(NB: Readers wanting information on the Ranger uranium mine's impact on Aboriginal people, the workforce and the environment, and its central role in the lengthy Australian debate on uranium mining, should refer to the File entry on Ranger. The ERA entry concentrates on the political context in which the mine was allowed to proceed, and its output, ownership and foreign sales).

Few people would doubt that, as Barry Lloyd put it in 1978, "It was Ranger [primarily] which elevated Australia to its current position as a future major uranium supplier" (1).

Ranger's importance lies not only in its being the first mine given the go-ahead after the longest public debate on uranium mining ever held, nor simply in its negative impact on the struggle for Aboriginal land rights. This project was also of overriding importance for the Australian government in signalling to the world at large its intention to become a major participant in the development of world nuclear power and in (supposedly) the "control" of weapons proliferation. Positions adopted vis-a-vis Ranger (to a lesser extent Roxby Downs, Nabarlek, Jabiluka, Koongarra, Honeymoon, Beverley, Lake Way, Yeelirrie - the other potential uranium mines in Australia in the late 1970s) became a litmus test on a whole range of social, economic and environmental issues. Support for the Ranger project within the Australian Labor Party (ALP) precipitated a split from which (some would claim) the ALP will never completely recover: certainly it polarised "right"- and "left"-wing views on matters such as foreign investment (and control over Australia's domestic resources), the power of the mining industry (particularly in the Northern Territory) and the betrayal of the intent behind the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights Act.

The Ranger Inquiry (Fox Committee) delivered its first Report on October 28, 1976 (the Ranger Report, or the Fox Report as it was known more colloquially). Nine months later, the Liberal (conservative) Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser announced in the Federal Parliament that uranium mining would be given permission to proceed "under strictly controlled conditions" (2). According to Fraser, the decision was motivated by a "high sense of moral responsibility to all Australians", and flowed from "four fundamental considerations": the need to reduce nuclear proliferation; to supply "essential" sources of energy to an "energy-deficient world"; to protect the environment; and to ensure that "proper provision" was made for the welfare of Aboriginal people in the Alligator Rivers Region (2).

Some ten years previously, as expectations for the global growth of nuclear power were riding high, the federal Australian government initiated what, in effect, has become the second wave of uranium development in the country's history. (For details of the first wave, see MKU.) A commercial export policy was formulated in 1967 by the Minister for National Development (3), and within less than two years, two Australian companies, EZ and Peko-Wallsend, discovered important uranium anomalies south of the Mudginberri Station, in the Alligator Rivers region of the Northern Territory (NT) (4). The project of nearly 80 square kilometres was granted special authorisation under section 41 of the Australian Atomic Energy Act (4).

With the election of a Labor government in December 1972, uranium development and its export was placed under intense scrutiny, and although pre-1972 contracts were to be honoured, an effective hold was put on new contracts and mining (3). However, in late 1974, a new policy was announced by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, emphasising government involvement in future mines, with considerable control over investment and export options. The key conditions were: greater government ownership and financing to be exercised through the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC); sole authority to explore beyond current licences granted to the AAEC; all future sales to be made by the AAEC (3).

A year later, the Whitlam government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the two Ranger partners, in an agreement described by Stephen Zorn (the international lawyer who advised the Northern Land Council on the Ranger deal) as "on a par with schemes noted only in Liberia": the Federal government would contribute 72.5% of capital funding, and the companies only 13.75% each, whereas sales would be split on a 50/50 basis (5). The AAEC would itself take a half share in Ranger (3), and receive 50% of the output (6). By then (in early 1976) the Liberal-Country Party government had already announced that the AAEC would withdraw from uranium exploration and return that activity to private enterprise. Two months later, "continuing and extending the previous government's pro-Australian policies" (7), the federal administration stated that new uranium producers must be 75% Australian-owned. However, exceptions were later to be made, if shares offered at a "reasonable" price did not attract sufficient Australian investors (7).

The 1975 Memorandum of Understanding was an obvious bugbear to the Liberal opposition, a point made by Fraser when he gave the greenlight to Ranger in mid-1977. He emphasised that this special arrangement should not be thought to "... give Ranger an advantage over other mining companies", nor "accord specific marketing advantage" to the project (2). However, the Federal government would not "disturb" arrangements made by its Labor forerunner.

In 1978, the government announced that A$48M would be spent on development costs of the mine, A$20M from the Budget, and A$24M from the AAEC, through borrowings. (A$ 1.19M would also be spent on field research and "co-ordination activities of supervising scientists for environmental protection measures" (8).

In the middle of the following year, the government stated that its share of Ranger would be put on the market (3): a move clearly long overdue so far as it was concerned.

Very soon afterwards, some forty or fifty companies had expressed an interest in buying (9, 10). Fourteen of these tenders were under active consideration by November (11) after the deadline for bids had been extended (10, 12).

Understandably, Peko and EZ felt that they should not only be given first option (which they were) but allowed to acquire the whole project for the price of the government's participation so far (by then around A$60M) (9); the actual market value of the mine, given that it had not even started production, being academic (13). Failing this, Peko and its junior partner EZ (there was never any doubt that, despite their equal interests in Ranger, Peko has always led on Ranger, while EZ has followed) would float a public company, thus keeping majority ownership in Australian hands. A third option was for Peko to put together a consortium of "heavyweight" Australians, notably CSR (which had for some time been keen on gaining a stake in Ranger), BHP, and others (13).

On the other hand, the Australian government and public were being left in no doubt as to where Japanese utilities stood on the issue: they wanted to buy in as quickly, and as much as possible, with the Kansai Electric Power Company leading the way (13, 14). The Northern Territory government also confirmed an interest in buying out the government's half-share (11). Among non-Pacific contenders, Esso was believed to have bid A$165M and Denison more than A$170M for the stake (15).

In the event, Peko won the bidding, at A$ 125M, with a promise of re-imbursement to the government for past and future spending on Ranger (16). Peko would combine its 25% interest with that of the AAEC in a new Australian public company, to be called Energy Resources of Australia (ERA) Ltd ERA would take over the government's commitment to fund its 72.5% of the project. Shares in ERA would be offered to public investors and major financial institutions, comprising the largest public float ever undertaken in the country (15). Overseas utilities would also be allowed to take up the remaining 25% of the equity, provided they concluded sufficient contracts to make the project immediately viable (16).

The federal government seemed pleased with the arrangement - and why not? Announcing the flotation of ERA, deputy Prime Minister Doug Anthony lauded the mix of Australian and overseas interests, promised that the assignment process would not jeopardise obligations towards Aboriginal people, nor the need for proper environmental measures, and that it would conform to the guidelines laid down the previous year for the export of uranium. Almost as an afterthought, Anthony mentioned that "the action will relieve the Government of A$200M in capital payments in relation to the project over the next two years" (16).

And what was to be EZ's role in ERA? The other Australian company had made it quite clear that it did not believe the AAEC holding should be sold at a profit, but returned to the original partners. Finally it capitulated and agreed to join with Peko in forming ERA, as well as opening the door to foreign participation (17).

ERA was incorporated on February 8, 1980, in Canberra. The interest in Ranger was transferred to the new company later that year, and a public float of A$500M was authorised in October, of which nearly A$230M (A$229M was to be repaid in respect of the federal government's and the AAEC's expenses (18). EZ and Peko would hold a 30% share in ERA, with 15% of the equity offered to the public; Japanese and West German utilities would take up the other 25% (19).

ERA was said to be seeking loan finance amounting to some US$390M, and to have obtained US$250M of this from a bank consortium headed by Continental Illinois of Chicago and J Henry Schroder Wagg of London (20). The Japanese partners were also later reported to have arranged for direct financing of US$18.8M, with a bank loan from the country's Export-Import Bank of another US$140M (21).

Some of the anti-nuclear movement predicted that ERA would be a failure, if not a disaster. FoE (Friends of the Earth) in late 1979 said it would "be, at best, a non-event, and may be one of the biggest commercial flops in history" (22). By the end of 1980 however, the book value of the company had shot up to A$1.6billion, making it one of the top Australian commercial enterprises (3). A large chunk of initial production was under contract, and (as we shall see a little later) it was not long before the company was seeking to increase, and even double, production.

Although, as Thomas Neff has pointed out, unit costs of Ranger production are not known with accuracy, the size of the deposit, the ease of open-pit mining, and the low royalties paid to Aborigines, suggest they are below average (3): one source in the early 1980s put the costs of doubling the mine's output at A$60M, "far below (perhaps one-tenth) the cost of new production capacity at new deposits in Australia (and perhaps anywhere)" (23). On the other hand, the remoteness of the mine, high labour costs, and higher future royalties to the NT government, have probably ensured that Ranger will prove to be nothing like an economic miracle.

A crucial factor is, of course, the contract prices. While it has been generally assumed that most contracts were concluded (at least in the first couple of years) at around US$31 per pound base, some reports suggest higher charges (24), and possibly more than US$38 per pound to Japanese utilities (25).

The initial ownership structure of ERA was as follows (26): Peko-Wallsend 30.5%; EZ Industries 30.5%; Japan Australia Uranium Resources Development Co Ltd (AURD) 10%; West German group of utilities 14%; Oskarshamnsverkets Kraftgrupp Aktiebolog (OKG) [Sweden] 1%; Australian public 14%.

JAURD itself comprised (27): Kansai Electric Power 0.5%; Kyushu Electric Power Co 2.5%; Shikoku Electric Power Co 1.5%; C Itoh and Co 1%.

The West German consortium was made up of: RWE 6.25%; UG Australia (a wholly-owned subsidiary of UG or Urangesellschaft) 4%; Inter-Uranium Australia (wholly owned by Saarberg-Interplan) 3.75%.

The public shares were initially held by 37,117 investors. Many of these, however, were also shareholders in Peko and EZ (21). Within the next four years, while the public contribution had been reduced, both Peko and EZ had slightly increased their share of ERA (up to 30.85% each in 1984) (28), although one report put Peko's at 30.96% (29). Peko's holding was said to be 33.25% by 1987: at this point, Cogema purchased a 1.25% share (see later) (30). To date, ERA is the only major uranium company in Australia to have kept strictly to the guidelines on foreign investment laid down in 1976.

That grand aficionado of Aussie yellowcake, Doug Anthony, went overboard predicting that Ranger production could reach 7,000 tonnes by 1985 (sic). Ranger's first year in operation was greeted with adulation by the industry (31). Output from June 1981 to June 1982 was a more modest 2,677 tonnes of U3O8 which, though lower than capacity, included production above target for the last three months of the period. The results gave an enormous boost to EZ and Peko, both of whom had problems with their other operations. "ERA's performance must rank as one of the best corporate efforts this year," commented the Financial Times (32). "Just when things seemed at their stickiest for the Lone Ranger, his faithful Indian companion Tonto [the ALP] turned up in time to tip the balance" (32).

Sales that year were put at A$146M, with a return of A$110.65M before interest, depreciation and tax. A dividend of 4 cents per share was announced. Interest on the federal government loan amounted to a hefty A$48.05M but tax was more or less completely offset by sales made from ERA to the government stockpile in return for its original loans. The price for the sales was around US$40/lb, the price fixed in the mid-seventies when uranium was riding high, and not the depressed price of US$25 to which it had sunk by the early 1980s (33).

The following year's profits (1982-83) reached nearly A$60M and ERA declared a dividend of 10 cents for the year. However the results were not as spectacular as might appear at first sight, since by then ERA had used up all its exploration expenditure - offset against tax- and had to foot a hefty A$55.97M tax charge (34). Production for the year was 3000 tonnes (35, 36). That year, the mine management predicted output could be doubled, at a "comparatively small cost", if only the ALP government, which had recently come to power, would allow the company to negotiate new contracts (34). At its 1983 conference, the ALP rejected a call to ban uranium mining, and agreed to allow Ranger (and Narbarlek) to continue producing and exporting (35). Permission was given by Prime Minister Hawke for two new contracts with US utilities to be signed (37).

This undoubtedly gave a boost to Ranger's fortunes - it reported bigger profits on somewhat smaller sales in the first six months of the following financial year (to December 1983) (37). Within the next six months the mine had coughed up more than 3,000 tonnes (3098) despite an eight-week industrial dispute starting in June 1984 (38).

Production slipped somewhat the following year (39) to just over 3000 tonnes (40), and so marginally did profits: almost the same amount was repaid in interest as in the previous year (A$47.5M) (40). Each year, 2% of ERA's revenues also go towards the Federal government's Ranger Rehabilitation Fund - set against the day when the mine closes (41). Reserves in 1985 were put at 11,000,000 tonnes of proven ore, and 224,000 tonnes of probable ore in the No. 1 orebody, grading 0.32%, with probable ore of 35.2 million tonnes in the No. 3 orebody, possible ore of 7.4 million tonnes, grading 0.21% (42, 43).

In its 1985 statement, ERA expounded on its modus operandi. An average of 4.5 million tons of material is mined each year, of which just over one million tons is ore ... about a fifth of the latter is either processed of stockpiled, while nearly two million tonnes comprises low mineralised ore or rockfill suitable for tailings dam construction; waste material comes to nearly two million tonnes. Ore reclaimed from the stockpiles in 1984-85 amounted to just over half a million tonnes, and a total of 1.02 million tonnes was milled.

That year, the pit in the No. 1 orebody was deepened to around 50 metres, and metallurgical recovery rates improved to 92.45%, as expansion got underway (44, 70).

By mid-1986 ERA was back on form, with the signing of new contracts (see below). "Water management problems" (a euphemism for radioactive leaks) - followed by a major leak of sulphur dioxide affecting more than 60 workers in March 1986 (45) - were "reduced" (46), and output was increased - to 3496.6 tonnes, most of which was exported to West German, Japanese, Swedish, US, Belgian and Finnish customers, at a value of A$296M (42). Ranger was claimed to be "one of the lowest cost producers in the world" (42), and Australia's reasonably recoverable resources (at less than US$80/kg) were put at 462,000 tonnes, some 29% of the western world's resources (42).

Ranger's capacity, said ERA, would be lifted to 3800 tonnes per year, and could reach 4500 tonnes by 1989 (42, 47).

Mining of the No. 1 orebody had plumbed depths of 75 metres by the end of 1987, and an exploration programme was underway in the northern part of the Ranger site (30). Production was 324 tonnes U3O8 (30).

ERA's contracts can be arranged into two periods: those signed before December 1972 and early 1973, when a hold was put on all new uranium deals, and those signed after 1977 when Ranger was given the green light. Most of these were confirmed in late 1979, when the embargo on contracts was finally lifted, though there were some alterations in delivery period, amounts contracted, and pricing (due to escalation clauses) (20).

Before 1972, ERA partners Peko-Wallsend and EZ Co of Australia apparently signed only two deals: for the supply of 1300 tons to Chubu Electric Power Co from 1977 to 1982, and 2000 tons to Kyushu Electric Power Co Inc over the period 1977-86 (48).

In 1972, despite the embargo, the federal government promised that existing contracts would be honoured, using output from MKU, the AAEC stockpile, and Ranger "when opened" (3). In order to free the logjam on pre-1972 contracts, the embargo was partly lifted in 1976, to cover the pre-1972 deals (49). Just how much of the two Japanese contracts was delivered between 1976 and 1980 is not known: the majority appears not to have been. However, 181 tonnes was apparently delivered to Chubu in early 1977 (50).

In August 1977, Ranger was at last given permission to proceed. Sales would be arranged by the AAEC, together with the mine's partners, Peko and EZ (51), although the government had not then formulated its final export policy. Within a year, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Resources, Doug Anthony, had issued a "long awaited statement" in this regard (1). Henceforth Australian supplies were to be governed by "comprehensive" bilateral safeguards and a "complete oversight" of uranium exports, following the completion of "environmental procedures and compliance with the government's foreign investment policy". A Uranium Export Authority would also be established (1).

However, the Authority would only function when mines other than Ranger were opened (1), and, indeed, by mid-1978, not only had the government allowed companies to resume contract negotiations before the Authority was in place (49), but also before safeguards treaties had been signed (6).

The year 1977 was one of frenetic activity, as the government paved the way for Ranger to become financially viable. It was a case of the horse following the cart; the drumming up of customers so that by the year end Ranger could be justified on the grounds that new contracts had to be honoured (52).

Early that year, Prime Minister Fraser went to Washington. Allegedly President Carter asked his Australian counterpart to release Ranger's uranium, in order to discourage Japanese and European nuclear barons from building fast breeder reactors (53). This was the era of Carter's brave, but ultimately futile, attempt to control proliferation through the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) - into which Australia bought a ticket via Ranger uranium. Ironically, Fox, the author of the very report which had advanced arguments for the opening-up of Ranger and other Northern Territory deposits, was at the time himself reported criticising the lack of safeguards in both Canada and the USA (54).

In any event, Fraser had as much, if not more, reason to court Carter as the other way around. In a letter despatched to the American peanut king in February 1977, Fraser explained Australia's potential as a uranium supplier (although by then it was already widely vaunted as the yellowcake eldorado of the 1980s): "There is probably no other area of the world that is comparable to Australia's Northern Territory in its potential for significant resource expansion" said the influential Electric Power Research Institute at around the same time (7). The Australian Prime Minister also alluded to Australia's ability as a uranium supplier, to "exert influence on international development" - a sentiment close to Carter's heart (5). According to one observer, tacit agreement on supplies from Ranger to the USA had already been reached between the two governments before the release of the second Ranger (Fox) Committee Report in May 1977 (5).

The following month, deputy Prime Minister Anthony was publicly complaining that Ranger could not deliver its Chubu and Kyushu contracts because of delay in commissioning the mine; immediately afterwards the Japanese Ambassador held a press conference on the same issue (5). And if this was not enough, just after the Ranger final report had hit the streets in May the government was claiming that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty could be "breached" if Australia did not exercise its option to supply the deadly mineral (55); a sentiment reiterated in the major statement on uranium delivered on August 25, 1977 (see above). Australia had an "obligation" to provide the resources that would enable the "rest of the world" to overcome the "energy crises", Fraser declared. To this end, Australia would not only "supply energy that will provide jobs...heat homes...protect standards of living and enable them to be improved..." but also "slow the movement towards the use of plutonium as a nuclear fuel and lessen the attendant risk of nuclear weapons proliferation" (2).

By the middle of 1978, Bernard Fisk, Peko-Wallsend's general manager for uranium development, was telling the International Uranium Symposium (organised by the Uranium Institute) that the first tranche of Ranger production (3000 tonnes per year) would be "spoken for quite quickly, thereby facilitating the financing arrangements for the project and allowing production to commence by the end of 1981" (56). At a conference in Honolulu, Mr Newman, the Minister for National Development, predicted that the "bulk of the western world's uranium orders would soon be fulfilled by Australia" (57).

After a seven-year hiatus, the federal government gave the go-ahead for Ranger sales in late 1979. The initial contract for 2500 tons valued at between AS 160M and AS 180M (at AS36 to A$38 per pound), was the first signed since the early 1973 ban, and clearly announced as a "forerunner" for further contracts. Kepco was the recipient, and deliveries were intended to cover a ten-year period from 1983 (58). The contract was a coup for Peko-Wallsend, since Kepco was itself part of the CSR/Minatome/Kepco consortium bidding for the Government's share in Ranger (59). Labor's Tom Uren, a left-winger in the ALP strongly opposed to uranium mining, condemned the contract, predicting that "The Australian people will surely see the foolishness of selling uranium to such an unstable government as South Korea," and that the ALP, when in power, would cancel the sales (60).

Within six months, a batch of contracts had been announced to ERA equity partners, involving around 34,000 tons, worth more than A$2000M. Over 20,000 tons would be delivered to West German customers, RWE, UG, Saarberg-Interplan Uran (61). The Japanese customers were announced as C Itoh, Kansai Electric Power Co, Kyushu Electric Power Co, and Shikoku Electric Power Co, grouped together as the Japan Australia Uranium Resources Development Company (JAURD) (20). However, the contracted output (of around 11,000 tonnes) was "much larger than the equity [in ERA] perhaps would indicate", according to Thomas Neff. This was partly because the JAURD partners also acted as agents for other customers, and according to Neff it was "not entirely certain that all uranium involved will ultimately go to Japan or West Germany" (3).

Doug Anthony, the Federal Trade and Resources Minister, claimed that these contracts, along with those arranged with other Japanese, US, and South Korean buyers, would cover about 84% of Ranger's anticipated output: the contracts provided for price escalation adjustments during the period of delivery up to 1977 (20, 62).

The state of contracts, soon after ERA was formed, looked officially like this: 2500 tons to Kepcoi 2250 tons to Indiana and Michigan Electric Co of the USA during 1982-1990; 5820 tons to UG during 1982-1996 at around 360 tons per year (63); 9094 tons over a similar period to RWE (Rheinisch Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk AG of West Germany); 5456 tons also during 1982-1996, to Saarberg-Interplan Uran GmbH, also of West Germany; 13,413 tons to JAURD, again during 1982-1996.

A little later, a contract was announced between ERA and OKG for 3,150 tons from 1982 to 1994 (48), or until 1996 (3). Synatom was also to receive 1575 tons between 1982 and 1994 - and 1011 tons was apparently earmarked to be returned to the AAEC stockpile from 1982 to 1984 (64).

The assumed price for the majority of these contracts was A$31 per pound (48).

A minimum of 1100 tons of uranium was contracted to Wisconsin Electric Power Company in late 1983, to start around 1985 and run "for several years". This was the first deal following an ALP cabinet meeting at which not only the Roxby Downs uranium project was approved, but ERA was given permission to pursue two new contracts (65).

The second of these new contracts is with Virginia Power Company, for 1400 tons. Further contracts would, have to wait on the ALP conference in 1984, following which, in August 1984, ERA signed another contract with Belgium's Synatom for the supply of 500 tons of uranium (66).

The Indiana and Michigan Electric Company (wholly owned by American Electric Power Co) contract (2250 tons from 1982 until 1990) was cancelled in September that year, after the shipment of only 225 tons (66) and a suspension of the shipments at the request of the customer, in early 1983 (67).

However, the American Electric Power Service Corp signed a contract with ERA in 1985, for 2500 tons at an estimated US$500M in 1984 terms, provided all the options are exercised (68, 69).

At the same time, 675-750 tons was contracted to Pennsylvania Power and Light valued at US$50M (68).

Although these contracts appeared to be a financial coup for ERA, the Australian Financial Review estimated that their value (based on the 1985 spot price for uranium) could be as little as US$104M: even taking into account the federal government's probable base price of A$31 per pound, they wouldn't be worth more than A$200M. The discrepancy between the two sets of figures is due to the optional provisions contained in the contracts for future contracting (66). No firm date was then fixed for implementing the contracts, although a probable start of 1987 was mentioned (66).

ERA earned A$56.5M in the financial year 1984-85 (70), and Alex Morokoff, ERA's chairman, told the company's annual general meeting that, as well as possibly doubling the mine's output over the next five years (up to 6000 tonnes per year), five new contracts had been signed up to June 1985, and a further contract with a US utility had been concluded since (71). Kepco also added a new contract to its original one, for deliveries starting in the early 1990s (69).

Another set of contracts was given the go-ahead by the federal government in 1986 (41), and at the turn of 1986-87 ERA announced four further long-term contracts with US utilities, in addition to the five already concluded (72). The following year yet another two US contracts were signed - making a total of eleven (30).

The most controversial of ERA's contracts is that with France, a deal that flatly contravenes the strict code on uranium export laid down in 1977. The 1982 ALP conference had proscribed all uranium trade with France until the Euro-nuclear state ceased atomic testing in the Pacific (73). The platform was restated two years later (when the conference also voted not to provide any subsidies, tax incentives, or compensation of any kind to the uranium industry) (74), and again in 1986. By then it was quite clear that Australian uranium could enter the French Super-Phenix (Fast Breeder Reactor) either as enriched tails, or as processed plutonium or uranium from uranium of Australian origin: a possibility confirmed in 1988, when Australian uranium had its title "swapped" and was about to go to the USA and from there probably to the Super-Phenix programme, until the illicit deal was discovered and stopped (see Nukem for further details).

In 1986, the ALP government announced that sales to France would be resumed (75). This followed what federal Trade Minister, John Dawkins, the previous year had called a "commercial ploy" on the part of UG, to get out of its long-term contracts with ERA, by arranging a deal which the government was bound to stop. UG's deal was with the French brokerage company Enership; Dawkins maintained the uranium would not remain in France (because the French state utility Electricite de France, was "known to possess large stocks" of uranium) (63). Hence, in order not to give UG an excuse to withdraw from ERA without penalty, Dawkins gave the green light to the contract. UG strenuously denied the allegation, pointing out that it would not have paid ERA prices of more than A$40 per pound - more than double the spot price in 1985 - in order to forfeit the benefit of long-term supply commitments from ERA. It maintained that the Enership deal was covered by the Australia Euratom Safeguards Agreement (63).

Finally, in early 1988, the first direct sales to France were given the go-ahead, despite considerable opposition from within the Labor party. The federal government maintained it would otherwise have to pay a A$60M compensation charge (76). The amount of the sale was not announced (as of mid-1988) but delivery was not expected to begin immediately (77). At the same time, Cogema announced that it had acquired a 1.25% stake in ERA (77).

Britain's role (or, rather, absence of it) in ERA has been distinctly shadowy, if not conspiratorial. Once the announcement of the formation of ERA was made, it was widely believed the British Civil Uranium Procurement Organisation (formerly Directorate), or BCUPO, comprising BNFL, the CEGB and the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) - would take part of the foreign equity, along with the Japanese and West German companies (15). The CEGB was alone expected to take about 25% of the equity.

In 1979, an Australian Parliamentary report revealed that Britain had been top of the list of potential customers for Ranger (78). In February that year, the government had asked the British Minister of State for Energy if Britain was interested in purchasing 750 tonnes of uranium per year from Ranger; five months later, Australian officials went to London and "identified an interest on the part of the UK CEGB" for 500 tonnes a year (78). British officials during the same trip had also "confirmed" a "general" interest in buying as much as 1,300 tonnes from Australian sources. In fact, a draft supply agreement had been signed two years earlier, quoting this figure, although a somewhat lower amount was also mentioned (1000 tonnes) (79).

These announcements seem to have been motivated by self-serving interests on both sides. The federal government clearly wanted to land a major contract with its longest-standing trading partner as a "cachet" for further deals, (if it had been confirmed, the British uranium contract would have been the largest ever signed in Australia), while the British government needed an assured long-term supply to replace its Rossing (and probably Canadian) sources, if and when these dried up. In the light of statements made by Australian "official sources" in early 1980, it also seems that Britain wanted to bend the Australian export rules, established in 1978, and have a greater control over re-export of Ranger uranium than the Australian government could contemplate. In late 1979, a telex from the BCUPO's managing director, J Waddams, had gone out over the signature of Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington (until recently a director of RTZ) advocating to the potential West German and Japanese partners in ERA that they should form, with Britain, a new club, to market their own share of Ranger production. At that point, BCUPO was actively considering taking a 5% share in ERA (80). It is not known what the reaction of the foreign partners was to the British proposal, but Peko Wallsend apparently made clear to its putative Japanese partners that going along with the British would jeopardise their own participation in ERA. In any event, the British initiative foundered, the Japanese joined ERA, accepting Australia's export guidelines (although it was not until July 1982, some two years after the first Japanese contracts with ERA, that the Japanese Diet ratified a bilateral safeguards treaty with Australia, as 250 tonnes of uranium were awaiting shipment) (81); BCUPO did not join ERA, nor did any of its three partners sign a supply contract from Ranger.

While it is tempting to see in the British machinations a strategy to secure uranium which might be diverted to a British nuclear weapons (i.e. Trident) programme, this is less likely than that BCUPO was trying to arrange its own mini-cartel and dictate prices to ERA.

In late 1987, North Broken Hill announced a merger with Peko-Wallsend (84) thus bringing EZ (effectively controlled by NBH) into the Peko fold, and uniting the two companies' interests in ERA.

North Broken Hill Peko Ltd now holds 86.83% of the 'A' class shares, with Rheinbraun Australia Pty Ltd holding 41.6%, UG Australia Developments Pty Ltd 26.7%, and Interuranium Australia Pty Ltd 16.7% of the 'B' class shares. Japan Australia Uranium Resources Development Co Ltd holds all of the 'C' class shares (85).

In terms of equity distribution, North Broken Hill holds 65% of ERA, with Japan Australian Uranium Development Co Ltd holding 10%, RWE 6.25%, UG 4% and Interuran 3.5% (but with Interuran now largely held by Cogema, after Saarberg relinquished 1.25% of its 3.5% holding to Cogema, and then was bought out 75% by Cogema itself) (86). Production from Ranger was 3497 tonnes in 1986, 3,103 tonnes in 1987, and 3227 tonnes in 1988 (87). 1989 saw 3,595 tonnes produced (88) which tipped ERA's profits down to A$37.8 million, from its previous record of A$G3 million (89). That year, the No. 1 ore body had reached a depth of 90m below ground level and was expanding northwards. By the end of 1990, ERA admitted that reserves were being fast depleted at Ranger (with 27,464 tonnes of uranium concentrate produced to that time) and that its exploration efforts around the deposit had not yielded any major new reserves: while the No. 1 orebody was expected to be mined-out during 1991 or 1992 (91). The company was now said to be looking for new low cost deposits (92) though its major efforts have recently been put into a purchase deal with Pancontinental over its Jabiluka stake (by early 1991, NBH held 13% of Pancontinental) (91).

As of 1990, ERA had eighteen supply contracts with US, Belgian, West German, French, South Korean, Japanese and Swedish utilities (85).

Although the company maintains that the majority of its contracts are long-term, concluded at prices which fall within the Australian Federal government's "floor price" mechanism (designed to protect the industry and the economy) (91), ERA has been accused of negotiating contracts, especially with US customers, at the extremely low spot prices prevailing over the last few years, simply because the utilities refused to do otherwise. (And why should they fork out A$31 per pound when they could pick it up elsewhere for as little as A$10?). While, technically, ERA may not have been selling its own uranium at these bargain-basement prices, it is quite likely that it was entering the market, to buy at the spot price and then resell at a higher rate to some of its customers (e.g. Kepco) at the long-term price. In the light of this, various groups proposed in 1989 that uranium production should be shut down altogether in Australia, while leaving companies like ERA free to act as uranium brokers in the world at large. Commented researcher John Hallam of Friends of the Earth:

"The final irony of the matter is that a shutdown of Australian uranium production now could be achieved without adversely affecting ERA's profits, providing it's allowed to buy cheaply on spot and use the material to fill its high-price contracts - ie. by leaving it in the ground." (86)

Apart from the opposition to the Ranger mine mounted by Aboriginal organisations, the Movement Against Uranium Mining, FoE, anti-nuclear groups and "dissident" Australian Labor Party members, it is worth noting that in 1981, the Uniting Church - long associated with establishing missions on Aboriginal land decided to sell its shares in ERA, after making a A$ 11,500 profit: "We are involved in a genuine attempt to make amends" said the Church's Moderator (82).

In 1986, the German "Grunen" (Greens) demanded that the provincial government in Saarbrucken should ensure that Saarbergwerke AG, parent company of Saarberg-Interplan, divest itself of Saarberg's 3.75% holding in ERA (83) because of the damaging social and environmental consequences of the mining, particularly on the Aboriginal community.

"Ranger Uranium Mine" MM 11/85 pp 392-403.

Contact: MAUM, 247 Flinders Lane, Melbourne, Victoria 3000, Australia.

FoE, 222 Brunswick Street, Fitzroy, Victoria 3065, Australia.

WISE, PO Box 87, Glen Aplin, Queensland 4381, Australia.

SOURCE: "The Gulliver File - Mines, people and land: a global battleground" by Roger Moody.

Published in 1992 by Minewatch, 218 Liverpool Road, London Nl ILE, UK, and WISE-Glen Aplin, Po Box 87, Glen Aplin Q 4381, Australia.

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