A Shifty Non-Solution
Jim Green - Green Left Weekly - 1998
The federal government recently announced a plan to dump radioactive waste in the Billa Kalina region of South Australia. This strategy does not resolve Australia's radioactive waste problems, it just shifts them to SA. The plan is, more than anything, a clearing exercise for the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), designed to weaken opposition to the plan to build a new reactor at Lucas Heights in suburban Sydney.
The 67 000 sq km Billa Kalina region, in the mid-north of SA, has been chosen from a short-list of eight possible sites identified in 1994. The region includes the towns of Roxby Downs, Andamooka, and Woomera.
The dump will consist of one or more trenches, less than 20 metres deep, which will take low-level and short-lived intermediate level radioactive waste (radwaste). The site may also house an above-ground "interim" storage facility for long-lived intermediate level (Category S) waste, which may be destined for deep geological disposal sometime in the future.
The government hopes to begin construction of the dump in the year 2000. This is highly ambitious and flies in the face of the protracted history of the project, which dates from 1980. A "community consultative phase" is underway, which is likely to throw up some political obstacles. Detailed field investigations are planned to identify a suitable 2.5 hectare site for the dump - no small task since the Billa Kalina region is as big as Tasmania.
There is the promise of an assessment under the federal Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974; most likely this will involve a sham Environmental Impact Assessment. In 1994 and again in 1995, the federal ALP government approved the relocation of significant quantities of radwaste from the eastern states to Defence Department land at Woomera, and refused to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment or even a more limited Public Environmental Report before the relocation took place. Sure enough, liquid was found to be leaking from a drum containing radioactive soil while it was being trucked from Lucas Heights to Woomera.
You can't teach an old dog new tricks so the government has been trotting out all the old furphies. The link between nuclear medicine and radioactive waste (radwaste) has been grossly overstated. In reality, the main generators of radwaste in Australia are, in order of culpability: the uranium industry; ANSTO; industrial users of isotopes; and the health-care system.
Leaving aside uranium waste, which is managed (or mismanaged) on site, there is about 3500 cubic metres of radwaste and the stockpile is growing at about 60 cubic metres each year. The waste is currently stored in over 50 locations around the country, though ANSTO holds by far the largest store at Lucas Heights. In some cases the storage facilities are less than adequate. Western Australia has a centralised facility but it only accepts radwaste produced in that state.
No figures are available on the financial cost of the project. The federal government says that the cost will be recovered through a user-pays system, which will encourage radwaste producers to adopt waste minimisation strategies. But fear not, radwaste producers, since the government also says that charges will not be so high as to encourage illicit disposal or abandonment of radwaste.
The federal government likes to play a silly semantic game, sharply distinguishing DISPOSAL in a dump with above-ground STORAGE and claiming that the latter would impose an "unnecessary burden of management on future generations". But it is precisely for the sake of future generations - and the environment - that we should oppose a national dump. Instead, radwaste should be stored in state-of-the-art, above-ground dry storage facilities at the point of production/use. These are the reasons :
The government says that current temporary stores are "not ideal". True, but upgrading of current stores is a better option than a national dump. The government says current stockpiles of radwaste are potentially subject to vandalism, accidents, abandonment, the vagaries of climate and degradation of packaging. True, but some of these problems could be EXACERBATED by a national dump.
The government says that workers responsible for monitoring and maintenance of current stockpiles may be exposed to radiation. True, but workers at a centralised dump might be subject to greater doses of radiation. And what a breath-taking show of crocodile tears and hypocrisy given the expansion of the uranium industry, the plan to build another nuclear reactor, and given that Australian guidelines allow twice the exposure per nuclear installation (including dumps) as UK guidelines.
Another reason given for the national dump is that many small generators of radwaste, such as hospitals and universities, are not equipped to manage its long-term storage in a satisfactory manner. This raises the question as to whether these institutions ought to be dealing with radioactive materials in the first place. That said, it is true that the principle of on-site storage must be waived in some cases because of practical considerations - one example is a disused incinerator room in the State Government Offices in Melbourne. Exemptions might also be granted for institutions which have ceased to produce radwaste and cannot easily or adequately store the existing stockpile. Exemptions to the on-site principle would not justify a national dump.
Through the 1980s, all state governments supported the idea of a national radwaste dump - but not in their state. In the early 1990s, the federal ALP government was openly threatening to seize land for a dump if the stalemate prevailed.
While the stated criteria for a national dump are factors such as low rainfall and geological stability, the main game has been to find a way around the fundamental problem that a radwaste dump is a hard sell at the best of times. It appears that the strategy has been to find a state government which is (or may be) compliant, and then to use a crash-through-or-crash approach to force a dump on the local community.
In some respects the strategy is working. The SA Liberal government supports the proposal, thus reversing its previous strong opposition. The reasons for this backflip are unclear; the fact that the SA Liberals were re-elected less than six months ago will have dulled their sensitivities to community concern.
The Adelaide Advertiser spoke to a couple of ill-informed locals in the Billa Kalina region who don't object to the plan. A petrol station owner at Gelndambo said he will gladly accept business from trucks laden with radwaste, though he expects some trouble from the "greenies" chasing after the trucks!
Keith Greenfield, a station owner/manager, told The Advertiser: "I'm happy with it .... As long as its low-level and is in secure storage." Don't bet on either. It is openly acknowledged by the federal government that the site may also host Category S waste - classified as high-level waste in the USA and some other countries - such as concreted waste returned from Scotland after the reprocessing of spent fuel rods from the Lucas Heights reactor.
The dump might take components from the Lucas Heights HIFAR reactor when it is eventually decommissioned. If a new reactor is built, it is likely that spent fuel from the reactor will be transported to the national dump. Conceivably, the Billa Kalina region could host a reprocessing plant, the main purpose of which would be to trial the Synroc waste immobilisation technology under development in Australia for the past 20 years. The possibilities are endless: the idea of using Synroc to treat imported radwaste has some support within the nuclear industry.
To head off the thin-edge-of-the-wedge argument, the federal government's Bureau of Resource Scientists says that "a limit on total radionuclide activity for the proposed disposal facility will be established." When that limit is reached, a future government will have two options: increase the limit and expand the dump; or establish a new dump. The first option would be attractive given the political and financial costs of the second option.
As for security of storage, the Bureau of Resource Scientists says that an engineered cover will be designed so that "very little if any water will percolate down to the depth of the buried waste". How much is "very little", and might it amount to "very much" over a period of time? Is there a risk that contaminated water will find its way into water streams used by humans and animals? How will the dump handle severe weather?
There are literally dozens of unanswered questions on other aspects of the plan, such as packaging and storage of radwaste prior to and following transport to the dump; the nature and route of transport (and whether state and local governments will be informed of the route); the nature and time-frame for monitoring of the dump; operation by private or public sector agencies; and regulation by state or commonwealth agencies.
The international experience with radwaste - glossed over in the government's propaganda - is that efforts to establish dumps have been notoriously slow and contentious. Recent protests in Germany provide a salient example. Surveys indicate that dumps are feared even more than nuclear power stations. A French survey found that 94% of respondents would not live near a nuclear waste disposal site. Where dumps have "successfully" been established it can require a large dose of political authoritarianism, as in France. Even Margaret Thatcher once backed down on plans for a radwaste dump in the south of England.
In Australia, as around the world, efforts to centralise radwaste storage have historically generated opposition, not just from the environmental and anti-nuclear movements but also from land-owners (indigenous and non-indigenous), local residents, local government, and sometimes business as well. The South Australian ALP Opposition, Democrats, and various environmental and anti-nuclear groups have expressed opposition to the current plan.
It can be expected that opposition to the plan will mount as the issues become clearer. To date, two of the main sources of information for people in the Billa Kalina region have been glossy government brochures and, worse still, The Adelaide Advertiser. The Advertiser's coverage confirms its status as one of Australia's worst newspapers. A journalist visited the region - he spoke to a handful of locals and his analysis was non-existent. The Advertiser's Editor served up the usual fare of parochial populism. While "distinctly less than enthusiastic about the idea", the Editor argued that the Billa Kalina region might be acceptable depending on resolution of one "all-important" issue: what's in it for SA? He suggests some sort of "environmental" pay-off, anything from better quality water to safer roads.
One of the site-selection criteria for the Australian dump is that it should not be located in an area where land ownership rights or control could jeopardise long-term control. However this criterion has not yet been considered. The government offers the curious reason that "negotiations with land-owners will be necessary whatever the site".
There are a number of Aboriginal groups living in the Billa Kalina region - the Kuyani, Barngarla, Kokatha, Arabunna and the Nukunu. Most of these groups are represented on the Port Augusta Native Title Working Party, which has already met with the federal Department of Primary Industries and Energy several times to discuss the proposed dump. Andrew Starkey, a member of the Working Party and spokesperson for the Kokatha People's Committee, says that a number of native title claims are pending on land in the Billa Kalina region. Starkey is well aware that the current proposal may be the thin edge of the wedge.
How can the existence of a number of native title claims be squared with the site-selection criterion concerning long-term control? "A very good question," I was told by the Department of Primary Industries and Energy, but there isn't a very good answer. Native title claims could be jeopardised by the dump.
The government's propaganda fails to mention the main reason for establishing a national dump. Richard Mills from Greenpeace characterises the planned dump as a "clearing exercise" for ANSTO. ANSTO plans to move most or all of its radwaste to the remote dump, or to the USA and Scotland in the case of spent fuel rods. The removal of radwaste from Lucas Heights will make it easier to overcome public opposition to the planned new reactor.
ANSTO has played a significant role in the whole exercise, both as Australia's biggest producer of radwaste (excluding uranium mines) and as a technical adviser to the government on radwaste strategies. Needless to say, there is a glaring conflict of interest in ANSTO's dual roles as radwaste producer and adviser.
Such is ANSTO's clout that when it was directed by the NSW Land and Environment Court not to store radwaste of non-ANSTO origin, and to remove 2000 cubic metres of CSIRO-origin radwaste, the federal ALP government enacted the ANSTO Amendment Act 1992. This Act made ANSTO immune from NSW laws on land use, environment protection, and sundry other matters. The Liberal Party supported this legislation - so much for "states' rights". It is possible that if ANSTO is designated as the proponent of the SA dump, the ANSTO Amendment Act could be invoked to over-ride state opposition.
The 1993 Research Reactor Review noted that it would be no gift to future generations to leave Australia's radioactive problems untackled. The dump will not solve the problems. It merely shifts the problems of radwaste generators, most of all ANSTO, to South Australia. The first step forwards is to minimise the production of radwaste. For this reason, among many others, it is an outrage that the federal government is allowing the expansion of uranium mining (the major source of radwaste in Australia) and the construction of another nuclear research reactor (which will be the largest producer of Category S waste).