In 1959 Queensland Mines Ltd (Queensland Mines) was formed as a uranium exploration company, being a wholly owned subsidiary of Pioneer International Ltd in 1981. In May 1970 it discovered Nabarlek, a small high-grade deposit just inside Arnhem Land, 15 kilometres east of Oenpelli and in the East Alligator River region of the Northern Territory.

Nabarlek was considered by the Ranger inquiry, and after its draft EIS was released in 1978, the Fraser Government approved the project almost immediately. Queensland Mines then opened Nabarlek in 1979.

Queensland Mines Ltd (Queensland Mines) was formed in 1959 with Factors Ltd as a 51% shareholder, and Stanley Korman as chairman. With the failure of Factors, Kathleen Investments (KI) acquired the interest in Queensland Mines in 1965 (Kathleen Investments was the Australian company setup in the mid-1950's to maintain a 35% interest in the Mary Kathleen uranium mine, preventing Rio Tinto of the United Kingdom seizing full ownership). Queensland Mines became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kathleen Investments, and was floated as a public company in 1967, and Kathleen Investments apparently retained their previous 51% interest.

Both Kathleen Investments and Queensland Mines had enjoyed healthy respect during Australia's volatile mining boom of the late 1960's, mainly because of the promulgated exploration prospects at Westmoreland in north-west Queensland. Up until the discovery of the large and rich uranium deposits in the East Alligator Valley in Northern Territory (Ranger, Jabiluka and Koongarra), Westmoreland was considered one of the premier uranium prospects in Australia. Queensland Mines also owned the uranium exploration prospect at Nabarlek (sometimes called Oenpelli after the nearby mission), which finally began attracting attention in April 1970.

Queensland Mines began a detailed airborne spectrometer and magnetometer survey of the Nabarlek lease in April 1970. On May 31, the survey revealed a number of anomalous areas "and a very prominent cluster of strong anomalies" at the area later called Nabarlek. On June 22, Roy Hudson (chair and managing director of Queensland Mines, a veteran of the rough-and-tumble mining scene) told the board that a quick perusal of the grade had exceeded the measuring capacity of the instruments. This was welcome news because the companies' shares had been subsiding as the mining boom ran out of steam. In the six months to mid-1970 the market had wiped out half of their capitalisation.

 
Roy Hudson, and his Point Piper mansion in Sydney.

On July 3, Queensland Mines made it's first public announcement about Nabarlek, saying that assays of surface samples showed a very high uranium content and that it could be in shareholders' interests to wait for further information from the company. Queensland Mines had already begun an intensive campaign of radiometric gridding, trenching and sampling.

The results were spectacular. The 12 foot deep costeans (trenches) were being dug by backhoe and as it sunk through the soil it began to reveal the rich yellow and orange ochres of pitchblende, sometimes only four feet from the surface. Excitement mounted until the fifth costean, designated N-5, cut through a 2½ foot reef of pitchblende assaying an incredible 72% U₃O₈ (uranium oxide). Canadian and US mines at the time were working uranium ore grades as low as two pounds to the ton or 0.1%. This reef had assayed the equivalent of 1,440 lb to the ton. This was phenomenally rich. The ore within a distance of 30 ft was highly mineralised, ranging from 10 to 500 lb per ton. An internal managing director's report by Hudson on July 23 said the strike of the lode would appear to be 900 ft with a possible extension under a laterite covering to the south.

On the same day, diamond drilling had begun at Nabarlek. If they could prove a sufficient quantity of this amazingly rich ore, they would have a discovery of world significance. At this stage the boards of Queensland Mines and Kathleen Investments were identical. Hudson was chair and managing director of both. Other directors included Ric Dowling (who, along with Hudson setup Kathleen Investments to buy the 35% stake in Mary Kathleen), John Roberts, Harry Ferguson and Adelaide stockbroker C P Tilley. Roberts was a director of Castlereagh, the Longreach Group and other companies closely associated with Patricks. Tilley was one of the original participants in Kathleen Investments, being the former chair of Australian Oil Exploration (AOE - the company who originally bought the Mary Kathleen deposit, before Rio Tinto farmed in to buy it and develop the mine). Ferguson was a director of Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd and various companies including Longreach Oil, Cultus Pacific and Abrolhos Oil. Ferguson was alleged by Hudson to be one of the 'Patrick bloc' on the board. Ferguson was certainly a director of companies with close links to Patricks, but if Hudson's allegation were true Dowling, Roberts and Ferguson would have constituted a majority on the two boards. But Hudson had firm control of the board at this time and did not lose control until three months after he had forced Dowling and Roberts to resign.

Following the exciting field report of July 23 Dowling, Roberts and Ferguson decided to visit Nabarlek. Queensland Mines's senior geologist, Dr Emile Rod, went with them. Three other people on the trip were Tristan (later Sir Tristan) Antico, chair of Pioneer Concrete, Jim Millner, chair of Washington H Soul Pattinson & Co., and Jim Hohnen, a West Australian investor and mining engineer. Antico, Dowling and Millner were all directors of Castlereagh Securities Ltd, Patrick's recently formed investment company.

Hudson had been invited to go, but had declined. He later said he did not like the idea of people other than directors visiting Nabarlek but since the others were being taken directors he felt he could not object.

The party visited Nabarlek in August 27 and were most impressed by what they saw. "Undoubtedly visual reception is a thing that does affect you very much," Dowling said later. "I must admit I was terribly impressed with it." That night the party stayed at Mudginberri, Antico's pastoral property nearby. Antico sent a radio-telephone message to his secretary from Mudginberri ordering 10,000 call options in Queensland Mines. Hohnen subsequently bought 5,100 shares and 1,000 options in Queensland Mines plus 800 shares and 2,000 options in Kathleen Investments. There is no doubt they were all impressed.

There is one other event of August 27 that should be recorded. On that Hudson's wife died. He was described by close associates as "very down" at the time. It was during this time that crucial events occurred within the company.

August 28 was a Friday. Turnover in Queensland Mines shares rose fivefold. It is hard to attribute this rise in turnover to the touring party. They had not been in direct contact with anyone and were now on their way home. Antico had put through a call option order and Hohnen's buying did not begin until the following Monday. However, word may have been filtering around that a high-powered party had been impressed by a visit to Nabarlek. Hudson himself testified later to the speed with which news spread. He told the Rae Committee he had heard on August 28 that Antico had ordered 10,000 Queensland Mines options the day before. Hudson said he had been informed that a telegram had been sent through the Katherine Post Office. Katherine is the nearest town of any size to Mudginberri. Thus Hudson learned, within a matter of hours, the exact details of a broking order sent froma remote Northern Territory cattle station. If this information had leaked to Hudson, one can be quite sure it had leaked elsewhere as well. Hudson told the committee he did not know who gave him the information.

On Monday August 31 the Sydney Stock Exchange asked Queensland Mines if directors knew of any reason for the rise in share trading volume. Hudson called Dr Rod, who was now back in Sydney, and asked him to prepare a statement for the exchange by noon the next day. Next afternoon, after some discussion, Hudson dictated a statement with Rod's approval and sent it to the exchange. This statement - wrong and with inadequate information ^# - was allowed to stand uncorrected for nearly a year. In view of it's devastating results, it is worth repeating in full :

"The directors of Queensland Mines Ltd refer to their report to the stcok exchange dated July 3 last advising the discovery of a uranium anomaly named Nabarlek situated some 18 miles from the Oenpelli Mission and 170 miles east of Darwin.

The anomaly is in the Archaean-metamorphic rocks with a strike length of 3,600 feet and an average width of 300 feet. The uranium occurs within the anomaly in large lenticular pitchblende lodes dipping at an angle of 50 degrees to the east-north-east.

A two-foot thick core of pitchblende lode, surrounded by a thick crust of bright yellow uranium ochres, was exposed by costeaning at a depth of four feet below the surface and has been drilled to a vertical depth of 130 ft.

Intersections by diamond drilling were made of massive pitchblende with a macximum true thickness of 12 ft and of a grade of 1,300 lb to the ton of ore. On each side of the pitchblende ore the metamorphics contain patchy pitchblende giving a high grade mineralised of a combined average width of 28 ft.

Of diamond drill holes, 7 intersected the first lens with a minimum length of 400 ft, one was between the first and second lenses and was barren, and two drill holes intersected a second lens of patchy and disseminated pitchblende of an average grade of 120 lb uranium oxide per ton of ore.

The northern end of the first lens is still open. Drilling is continuing to the north and at depth.

Drilling and costeaning of the first lens gives indicated reserves of 55,000 short tons of uranium oxide of an average grade of 540 lb per tone of ore.

Yours faithfully,

Queensland Mines Ltd
E. R. Hudson,
Chairmand and Managing Director"

The Rae Report described this announcement as "grievous misrepresentation". In the first place, the fact that drilling or drill holes are referred to six times gives the impression that the assays were based on drill core. They were not. The company had not received any assay reports on drill cores at this date. Of the 10 holes referred to, only two had struck ore of 27 percent (540 lb) grade, both times over short intersections. Drill hole Na-1 had hit an astoundingly rich patch between 140 and 150 ft with values ranging from 13.2 to 48.7%. Hole Na-4 had struck 26.6% ore over 2.4 ft and the next 2.6 ft had assayed 36.7%. No other assays from these holes came close to the average grade stated by Queensland Mines. The assays for these 10 holes arrived at Queensland Mines three or four weeks after the statement of September 1. They were not released to the public for another year. - until after Hudson lost control of the board.

A second criticism is of the use of the term "indicated reserves". In mining, the terms "indicated", "proven", "probable" and "inferred", used in conjunction with reserves, have carefully defined meanings. At the time, the definition of indicated reserves from the US Bureau of Mines and the US Geological Survey was : "Ore for which tonnage and grade are computed partly from specific measurements, samples or production data and partly from projection for a reasonable distance on geological evidence. The sites available for inspection, measurement and sampling are too widely or otherwise inappropriately spaced to outline the ore completely or to establish it's grade throughout."

The Nabarlek estimate was not made on such data. In evidence to the Rae Committee, Hudson said he probably used the word "indicated" in the sense of "estimated" and went on to argue that the term "indicated" was used in it's technical sense by mineral producing companies, and not by exploration companies. The Rae Report squashed this contention, saying : "We do not think such an argument....deserves to be taken seriously. The reaction of some experienced and qualified mining investors to the September 1970 announcements is sufficient to refute it, and Mr Hudson must have observed this response at the time. It is equally impossible to accept the proposed distinction whereby the untried and speculative class of mining companies, often possessing less experienced managements, are permitted and expected to use words more loosely and irresponsibly than established, producing companies. Under such a convention, the scope for double-talk would be unlimited."

A third criticism of the September 1 statement is that the reference to the open north-end aroused hopes that the ore reserves could be even greater than stated. These flames of hope must have been fanned next day when, in response to a stock exchange enquiry for more details, Hudson issued a further statement. This said, in part :

"The orebody is minable by open-cut methods, is mineralised at the surface by high-grade disseminated pitchblende mineralisation commencing from 4-16 feet below the surface. Mining costs would be small per ton of ore and are of no significance per lb of uranium.

The area is accessible by road to Darwin during the dry season, but would not be accessible without further road construction during the wet season. Having regard to the grade of the ore, only a small treatment plant would be required and costs and infrastructure should not exceed $3 million.

In estimating the reserves, the result from drilling of a second lens has not been taken into consideration as only two drill intersections have been made to date. The 7 drill holes which intersected the first lens were over a distance of 400 feet and to a depth of 130 feet. The lens is still open at the northern end and drilling is continuing."

Kathleen Investments, which had been $4.80 on August 31, jumped to $8.10 the following day and hit $15.50 by the end of September. Their peak was $17.50 in October. Queensland Mines had been the subject of more speculation. From a low of $7.20 in August, these shares had risen to $11.20 on the eve of September. By the end of September they had vaulted to $43. Their peak was $46 in early October.

It may or not be a coincidence that the peak in the share prices followed closely on the receipt by Queensland Mines of the first drill assays from Nabarlek. The cores from these drills had been analysed by Amdel in South Australia. There is some uncertainty over the date Queensland Mines received the assays, but they seem to have been given to the company by telephone on September 22 and actually delivered to the office on October 2. The shares peaked a few days later. The price stayed high for a long time, drifting downwards only gradually; but by the end of December Kathleen Investments were back to $11.80 and Queensland Mines had been pared to $30.

These price movements were of great importance to Australia's two most successful boom-time institutions - Mineral Securities Australia Ltd and Patric Partners. Australia had not seen such successful entrepeneurs as Minsec in living memory. By December 31 Minsec was locked into a shareholding that would destroy it.

In mid-August Castlereagh Securities had bought 15,000 QM shares. Patrick Corporation Ltd, the other investment company associated with Patrick Partners, bought 14,400 at the same time. This was after the 72% costean sample but before the Dowling-Antico visit to Nabarlek. As Patricks had formed Kathleen Investments and Dowling was a director and shareholder, it was natural that Castlereagh and Patrick Corporation should have invested in the Nabarlek companies. Castlereagh sold 5,000 of it's Queensland Mines shares on the rising market between August 28 and September 1. After the September 1 announcement Castelreagh decided to sell the remaining 10,000 Queensland Mines and to begin buying KI shares, aiming at an eventual total of 500,000. On prices of a little over $8 for KI at the time this meant Castlereagh was prepared to commit at least $4 million to acquire about 6% of the company. The switch by Castlereagh from Queensland Mines to KI was strategic and long term. Queensland Mines shares were only trading counters. Ultimate control of the deposit lay through KI.

Minsec also jumped into the ring, starting a buying campaign in Queensland Mines on September 2. Castlereagh and Minsec quickly became aware that they were bidding against each other in a bull market. On September 15 they agreed on a joint buying effort, in which the purchases of KI shares by Minsec and Castlereagh would be co-ordinated. All buying would be channelled through Patrick Partners and split equally between the two parties.

This joint buying led to the formulation of a concept for a company to be called Power Resources of Australia Pty Ltd, which would hold strategic parcels of major energy stocks. The Kathleen Investments parcel would be put into this company, which would ultimately be floated publicly. Castelreagh and Minsec decided to put a coal stock in too and chose Thiess Holdings Ltd. They also contemplated an oil stock.

In conformity with this policy, Minsec and Castlereagh widened their buying to include Thiess shares. Their aim was to buy 1.8 million KI shares, representing 20% of that company, and 1.4 million Thiess, representing 12% of the big Queensland coal miner. By December 31, 1970, Minsec 746,908 KI, 428,635 Queensland Mines and 22,780 Queensland Mines contributing shares. The cost for these was $11 million for the KIs and $16.6 for the Queensland Mines, a total of $27.6 million.

This had been financed by borrowings. Minsec's average costs had worked out at $14.67 for KI, $37.08 for fully paid Queensland Mines shares and $32.95 for the Queensland Mines contributing shares. By New Year's Eve they were taking a paper loss of more than $5 million on this portfolio. Castlereagh's buying of KI had been the same as Minsec's, which meant they were taking a paper loss of $2 million on their portfolio by then. As can be seen from the prices, much of their buying had been at the top end of the market. Indeed, their buying was largely responsible for the high prices.

The scale of buying was reflected in market turnover. Queensland Mines shares had turned over at about 70,000 per month in Sydney in July and August. In September, turnover leapt to 582,000 shares, followed by 147,000 in October and 171,000 in November before lapsing to former levels in December. KI also had a turnover around the 70,000 mark in July and August, but climbed to 1.3 million in September, 502,000 in October and 350,000 in November. On these figures, the bulk of Minsec and Castlereagh's shares were bought in September and October in the peak market. Their joint buying accounted for two-thirds of all trading in KI between September and December and Minsec had accounted for nearly half the Queensland Mines purchases. All these shares were bought on the false premise that Queensland Mines had 55,000 tons of 540 lb per ton of ore.

It was not until August 12, 1971, that the new Queensland Mines board and the public learned that the reserves amounted to only 8,932 tons (8,103 tonnes U₃O₈), some of which was at 16 lb per short ton and some at 240 lb. This was only one-sixth of the amount stated as indicated reserves a year before. The news shocked financial circles, despite persistent rumours that the mine might be downgraded. A greater shock was the disclosure that the original announcement had not been based on any drill assays.

The September 1 statement was prepared by two men - Hudson and Dr Rod. Hudson, although he had spent half a lifetime in the mining industry, was not a qualified geologist. Dr Rod had obtained a PhD in Berne, Switzerland in 1937 in geology, mineralogy, petrography and chemistry. He did not have any other degrees, because in Switzerland it is possible to get a PhD after six years study, without acquiring other degrees first.

Having obtained his PhD at the age of 25 Rod joined Royal Dutch Shell in the Hague. In 1938 they sent him to Guatemala for two years and from there he was transferred to the jungles of the upper Amazon in the backlands of Ecuador. He was sent to the Dutch East Indies next but had been in Java only three months when the Japanese occupied the island. After the war he took a six month rest in Switzerland before Shell sent him to Peru then once more back to Guatemala. In 1948 Shell were going to send him to Borneo, but Rod had had enough of the Dutch East Indies and joined Atlantic Richfield, who sent him to Venezuala.

He worked for that company in Turkey, Bolivia and the Spanish Sahara before being transferred to Australia in 1962 to work first in Gippsland and then in Brisbane. In 1968 he left Atlantic Richfield to join Queensland Mines.

Rod's experience had been mainly in petroleum geology, but like all geologists he was expected to keep an eye out for any minerals that might interest his company, especially in the Spanish Sahara and the upper Amazon. When he joined Queensland Mines he was widely travelled, with 30 years experience as a geologist, but he had no experience in uranium mines.

On September 1, Queensland Mines had not been asked to calculate it's reserves. All the Sydney Stock Exchange had asked for was the reason, if any, for the rise in trading in the stock. On receiving the query Hudson asked Rod to make an "assessment" of Nabarlek. Rod took this to mean a calculation of reserves.

On this point the Rae Report said :

"The stock exchange had not, as should have been obvious to Mr Hudson, asked Queensland Mines to pronounce on the sieze of it's estimated ore reserves, let alone to issue a wildly speculative 'guesstimate'....No outsider was setting a time limit on the company converting the preliminary encouraging announcement of July 3 into definitive terms. If specific information was not available on September 1, the company was entitled and was required, to say so. It could well have said that it was awaiting drill assays from the laboratories."

The information he had available was the geological mapping of the area, the assy results from 15 costeans and spectrometer checks on some of the first 12 drill-holes. Split cores of the first 12 drill-holes had been sent to Amdel for analysis and those assays were noy yet available. However, it is possible for a geologist to get a reasonably accurate reading of uranium from the cores on site. With high grader ore it is possible to pick the bright ochres of massive pitchblende by sight.

When Dr Rod visited the site on August 27 he had a light German geiger counter called a Berthold-1200. Once this instrument is calibrated to allow for the effect of other radioactive minerals, a geologist can use it to make reasonable estimates of uranium oxide levels in a core sample up to a level of 50%. Dr Rod knew already that the Nabarlek ore contained no thorium and hardly any potassium (two other radioactive minerals often found in association with uranium) so he could calibrate the Berthold to take readings for uranium.

Armed with these spectrometer readings, Dr Rod began his calculations. He made a model dipping at an angle of 45 degrees, which was the slope of the mineralised zone, toward the east. He took an 18 foot zone near the surface averaging 15% U₃O₈ for 14 feet and 70% for 4 feet. He knew that the average for the mineralised zone in the drill intersections was 38 feet so he averaged the width as 28 feet (halfway between the 18 and 38 feet). The ore grade he calculated was the average of 14 feet times 15% and 4 feet times 70%, which works out at 27%. This is equivalent to 540 lb per ton. Working on a 28 foot average thickness over a strike length of 400 feet, he calculated that the ore contained 55,000 short tons of uranium oxide. In fairness to Dr Rod, he had made an attempt at conservatism by taking a 400 foo strike length at a time when mineralisation was known to extended over some 700 feet.

Dr Emile Rod's wildly speculative 'guesstimate' of the Nabarlek ore reserve.
31-August-1970.

The weakness in this calculation is the assumption that the amazingly rich 70% grade could be taken as typical of grade. However, I do no know enough about geology to say whether Dr Rod's calculation was soundly based. Nor did the Rae Committee, so they hired the Canadian-based firm of consulting geologists, Watts, Griffis and McOuat, to review the data on which the Queensland Mines statements were based and to comment on their validity.

The Watts, Griffis and McOuat report, prepared by Jack McOuat and Terence Willsteed, was presented on October 20, 1971, to the Rae Committee. Unfortunately it is too long to reproduce in this media.

The McOuat report was a scathing indictment of the original Queensland Mines statement and the company's subsequent silence. McOuat and Willsteed said said Nabarlek should be a "relatively small, high-grade profitable mine" and agreed that with some minor criticisms the field programs seemed to have been conducted normally. The exploration program was described "workmanlike". Apart from that, it had little good to say about the company.

"The September 1 and 2 statements were not supportable by technical evidence and were merely geological 'guesstimates' at best," the McOuat report said. "They should not have been made available to the public. Any independent geological examination would have disclosed the weakness in the statement and it's assumptions."

"...As of September 1, the company had made a significant and hig grade surface discovery of uranium. An analysis of surface assays and other information showed possible dimensions of the deposit of 700 feet in length and 60 feet average width on the surface, which averaged 1.2% uranium oxide. They also clearly show the mineralisation was erratic in grade and width."

"Geological descriptions of the drill cores from the first 10 holes completed showed that while zones persisted to at least some 130 feet below the surface, it was still very arratic in both shape and mineral content, and that there could be barren or very low grade areas within the zone.

"Except as geological 'doodling' there could not have been a tonnage and grade estimate made, and even the estimate that was made and published appeared to ignore the technical data that was available at the time."

The McOuat report by it's nature was an exercise in hindsight. But whatever the merits of Dr Rod's original estimate, they were clearly changed when the Amdel assays of the first drill came to hand. The arrival of these assays also meant the company was now in a better position to calculate it's reserves than it had been on September 1. Why did not the company immediately alert the market that the fabulously rich grade would not be attained ?

Hudson later defended his action by saying that each drill hole had varied materially and until the end of June 1971 he had accepted the advice of Dr Rod and geologists working under him that the original estimate of tonnage would be maintained. In a statement in August 1975 (made after the section of the Rae Report on Queensland Mines had been released) Hudson said : "On October 7, 1970, I visited Nabarlek without Dr Rod and accompanied by a senior Government geologist. I made all the information available to him and he informed me that in his opinion, the tonnage estimate was correct, but that the grade would be lower than stated. I was not materially concerned with the fall in grade because of the high nature thereof. When doubt arose about the reserves position, Amdel was commissioned to make an independent report, and I assigned mambers of the staff of Kathleen Investments to report also."

Hudson said he still believed the board made the right decision in all relevant circumstances, in the best interests of shareholders, to defer any further statement until drilling was completed and a final assessment of reserves could be made.

In evidence before the Rae Committee, Dr Rod said he was disappointed to see the results, which were much lower than he had thought, but he did not consider it necessary for the moment to recalculate the reserves. He thought that before any revision the company should drill many more holes to have a much better picture and do some statistical research to find out the average grade. This led to the following exchange :

Senator Rae : Do you agree that from the time either late in September or early October when the assay results were received from Amdel all the assay results which you received tended to take away from the original estimate of the reserve which you had calculated for the purpose on September 1 ?

Dr Rod : That is correct. What actually appeared was the grade. As long as you can compensate with more tonnage of ore you are safe. I was watching this closely, and I think it was in May that I made an estimate. I said : "Well we certainly do not have a lot more than 25,000 or 30,000 tons proved." Based on the drilling results, I was quite aware of this in May. I knew, though, that unless further drilling proved more tonnage and better grades, and unless we could find more ore to the north or along the southern extension we could not make it. But Iwas very confident. I had actually no doubts that eventually we would make it. I was still full of hope that the 55,000 tons would be here.

"Incredibly, no effort seems to have been made by the company to check these guesstimates at any time until mid-1971. No apparent inspection of assay data or drill logs seems to have been made. If such an inspection were made it would have become immediately obvious to a technical person or even a person experienced in arithmetic that the average grade and tonnages publicly stated could not be achieved. This should have been immediately obvious upon an inspection of the assay data available up to hole 10, hole 23 or hole 47.

"In our opinion the geological logs of drill holes Na-1 to 10 showed conclusively, even before the assay became available, the the deposits was erratic and could not be reasonably expected to have the uniformity, grade or tonnage stated or implied.

Even if by wishful thinking it was hoped that the ultimate tonnage could be developed, it had to be geologically obvious that by drill hole Na-23 it was then at best a remote possibility."

This was equally important. The amount of uranium contained in the Nabarlek orebody was calculated on two factors - the tonnage and of ore and the grade. Dr Rod had reached a figure of 55,000 tons of contained uranium oxide on the basis that he had 199,000 tons of ore averaging 27%. (Actually this comes to 53,730 tons, but this is a minor discrepancy) Any drop in grade would have to be matched by an increase in ore to maintain the amount of uranium oxide in the deposit. If the grade dropped to 10%, there would have to be 550,000 tons of ore to still make 55,000 tons of contained uranium oxide, for example. This equation prevailed down to the cut-off grade where the ore was too poor to be mined economically.

However, all these doubts were in the future as the market euphorically pushed Kathleen Investments shares up in September 1970. The scale of buying was such that on September 17 Hudson hurried to Canberra and persuaded (Prime Minister) John Gorton that foreign investment in Kathleen Investments and Queensland Mines should be limited to 15%, with no more than 5% hold by any single foreign party. Gorton, being a dedicated economic nationalist, agreed and introduced the Nabarlek Ordinance in those terms. He was able to take this action because Kathleen Investments was an ACT-registered company.

By the end of September there were two big secrets about Queensland Mines and Kathleen Investments. The first secret was that Nabarlek's reserves were not as high as stated. From the McOuat report, this should have been evident to Hudson and Dr Rod from September 22. But it was not known by the investing public nor even by Hudson's fellow directors.

Harry Ferguson told the Rae Committee : "Mr Hudson has consistently withheld information form the board, and he did not inform directors that the first assay results indicated a marked downgrading until these results had been in his possession for almost 12 months. Not only did he refeuse access to geological reports, but he presented to the board only his interpretations of them."

The second secret was that Dowling and Roberts, as directors of both companies, were also part of a group which was in process of buying a substantial interest in those companies without informing either Hudson or the other directors. Dowling and Roberts were both directors of Castlereagh, which was collaborating with Minsec in an effort to acquire 20% of Kathleen Investments. Originally Minsec had suggested buying 51% of Kathleen but that this had been ruled out as impractical. Twenty percent would have made Castlereagh (or Power Resources of Australia) the largest stockholder in Kathleen, although it's voting clout would have been reduced substantially by the sliding scale of voting under Kathleen's articles of association, unless it split it's shares.

The Rae Committee believed Dowling and Roberts should have disclosed details of their buying to the KI board. On this point Dowling said : "So what would the board do with the information ? I do not know what they would want it for."

Ingenuous, to say the least. Any company is interested in a major change in it's ownership and it is particularly desirable that substantial changes in directors' shareholdings be known fully and promptly. It would be hard to imagine Ric Dowling taking the same complacent view if he were chairman of a company where other directors were making a similar undercover raid on the shares.

A different pointer to Dowling's attitude comes from the report into the affairs of Mineral Securities by the inspectors appointed by the NSW government, called the Rath report. Ken McMahon, in evidence to the investigators, said Minsec had been anxious in December 1970 to reveal the joint purchases of shares. McMahon said : "Mr Dowiling agreed, but requested Mineral Securities to hold off as Kathleen Investments were to have a board meeting in a few days time and would have to make it's regular quarterly or half-yearly report; Mr Dowling said that if Mr Hudson resented the moves which were going on he was quite capable of issuing a report that would be detrimental to our proposals."

Later McMahon said : "Mr Dowling said that if Mr Hudson knew before we had a pretty substantial percentage and disapproved, he would quite possibly throw a spanner in the works."

This had become a high-flying, cat-and-mouse game because Hudson was already suspicious. On his own evidence he had been suspicious since the proposed visit by Dowling's party to Nabarlek on August 27. He told the Rae Committee : "One of the purposes of the visit may have been to try to acquire an interest in Kathleen Investments. I have no basis for my reason but you asked me why I was suspicious. They are the facts as I knew them that made me suspicious."

Hudson later said he became aware of Castlereagh's buying as soon as he saw the price of the shares rising. He made inquiries and found they were being registered in the name of Patrick Nominees. This did not necessarily mean they were being booked for Castlereagh, but Castlereagh had only been floated a few months before and still must have had a lot of cash on hand and four Castlereagh directors had just visited Nabarlek. A far less astute man than Hudson could habe come to the same conclusion. On his own evidence, Hudson's suspicions were in existence before September 1, although Castlereagh had only bought a few Queensland Mines until then.

A detached observer could have derived a certain amusement from the subsequent board meetings. Hudson's suspicions were tantamount to certainty and he was suppressing geological information from the board. Dowling and Roberts were suppressing news of their share purchases from Hudson. One wonders what other subjects there were to talk about.

If Hudson suspected Castlereagh of buying as early as August, it is worth asking why he went to Gorton on September 17 with fears of foreign buying. Perhaps he feared Castlereagh would resell overseas. In fact, the Nabarlek Ordinance became a very large problem for Minsec because it limited the number of buyers to whom they could sell when they ran into trouble and tried to unload their KI and Queensland Mines holdings. Hudson was never formally told of the PRA buying until McMahon saw him at the end of January 1971, when Minsec was only days away from collapse.

When McMahon saw Hudson, an uneasy suspicion was spreading about the validity of Nabarlek's ore grades. It had been spreading for some time. On March 25, 1971, Minerals Week published an article which said : "Japanese companies such as Mitsui & Co and Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha had conducted their own surveys of Nabarlek and claimed that the amount and quality of the ore the newly-found ore deposits are only about one-half to one-fifth of those reported by Queensland Mines."

When this article was shown by Roberts to Hudson at a board meeting in early May, Hudson told directors the statement was completely incorrect. Later Hudson told the Rae Committee that a Mitsui representative had seen the orebody on October 19, 1970, but no one from Mitsubishi had seen it. Hudson said Mitsubishi acted for RTZ and were competing with Queensland Mines for sales in Japan."

An interesting point in this testimony is that Hudson said the Mitsui representative saw drill results up to hole Na-10. This was more than the Australian public saw for another 10 months, but on that basis Mitsui apparently came to a far more accurate conclusion about the size of the orebody than Dr Rod. It also provides justification to McOuat's assertion that on the basis of holes 1 to 10 the deposit could not be reasonably expected to have 55,000 tons.

The Japanese are excruciatingly thorough in their investigations of potential ore suppliers. Queensland Mines would never have had a chance of concluding a supply contract to any Japanese uranium buyer without first releasing to them every detail of the orebody.

Others visiting the orebody reached similar conclusions to Mitsui. It has never previously been published, but Noranda and Patrick Partners both sent geologists to inspect Nabarlek in November 1970.

Noranda sent a small team. Patrick Partners were represented by their own geologist, Lionel Milligan, accompanied by an independent consultant Geoff Hannes. Hannes was a former general manager of Queensland Mines and had been largely responsible for the company acquiring the Nabarlek property.

The Noranda and Patrick teams looked at the drill cores and results and received an unpleasant surprise. By that time the limits of the orebody had been fairly well defined. They found that the geometry of the orebody had been satisfactorily outlined (the McOuat report later agreed on this) but that the 540 lb grade had been extrapolated from limited early knowledge and that there was no abundant evidence to refute it. The more drill intersections you have in an orebody, the less influence any single intersection has on the weighting of averages.

Milligan estimated that the orebody contained 10,000 tons of uranium oxide at worst and 20,000 to 25,000 at best. He thought 10,000 the more likely figure. Hannes thought Milligan's assessment harsh and that it was more probably 25,000.

Noranda's geologists had been to the site a little before the Patrick Partners team. After the Patrick team returned they quietly compared notes. The estimates were almost identical, Noranda having estimated 9,000 to 25,000 tons. Thus three visitors to the site - from Mistui, Patricks and Noranda - had all estimated considerably lower reserves than Queensland Mines had published. Their estimates were based on visits within three months of the September 1 announcement.

On his return Milligan reported his findings to the head of Patrick's research department, Michael Baume. Both understood the gravity of the situation because they knew of the heavy buying in Kathleen Investments. They reported their findings to Dowling.

Dowling took no action on this report, which must have reached him by early December 1970. By that time Castlereagh and Minsec had basically stopped buying and the share price was was weakening. Despite his inaction, Dowling could hardly have ignored the report. It was too vital to his own future.

In evidence to the Rae Committee Dowling said he did not think of any of the staff of Patricks had visited Nabarlek between September 1970 and May 1971. His memory must have slipped because this visit was in November 1970.

Upon receipt of this information Dowling was also in a position where, if he dod not have a conflict of interest, his various responsibilities certainly sat uneasily with one another. As a director of Castlereagh he had a duty toward it's major shareholders and an interest in seeing the value of it's major investment maintained. As a director in Kathleen Investments and Queensland Mines he had a responsibility to see that the company's public statements were accurate and not misleading. As a stockbroker he was responsible for advising clients on whether to buy, sell or hold stocks. As a member of the Sydney Stock Exchange committee he had a responsibility, if he suspected a company was seriously misleading the public, to protect the larger public interest by seeking information from the company. It is difficult to see how anyone could have satisfactorily reconciled these diverse responsibilities.

As a director of Queensland Mines, Dowling could have pressed for more information. Asked whether he was happy to be kept "in the dark" about Nabarlek, Dowling told the Rae Committee he had been very concerned, "but the board meetings were advised that it was drilling up according to the program, which meant the situation had not altered." Questioned further on this point, he said he did not see any reason why a company should not rely on it's managing director and geologists. He said that at one meeting, in about October 1970, Hudson had told the board "that in his view there were 95,000 tons of uranium oxide."

In fairness, it should be recorded that Dowling later said (commenting on the Rae Report) that while he had been involved in different interests, actual conflicts among ihs own interests had not arisen. He said that he did not advise his clients when he was on the board of a company and that any conflicts of interest were easily resolved.

One point in Dowling's favour is that although he had a sizeable personal holding in KI, he did not sell any stock before or after his resignation, despite the growing doubts about Nabarlek's viability.

By November 1, geological evidence indicated to senior executives of Queensland Mines a definite closing off of the mineralised zone. On November 24 Hudson told the board that, by contrast with the early indications at Nabarlek, "some of the current drilling has shown that the pitchblende has become disseminated on each side of the massive pitchblende with consequential lowering of grade." This was the first evidence of Hudson advising the board of a downgrading of the ore.

According to board minutes, he concluded that drilling was not sufficiently advanced to give any real indication of reserves, but it indicated that reserves would still be 55,000 tons although the overall grade would probably be between 150 and 200 lb of uranium oxide per ton. On January 19 a further report from Hudson to the board said the indications were that the grade would be lower than 540 lb but there seemed little doubt of the tonnage of 55,000 being achieved. On February 5, 1971, Queensland Mines made it's first public statement since September 1, saying that 47 drill-holes had been completed and affirming reserves of "at least 55,000 tons of uranium oxide". No mention was made of the assay results or the falling grade, except for a statement that "no calculation of proved reserves and grade is possible at this time". The report received scant analysis, because the day before Mineral Securities had been suspended on the Sydney Stock Exchange and the whole Australian share and money markets were in the grip of a major panic.

On March 17, the Minsec holdings were sold to Noranda Australia Ltd and the AMP Society; Terry Rodgers and E C Kennon were appointed to the board of Queensland Mines to represent the respective interests of these new major shareholders. Rodgers was managing director of the Australian subsidiary of Noranda of Canada. More importantly, he was a mining engineer and became the only director of Queensland Mines who was technically qualified to appraise the Nabarlek deposit.

The New Zealand-born Rodgers was a pleasnt-mannered executive with greying hair. A former general manager of the Radium Hill project in South Australia in the early 1950's, he was an expert on uranium mines and his company Noranda was currently delineating the Koongarra deposit not far from Nabarlek. His hair was about to become a bit greyer. He began his board appointment on relatively cordial terms with Hudson, but he developed doubts about Nabarlek abd began to fight the chairman for fuller disclosure. This soft-spoken technician would eventually succeed, after much trauma, in ousting Hudson. Rodgers, who said he was "emotionally upset" after his calculations first revealed the drop in Nabarlek reserves in mid-July 1971, had a series of increasingly heated clashes with the redoubtable Hudson.

The next few months were tempestuous. On May 16, Hudson told the board there had been a further drop in average ore grade to 120 lb. On May 26 the matter was ventilated publicly when Tom Nestel told the Rae Committee that rumours had been circulating for some time that drilling at nabarlek had not confirmed either the reserves or the grades claimed on September 1.

Two days later was the Kathleen meeting - one of the stormiest annual meetings in Australia in years. It had been public knowledge for weeks before that Dowling was under pressure to resign because of Castlereagh's secret buying of KI shares. Both Dowling and Hudson had been seeking proxy support in the days before the meeting. Dowling and Roberts, who were both facing re-election, sent a statement to shareholders supporting their actions. In a shock move at the meeting, Dowling announced his resignation after an emotional speech. He appeared close to tears as he spoke. The contrast with his usual image as a calm, self-assured top financier was startling. Roberts also resigned rather than carry the fight to a showdown. Any such fight would have resulted in victory for Hudson on the proxies. At both this meeting and that of Queensland Mines five days later, Hudson parried shareholders' questions about Nabarlek reserves.

For the moment, Hudson had retained dominance of the companies, but in mid-June 1971 Rodgers visited Nabarlek and began having his first doubts about grade levels and reserves. Rodgers was in an unenviable position. Noranda had bought a stake of nearly 5% in Nabarlek and he was it's chief representative in Australia. If the reserves at Nabarlek were lower than stated, as he suspected, his company's investment would fall in value. If he were instrumental in forcing such disclosure he would be triggering a fall in the value of his own company.

He had only been on the Queensland Mines board a few weeks and was now on collision course with it's formiddable chairman. Rodgers is not a naturally aggressive person and must have winced at the prospect. Nevertheless, he went ahead.

He made a series of requests, by letter and at board meetings, for an updated reserves statement. Hudson resisted on the grounds that no new reserves estimate should be published until further exploration work had been completed. Their relationship cooled markedly. One board meeting lasted from 3:30 pm until well after midnight as Rodgers spoke to directors at length. Their letters, prebiously addressed "Dear Roy" and "Dear Terry", changed to "Dear Mr Rodgers" and "Dear Mr Hudson".

The climactic board meeting came on August 12, when the staff technical committee of the company, comprising Dr Rod and two other geologists, reported that reserves were not expected to exceed 9,000 tons of ore. Rodgers pressed for an immediate statement to this effect. According to Rodgers, Hudson resisted on the grounds that it would destroy confidence in the company and it's prospects of negotiating sales contracts.

From this pint, the normally dry minutes of a board meeting disclose a series of volcanic series of confrontations and maneouvres. Rodgers declared that Queensland Mines might be inadequately led by it's chairman. Hudson fainted and was taken to another room. Other directors believed his illness may have been feigned. Queensland Mines secretary Lincoln Madden, a longtime associate and staunch adherent of Hudson, left to get a doctor for his chairman. In his absence Ferguson assumed the chairmanship of the meeting. Rodgers resigned, saying, he considered "his presence on the board would undoubtedly contribute further to the deterioration of Hudson's health". Ferguson foreshadowed a motion appointing Millner to the board.

Then Madden returned and violently attacked Ferguson for resuming the meeting in Hudson's absence and for abrogating a previous agreement in moving the appointment of Millner. He also deplored the resignation of Rodgers at a time when the board needed solidarity. The board voted to appoint Millner despite Madden's strong objections.

On the same Friday, Queensland Mines announced it's downgraded reserve figure at the end of trading. On August 24 Hudson was removed as chairman of Queensland Mines and was replaced by Millner. Two weeks later Hudson resigned as managing director of both companies.

Hudson bitterly resented his overthrow and subsequently tried to regain power. He called an extraordinary meeting of Kathleen and tried to unseat the new board with a slate of directors headed by Sir Wlater Michelmore. He failed - after yet another long and explosive meeting - but his bitterness was unassauged.

One consolation was his share-trading profits. Hudson and his family company, Talbot Investments Pty Ltd, had bought 8,500 Queensland Mines shares between February and July 1970 and 5,500 Kathleen Investments in April 1970 for a total of $67,000. After the September 1 statement Hudson and Talbot began selling. A total of 4,000 Queensland Mines were sold on September 2 and 3. On September 24, two days after Queensland Mines had received telephone advice from Amdel of the first drill assays, 4,000 Kathleen Investments were sold a further 3,000 Queensland Mines. By that time KI was over $15 and QML was $40. With 2,000 more QML shares sold on November 18, these sales grossed $355,000.

It must be emphasised that the trading volume was insignificant compared to Hudson's total holdings in the two companies. By the end of 1970 Hudson and Talnot's combined holdings totalled 95,000 KI and 28,000 QML shares; but his profits had been large. On his trading in the two stocks in 1970 Hudson had made a gross profit - before brokerage and after tax - of nearly $290,000.

Hudson told the Rae Committee he had sold shares , after consulting his accountant, to raise money for other commitments, notably a tax bill totalling nearly $250,000. He said the only shares he could sell without incurring further tax were QML and KI, as he had held equity in these companies for 13 years.

The Rae Committee conluded :

On each of these selling occasions Mr Hudson was privately aware of developments which widened the glaring discrepancy between the ascertained geological facts and state of confident belief in the market to which he sold the shares. Each of the selling transactions coincided with an advance in his personal understanding of the discrepancy. Mr Hudson's explanation of the sales does not alter the grave impropriety of the share dealings. This is a case of 'insider trading' with a peculiarly objectionable twist. The person who made profits from his possession of the information that made a mockery of the market's belief in his company's shares was also one of the person's responsible for misleading that market for a period of nearly a year."

"This bitter fight left the interests of the shareholders disregarded and virtually irrelevant, and, accordingly, the shareholders suffered the consequences of the power play of the members of the two boards."

As 1970 closed, Mineral Securities had barely a month to live.

With the relatively small size and high ore grade of the deposit, the Nabarlek 1 orebody was mined out in just over 4 months of the dry season and the ore stockpiled for treatment from 1980. About 2.3 million tonnes of waste was also mined. The Nabarlek 2 deposit is of unknown, but presumably not great, significance. It is not described as an orebody. The high grade of the ore means that both the ore stockpile, plant, and tailings will continue to emit significant quantities of radiation.

The mine is very close to an area of special significance to Aboriginal people. The Gabo-Djang (the Dreaming Place of the Green Ants) is only one kilometre from the mine, and is one reason the Oenpelli people have opposed Nabarlek. The Oenpelli have clashed in the past with the NLC over both the go-ahead for the mine and over the construction of roads through sacred sites.

In March 1981, after heavy cyclonic rain, radioactive material was released from the plant runoff pond into a nearby creek. The infringement wasn't reported to the OSS ⁽¹⁾ or the NT DME ⁽²⁾ by the company, and only came to light four months afterward following media reports, though the environmental requirements demand immediate notification.

According to a letter from the NT DME dated September 7, 1981 ⁽³⁾ :

"Your failure to report the incident of 6 and 7 of March 1981 when excessive rainfall fell on the plant and flowed outside the restricted release zone has caused excessive reaction which could have been avoided. We have had to waste many man-hours in reinvestigating the matter which could easily have been resolved through notification and follow-up if reported at the time. This would have reduced the adverse publicity which ensued. As a result, we will have to take measures to ensure a closer control on these happenings which we believe will be an extra burden on the company and which would not normally have been required."

When the company presented a report to OSS, it contained contradictions and insufficient information. OSS expressed concern over monitoring of water quality, concentrations of radioactive dust, and lack of response from QM over plans for decommissioning, dewatering and covering the tailings, and rehabilitation at the end of the project.

The tailings have subsequently been dewatered and placed in the mined-out pit. According to the Nabarlek Environmental Requirements painfully negotiated between the Miners, the Federal Government, and the NLC (ER-26),⁽⁴⁾

"26 (a) All tailings shall, as soon as practicable, be dealt with by being deposited in, or transferred to, the mine pits in a manner approved of by the Supervising Authority.
(b) No tailings shall be deposited or transferred to the pit before the pit is prepared in a manner designed to minimise seepage, and approved by the Supervising Authority"

Tailings were initially deposited straight into the mined-out pit, apparently without the need for a separate tailings impoundment. Given the requirement in ER 26 (b) that the pit be prepared in a manner designed to minimise seepage, this seems not to fulfill the clear requirements of the ERs. The existence of seepage from the pit now, would seem to be an obvious consequence. Initially, Nabarlek tailings were deposited sub-aqueously, (i.e., - under water), but the method changed from sub-aqueous to sub-aerial 'semi-dry' disposal in 1985, resulting in stronger and denser tailings. By then, 58 m of 'wet' tailings had already accumulated, which have had to be dewatered using wicks.

Semi-dry disposal has been criticised by the environment movement as likely to lead to higher radon emanation rates than wet disposal. Claims that semi-dry tailings disposal would eliminate seepage have been decisively disproved by the massive leakage at Roxby.

In June 1989, when milling ceased at Nabarlek, a geotextile and waste rock cover was placed on top of the Nabarlek tailings, and the dewatering wicks installed. The strategy of disposing of material in the pit was continued after the project officially commenced decommissioning in 1990. By 1992, material from evaporation ponds had also been placed in the Nabarlek open pit, and already problems were becoming evident with groundwater. According to OSS ⁽⁵⁾ :

"The tailings, and the material from the evaporation ponds placed in the pit in October 1992, represent a source of solutes which will affect groundwater quality in this area for the long term. Conductivity, sulphate, and nitrate values are continuing to increase in bores affected by the pit, while pH is decreasing."

"Observation bore OB-23 is beginning to show the effects of seepage over the last two years from tailings deposited in the mine pit. Sulphate is gradually increasing, and there may have been a slight decrease in pH."

When the geotextile layer was placed and the wicks installed, the idea was that the tailings would consolidate and dry out under the weight of the geotextile layer itself, aided by the weight and vibration of machinery. In 1993, the wicks were still expelling water and a degree of subsidence had happened. Some elevation in sulphate levels in nearby groundwater monitoring wells had been detected, indicating seepage from the pit. Given the quantity of water shown in the supposedly drying out pit in various OSS photos, this hardly seems surprising, though the quantity of water in the pit is surprising. By November 1993, the pit seems to be nearly clear of water ⁽⁶⁾ but a subsequent photo taken in 1995 with contaminated mill equipment being deposited in the pit still shows large quantities of water.

Narbalek Decommissioning
Tailings pit, November 1993	Mill area with foundation removal June 1995	Tailings pit, June 1995

OSS 1993-94 and 1994-95 Annual Reports (click to see the larger image).

By July 1994, the company had started to dismantle the milling plant, and all items that could not be decontaminated or were not considered of value were dumped into the pit including large numbers of pipes, pumps, and bits of the yellowcake calciner. The glorious technicolour photo on p42 of the 1994-95 OSS Annual Report, shown below, is far from pleasing and looks decidedly messy. No figures are available for rates of radon emanation from the tailings in the Nabarlek pit.

By the end of the 1995 wet season, the Nabarlek pit still had not dried out, containing 152 Megalitres of water, 75 Megalitres more than anticipated from a normal wet season. Disposal of water from the Nabarlek pit still remains a problem, with the company committed to develop a water disposal strategy. As of 1994, the Nabarlek decommissioning program envisaged the placement of all residue from the milling plant, evaporation ponds, etc. in the pit, which would finally be filled with waste rock, and to have a 'cap' placed on it to prevent erosion and re-vegetated.⁽⁷⁾ No separate radon barrier as required by 10CFR40.192 is thought necessary.

The dewatering and covering of the tailings hasn't posed short-term problems as the disposal of contaminated water has. But slow seepage and radon emanation from the tailings in the pit for the next 100,000 years is a virtual certainty. Rehabilitation of the offices and camp area is expected to be finished in the 1997 dry season, but no firm guarantee exists that the Nabarlek Decommissioning Working Group, of which the NLC is a member, will actually be able to return the area to a state satisfactory to its traditional owners. ⁽⁸⁾ The contamination of groundwater in bores next to the pit is argued as 'not significant'.

However, Pioneer International Ltd as the parent company of Queensland Mines (which is virtually defunct) wrote off Nabarlek except for a liability in its balance sheet to allow for rehabilitation of the site. In respect to its exploration leases at Nabarlek it introduced Cogema Australia on a farm-in basis to undertake further exploration, and Cogema now has a 50% interest in these.

Firm plans should be made for the final rehabilitation of the Nabarlek site to the satisfaction of the traditional owners. Final authority over this process should be exercised by the working group, not as at present, by the NT DME.

As a final note, it is worth remembering these disturbing words from the 1985-86 OSS Annual Report :

"Disposal of uranium mill tailings in surface dams, no matter how well stabilised and protected, almost certainly involves the acceptance of eventual tailings release to the environment. While this risk may be reduced.....it is unlikely that any containment structure could remain totally impregnable to the natural processes of slow erosion over periods comparable to several half-lives of the longest lived isotopes retained in the tailings."

The following environmental management record of QM's Nabarlek mine is from the recent report of the Senate Select Committee into Uranium Mining and Milling ("SSCUMM"), May 1997. It is compiled from official reports by OSS. The following list of incidents are those that caused regulatory concern or direct infringements of QM's Environmental Requirements (ERs). It is consistently asserted that there was "no environmental impact" or "no environmental detriment". Please consider this list and decide for yourself........

1979	May	Site visits by Soil Conservation officers satisfactorily resolve the matter of a complaint concerning incorrect procedures for stockpiling topsoil. Discussions on procedures were held with the company.
	June	The Northern Land Council (NLC) withdrew a permit for roadwork from an employee of Henry and Walker because it was not suitably endorsed for this work. The NLC reissued the permit after it had been endorsed correctly.
	July 13	16 mine workers commenced work without their TLD badges. Consequently radiation dose records were incomplete for that day.
1980	October	Three road permits expired, action advised to renew. Two contractors were absent from site without permits, both were dismissed.
	November	One contractor was off site without a permit, he was subsequently dismissed.
1981	March 7	Water flowed from the Restricted Release Zone (RRZ).
1982	April 1	Two leaking joints were discovered on a pipeline between the Waste Rock Runoff Pond and Evaporation Pond No 2 and repaired immediately. The quantity of runoff water estimated to have leaked was 40,000 - 80,000 litres.
	July 22 & 26	The pipeline returning water from the stockpile runoff pond to the mill ruptured along a weld seal. Less than 30,000 litres of water escaped from the RRZ. Nitrogen, sulfate, radium and manganese contents were within the limits of some local natural waters, other water quality parameters were within National Health and Medical Research Council drinking water standards.
1983	March 4	A small leak from a tailings line in the plant area was detected during routine surveillance and reported by the company. Less than 1,000 litres of tailings sprayed over the top of the retaining bund to a distance approximately 3 metres outside the RRZ. The leak appears to have been caused by gradual internal abrasion of a pipe at a defect point. The spilled tailings and contaminated earth were cleaned up.
	Nov. 17	A split in a pipe from a stockpile runoff pond to the mill resulted in less than 500 litres of liquid being sprayed over the bund. The pipe was replaced.
1984	March 27	A small quantity of tailings in suspension (about 300 litres of liquor, 25% solid tails) sprayed from a pipeline outside the Nabarlek RRZ. The spill area of about 10 m2 was cleaned up immediately and with associated soil removed to the tailings pit. The pipeline was repaired.
1985	August 17	As a result of a small split in a pipeline, about 5 kilos of tailings slurry was sprayed onto and over a bund outside the RRZ.
1988	June 29	A leak occurred from a process water pipeline, from which radium had been largely removed, allowing a small amount of treated process water to escape the RRZ and spray an area about 15,000 litres.
1989	August 3	A break occurred in a T joint from the main irrigation plot 8. An estimated 10,000 litres of Evaporation Pond 2 water escaped the RRZ.
Other Incidents
1987		Early in 1987 tree death started in the area called the Forest Irrigation Area. Eventually the whole ten hectares of the irrigation area lost their trees. Whilst not certain, it appears that the tree death was due to the excess amounts of nitrogen (ammonia) applied to a soil regime more used to being leached of all nutrients. Ten hectares of dead trees was a significant impact on the environment but it has been a temporary impact. Successive wet seasons have leached the soil, seeds have been planted and new trees are growing. They are currently 2-3 metres in height.
1992	August 31	A bushfire damaged a number of buildings and destroyed eleven demountable buildings and an ablution block at the Nabarlek camp. There was no risk to the mine and mill complex which was approximately 1.5 kilometres from the fire. No one was injured and there was no possibility of the occurrence of a radiation hazard. This event did not constitute an infringement of the Nabarlek Authorisation or a breach of the Environmental Requirements.
1996	September	Further bushfires swept through the revegetation area. Surveys conducted by an independent expert concluded that less damage had been done than previously feared. The company still planned to use the same measures as previously to prevent fire accessing the revegetation areas next dry season. (9)

^# - emphasis added.