mutually exclusive, just like adequate supervision of genocide. Here it is futurecide.

But beyond this limitation, the most basic requirement of an independent supervisor is not being met: Ironically both the South Australian Health Commission and ANSTO aren’t meant to conduct the environmental tests and measurements at the mine and mill, but rather to rely mainly on the operators information.

See the FOE (Friends of the Earth) documentation for further info on these matters, in particular their submission to the Senate Select Committee on Uranium Mining and Milling (Submission No 40 Part 2 in Vol 9 of the Senate’s edition of submissions).


6.4. Nuclear industry and society

The nuclear industry is often seen as antagonistic to democracy and human rights. A free society is a big threat to this industry which is so dependent on cover-up and disinformation, because of


6.5. The ethical background

This most important issue has been addressed in the foreword of this paper. I would like to add some considerations:

During my research I came across many instances where essential information was not brought out to the public. The ‘Indenture Agreement’ between the South Australian Government and the operators of the Roxby Downs mine is the most obvious example: This contract includes a clause (clause 35), which prohibits the government from making public certain information, including the results of the environmental monitoring of the project. The government now needs the agreement of the mining company to release any such information.

The hiding of the information about the tailings reminds me of the general dishonesty in government and industry. Dishonesty is a near total blanket over our society, and nearly everybody is aware of this. Dishonesty is required where responsibility is discarded. In contrast, for a responsible society, speaking out the truth becomes a major responsibility for everybody.

Confronted with a technology which expands into ever more risky dimensions, the only society capable of handling such challenge I feel would have to be based on truth and a caring attitude.

CONCLUSION:


“No practice involving exposures to radiation should be adopted unless it produces sufficient benefit to the exposed individuals or to society to offset the radiation detriment it causes.” ( ICRP - Principle ). The most important detriment from the Roxby Downs mine -- the radioactive contamination by tailings for more than 500,000 years -- has not even been mentioned in the Olympic Dam EIS. Currently there are about 42 million tonnes of uranium tailings at various mine sites in Australia. Olympic Dam may add another 190 million tonnes. These will cost many times more lives and health than Chernobyl or Hiroshima -- not in one dramatic event but rather quietly over the next 500,000 years. Can this be justified by the profit, by any profit?


The research for this submission has been conducted with inadequate funds and personnel. However it certainly provides sufficient information

I request that all current and past workers at uranium mines be contacted for a thorough dose assessment and health examination, that they be informed about their medical and legal situation, and that the derived data be utilised for a thorough research project into radiation hazards.

APPENDICES:

App. 1: Dose limit calculations:

The spec. activity of U238 is 1.233 x 104 Bq/g and the U238 content of U3O8(yellowcake) is 84.8%.

Therefore the spec. activity of U238 in yellowcake is 1.045 x 104 Bq/g (alpha only).

With an Olympic Dam ore grade of 0.05% the spec. activity of U238 in the original ore is 5.225 Bq/g, which represents the current chain activity both in the uranium ore and in the tailings.


App. 2: Dose limits for inhalation of tailings particles:

the tailings contain 6 alpha-decays, each having the same activity

therefore the total spec. activity for the tailings (alpha only) is 6 x 5.225 = 31 Bq/g

the dose limit for a member of the public is 1 mSv per year averaged over 5 years (ICRP60, p.72) or over lifetime (CoPMM, p.21) and for a worker 20 mSv per year averaged over 5 years (ICRP) and 50 mSv per year (CoPMM).

According to the regulations (CoPMM, p.23) the conversion factor (inhalation) for uranium tailings dust is 1.7 x 10-2 mSv/alpha dps and for yellow cake dust 0.034 mSv/alpha dps.

Therefore the maximum quantity of yellow cake dust to be inhaled per year by a worker is 0.056g and 0.14g respectively, and with an assumed density of 3 it would be equivalent to the volume of about half a (one) grape seed.

The maximum quantity of Olympic Dam tailings dust to be inhaled per year by a member of the public is 1.9 g

This is less than two grams, and with a spec. gravity of 1.9 it would be equivalent to the volume of about 25 grains of wheat.


App. 3: External radiation, gamma dose:

The surface dose rate is

dD/dt = 0.29 K E (mSv/h) (see O.D.EIS, p.9-27)

where K = specific activity (Bq/g)

and E = mean energy per disintegration (MeV)

The total chain energy (gamma only) is 1 MeV per chain disintegration (tailings only), considering only the major gamma disintegrations.

Assuming the source (tailings) towards the target (a human living, working and sleeping on the tailings) to be adequately represented by one eighth of a square metre of tailings material 5 mm thick, we calculate for this source (density 1.9 t/m3) a

chain activity of 100 x 12.5 x 0.5 x 1.9 x 5.22 = 6,205 Bq

Therefore, with a distance factor of 0.7, a geometric factor of 0.05 and an internal absorption factor of 0.3 the gamma dose received by the individual could be

D = 0.7 x 0.03 x 0.3 x 0.29 x 6,205 = 0.011 mSv/h

Please note that for this dose result it is assumed that the person sleeps on the ground i.e. on the tailings. This calculation is fraught with uncertainties due to the lack of information. However, the result is confirmed by the measurements. The annual dose limit would be exceeded within 91 hours, just from one source, the gamma radiation. The yearly dose for the member of the ‘critical group’ would be more than 96mSv.

The above source definition would apply not only to the tailings dam, but to any accumulation of eroded tailings material of more than 5 mm thickness.


App. 4: Radon emanation and annual dose:

In the O.D.EIS (1982, p.9-26) the radon emanation rate for the tailings during mine operation is specified as 0.6 and 3.2 Bq / (m2 x s). While this might be correct for the partly saturated tailings during mine operation, the long-term emanation rate after erosion of the cover and dehydration of the top strata of the tailings would be rather 5 Bq/ (m2 x s). This assumes a radium 226 content of 5.25 Bq/g (O.D.EIS, 982, p.9-26) and an emanation constant of 1Bq/ (m2 x s) per Bq/g of radium 226 (ARL TR 43).

With the 4 square kilometre surface of the tailings deposit we calculate a radon release of 20 million Bq/s, or a daily release of 1.7 x 1012 Bq or an annual release of 6.3 x 1014Bq.

The current climatic conditions (inversion during 85% of the nights) allow some simple calculations: The radon release during a night will be 0.85 x 1012 Bq, the inversion occurs at a height of 100 m to 400 m (average 250 m) and the horizontal spread is assumed to be over 10 square kilometres. This results in an

average radon concentration = 0.5 x 0.85 x 1012 / (250 x 10 x 106) = 170 Bq/m3.

The exposure time is 0.85 x 0.5 x 8760 = 3723 hours/year.

This results in an annual dose of 1.4 mSv.

However the remaining 5037 hours won’t mean just clean air for the future resident. We assume an additional dose due to radon of 1 mSv, resulting in an annual radon dose contribution of 2.4 mSv for somebody living in the vicinity of the tailings dam.

Somebody living right on top of the tailings would obviously receive a much higher dose, perhaps 100 mSv per year.

The radon released from a tailings deposit stems mainly from the top layer of the deposit. Most of the radon from the deeper layers can not escape from the deposit. This explains why the radon emanation rate (see above) is proportional to square metre and not to cubic metre or ton. As the tailings are being eroded and spread out over vast areas, the total radon release increases considerably. After some 20,000 years of erosion an average radon dose of 1 mSv could well apply to the residents of an area of 200,000 square kilometres.

For the ‘critical group’ the radon dose contribution is estimated to be 80 mSv per year.


App. 5: Estimates of future radiation cancer deaths from current Australian uranium tailings:

It has been estimated by the US EPA that, without control, the radon emissions from all tailings in existence at licensed US sites in 1983 would cause about 500 lung cancer deaths per century (EPA 1983a), and that, without remedial action, the radon emissions from all tailings at inactive US mine sites would cause 170 - 240 death (EPA 1983b).

For our estimates we use the figures from the inactive mine sites as they more closely reflect the condition of the Olympic Dam tailings deposit over the future millennia, when much of the tailings will be exposed and spread around (the US study does not include the long-term aspects of the tailings).

Considering the very slowly diminishing radioactivity of the tailings the 170- 240 death per century would result in about 300,000 future lung cancer deaths from radon emissions alone.

We assume the average dose distribution model for uranium tailings to be 42% radon, 30% inhaled tailings dust, 25% ingested tailings and 3% external radiation. This would result in 714,000 future lung cancer deaths from the combined pathways.

The US EPA estimates have been made for the situation in the US in 1983.

How do they compare with the future situation in Australia (99.9% of the cancer death will be caused after more than 100 years)?

a) The Australian population density today is about 10% of that of the US in 1983, when the US EPA estimates were made. However, it is assumed that the population density will eventually be in balance with the agricultural capacity of a country. We estimate that eventually the population density will be 10 .. 20 .. 50% of the US level of 1983. Correction factor(C/f): 0.1 .. 0.2 .. 0.5

b)The Olympic Dam area (200 km radius) is a remote area. C/f: 0.2

c) In 1983 there were some 26 million short tons (equivalent to 23.6 million tonnes) of tailings at inactive mine sites in the US. The Olympic Dam tailings are proposed to accumulate to some100 million cubic metres, equivalent to 190 million tonnes of tailings. C/f: 8

d) The Roxby Downs tailings come from a low-grade uranium ore (0.05% compared with the average 0.1%). C/f: 0.5

e) Those American tailings were mostly exposed to wind and weather. Within 10,000 years we estimate that all the Olympic Dam tailings will be exposed and, much worse, will be partly spread around by wind and water. Eventually all the Olympic Dam tailings will be spread around. (The American estimates assume that the tailings stay as they were in ’83.) C/f: 10 .. 30 .. 100

These assumptions would suggest 3.4 million future cancer deaths from the intended Olympic Dam uranium tailings (710,000 x 0.2 x 0.2 x 8 x 0.5 x 30 = 3,400,000) for the scenario considered most likely (underlined correction factor). With the above assumptions the death toll could range between 568,000 and 28 million!

Obviously these estimates come with big uncertainties which could increase or decrease the estimate considerably. However, we do not have the right to give the credit of the doubt to the mining companies. This is not a murder trial where the murder has already happened, where we have to give the credit of the doubt to the accused. This is rather a proposal for the future to indirectly inflict death and disease. The credit of the doubt has to be given to those potentially affected.

Please note: For the calculations of the future death toll in App.5 very small doses (minute fractions of a mSv) have been included into the statistical cause of cancers. The consideration of annual doses below 1mSv (the maximum dose for members of the public) is often rejected as insignificant. However, there is a natural background dose of about 2 mSv providing already a high base level. Therefore these minute additional levels have to be included.

The other argument made is that these smaller man-made doses are insignificant compared to the natural background. While it is true that a dose of 0.1 mSv adds only 5% to the background radiation, it is as well true that the natural background radiation costs many lives (some 1800 deaths per year in Australia). The fact that nature causes deaths does not give us the right to add to this. Over the very long time spans involved vast numbers of people (perhaps some 40% of the above estimates) will die due to those ‘insignificant increases’ of the natural background radiation. The sanctity of human life can not be abolished because nature causes deaths. The evidence suggests that nature provides for the eventual death of each of us. This does not give a mining company the right to request a share in killing rights.

REFERENCES:

Baley (1995): Jonathan Burstein: “For Life In Baley” http://www.igc.apc

Bertell, Rosalie: “No immediate danger” The women’s press, 1985

BI 1992: Bürgerinitiative gegen Uranabbau im Südschwarzwald: “Sanierung von Altlasten des Uranabbaus”, 1992

CoPMM, 1987: ‘Code of Practice on Radiation Protection in the Mining and Milling of Radioactive Ores’), 1987, Commonwealth of Australia

Diehl, Peter (1995): Uranium Mining in Europe, Wise 439/440, Amsterdam

Diehl, Peter (1996): ‘Costs of Uranium Mill Tailings Management’;

Dimtchev ,Todor (1991): ‘Radioaktive Belastung in der Umgebung der Stadt Sofia …’ in Bürgerinitiative gegen Uranabbau im Südschwarzwald: Bürgerinitiative Oberrothenbach: Tagung der Bürgerinitiativen gegen Uranabbau in Europa, Zwickau (Sachsen) 1.-3.8.1991, Tagungsband, Herrischried, 1991, p.66-74

EPA1983a: US Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Part 192 Environmental Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings at Licensed Commercial Processing Sites. In: Federal Register Vol.48, No.196, Washington, DC, October 7, 1983, p.45926 - 45947

EPA1983b: US Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Part 192 Standards for Remedial Action at Inactive Uranium Processing Sites. In: Federal Register Vol.48, No.3, Washington, DC, January 5, p.590-604

ICRP 42: 1984 “A Compilation of the major Concepts and Quantities in Use by the ICRP”

ICRP 60: “1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection”, Annex C, Table 4

O.D.EIS: ‘Olympic Dam Project, draft-EIS’ (1983), by RMS / Kinhill-Stearns

OECD: Nuclear Energy Agency: “Long-Term Radiological Aspects of Management of Wastes from Uranium Mining and Milling”, Sept.1984

McKay, T.R. et al., 1984: “Overview of recent studies on radium in mussels in the Alligator River Region”

NUREG-0706: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Uranium Milling, Project M-25, NUREG-0706, Washington, DC, Sept.’80

OSS 1990: Office of the Supervising Scientist: Annual Report 1990-91

OSS 1983: Office of the Supervising Scientist: Report on Radiation Safety Standards, Practices and Procedures for Uranium Mill Drying and Packing Operations, 11 Nov ’83

RDWL: “Roxby Downs Water Leakage” (1996), Environment, Resources and Development Committee, Parliament of South Australia

Reif, R.H., et al. in ‘Health Physics’ Vol.65 (1993) No.4, p.386-389,

s.O.D.-EIS: “Olympic Dam Project, Supplement to the draft- EIS”, 1983, by RMS / Kinhill - Stearns

Vapirev,I et al.(1991): ’Radioactive Sites in Bulgaria contaminated with Radium and Uranium’ in: European Commission (Ed): Proceedings International Symposium Remediation and Restoration of Radioactive Contaminated Sites in Europe, Antwerpen, Vol.II

WIN-112: ‘Summary Report’, National Lead Company, Winchester Laboratory, January 1960,

Zaire, Reinhard et al. at Congress of German and Austrian Oncologists in Hamburg (1995): ‘Chromosomal aberrations with Namibian Uranium Mine Workers’;

COMPARISON ROXBY DOWNS (OLYMPIC DAM) - RANGER - JABILUKA

Roxby Downs is claimed to be the mine with the worlds biggest uranium ore reserves.

The current operation has a limit of about 190 million tonnes of tailings due to the size of the tailings dam. The ore grade is claimed to be 0.05%, a low grade ore. The tailings disposal in a dam is covered in this paper. Supervision is poor, mainly by the S.A. Health Commission.

Ranger is one of the worlds biggest uranium mines. The mine will eventually produce some 42 million tonnes of tailings. Due to the high ore grade (0.3%) the radiation hazard from the tailings could be nearly the same as from Roxby Downs current operation. This depends largely on the tailings storage, which seems to be unclear again:

The tailings dam, currently filled to its capacity with some 16 million tonnes of tailings, was originally designed, approved and built as a temporary storage facility. After the completion of mining, these tailings together with the balance of the total tailings quantity were to be backfilled into the two mine pits. These mine pits are unsuitable for tailings disposal (many aquifers, proximity to Magela creek, proximity to floodplain, etc.).

In a recent EIS the operator proposed to have the tailings dam declared permanent and to use the surplus space in the mine pits for Jabiluka tailings. This would even further aggravate the situation because of the use of a tailings dam and because of the strongly acid-forming nature of the Jabiluka tailings. If this proposal were to go ahead, the tailings problem could be considered as severe as at Olympic Dam.

Jabiluka is a proposed new uranium mine adjoining the Ranger mine. The very high ore grade of 0.46% and the strongly acid forming nature of the resulting tailings (some 20 million tonnes at a first stage) would make this proposal very problematic. To allow a convenient tailings storage, the redesignation of the temporary Ranger tailings dam as ‘permanent’ has been proposed (see above).

Using our estimates of the future death toll (appendix 5) and our comparison of different storage options (section 2.6) and correcting for the respective ore grades, we may have to expect a total death toll

for Ranger, if continued as approved, of 1.2 million humans (3.4 x 6 x 0.28 x 42 / 190),

for Ranger, if the current tailings dam were to be retained, of 2.5 million humans

for Jabiluka, if tailings are to be deposited in Ranger pit (see Jabiluka draft-EIS, section 4.13.2), of 1.1 million humans (3.4 x 9 x 0.35 x 19.5 / 190)

for Jabiluka, if fine tailings sections are to be stored in own tailings dam according to section 5.5.6 of the Jabiluka draft-EIS, of 1.7 million humans.

The total death toll for the two linked mines Ranger and Jabiluka, if approved, could be between 2.3 and 4.2 million humans, depending on the tailings storage option chosen.

Uranium mining has to be stopped

Last updated May 16, 1999.
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