The real agenda behind the federal government's plan to build a new nuclear research reactor has little or nothing to do with producing medical isotopes or furthering scientific research. It involves a set of convoluted national interest/security arguments. Essentially, the government wants to maintain a pool of nuclear expertise in order to monitor nuclear programs abroad and to pursue its objectives in international fora. The government also wants to keep its hat in the ring in case a future government decided to produce nuclear weapons or nuclear power. Last but not least, the reactor will be a prop for Australia's uranium industry.

It is likely that at least some of the key proponents of a new reactor want it in order to maintain a pool of nuclear expertise, thus leaving open the option of a nuclear weapons program at some stage in the future.

Like every nuclear reactor, the reactor planned for Lucas Heights will produce plutonium, which could then be separated from the irradiated fuel and used to build bombs. It is possible, though not certain, that the new reactor could be used to produce enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon; this depends on technical parameters that have not yet been established. Either way, the reactor could be used directly for weapons-related research, and also to maintain nuclear expertise which could at some later date be put to use in a weapons program.

While there is little likelihood that a new reactor in Australia would be used in support of a weapons program in the foreseeable future, it encourages other countries to operate reactors; it is part of a cycle of proliferation. Moreover the new reactor may lead to the construction of a reprocessing plant at Lucas Heights or elsewhere in Australia. Other countries might follow suit, and this is problematic because reprocessing facilities can be used to separate fissile plutonium or fissile highly-enriched uranium from spent fuel.

It is acknowledged that Lucas Heights is a potential target for nuclear terrorism, as during the 1991 Gulf War when security was increased. The Georgia Institute of Technology closed its research reactor in late 1995, because of concerns that the weapons-useable highly-enriched uranium fuel could be a target for terrorists during the 1996 Olympics. Will the Lucas Heights HIFAR reactor be closed during the Sydney 2000 Olympics?

ANSTO is supplying a "hot cell" facility to Thailand, ostensibly to process radioisotopes. Does this represent a proliferation risk, given that hot cells can be (and have been) used to separate fissile plutonium? Why does ANSTO refuse to answer my questions on this topic? In particular, why is it that ANSTO refuses to tell me what the maximum plutonium separation capacity of the facility is? Was this issue debated in federal Parliament and if not, why not?

The government claims to have a strong policy in opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In reality the Coalition and the ALP have selective policies, supporting some nuclear weapons programs (esp. the USA), tolerating others (e.g. Israel) and actively opposing weapons proliferation only in some cases (e.g. North Korea). Moreover Australia is in effect a nuclear weapons state by proxy, given the bipartisan reliance on the US nuclear war-fighting machine as a central plank of Australia's "defence" policy.

Philip Baxter, head of ANSTO from 1953 to 1972, was a strong advocate of nuclear weapons. To the best of my knowledge, the current Executive Director of ANSTO, Prof. Helen Garnett, does not support a domestic nuclear weapons program but she certainly supports the development of weapons-useable technologies. For example Prof. Garnett made the following comments about establishing a reprocessing plant at Lucas Heights: "It was consistent with the activities we have. It is consistent with dealing with radioactivity, and therefore we said that it was a reasonable place to put a small pilot processing plant."

A new reactor may turn out to be a forerunner to the introduction of nuclear power in Australia. The nuclear industry has been let off the leash by the Coalition government, and proponents of nuclear power are becoming more numerous and more vocal. ANSTO will be in the thick of the debate telling us how nuclear power can reduce greenhouse emissions from fossil fuels. ANSTO will tell us many other weird and wonderful things; after all, it already claims that its nuclear research reactor cures cancer.

Monitoring overseas nuclear programs is a legitimate objective, and the question is whether a new reactor in Australia will facilitate the monitoring of overseas nuclear programs. It is true that the reactor gives Australia a ticket into the nuclear programs of other countries. But there are practical limitations in relation to the use of scientists as part-time spies (to say nothing of the moral questions). Whatever information might be derived from these channels, it will always be marginal in comparison with information gleaned from normal intelligence and communication channels.

Tied in with the debates over monitoring is some chest-thumping rhetoric about maintaining an "independent" source of expertise and advice to the government. This independent source of advice and expertise is ANSTO, and its expertise is said to depend upon the operation of a research reactor.

But Australia will be dependent on outside sources for the vast majority of information on nuclear matters, with or without a domestic reactor. And if the government is so concerned about independence, then why do Coalition and Labor governments insist that we cower under the US nuclear umbrella? Why do they insist on hosting the US nuclear bases, even though it is known that those facilities are used to spy on Australian communications among other purposes?

Even more laughable is the notion that ANSTO is an "objective" source of advice. ANSTO's secrecy and dishonesty are legend. While it is difficult to assess the quality of advice provided to government by ANSTO, because very little of that information is open to public scrutiny, we do have examples of ANSTO supplying false information to the government on matters of significance.

For example, several years ago ANSTO claimed that Japan would not stockpile plutonium, some of which is derived from Australian uranium. But that is precisely what happened. It is dangerous and stupid to allow Japan to stockpile plutonium. On the strength of its nuclear industry, and its stockpile of weapons-useable plutonium, Japan considers itself, and is treated by others as, a de facto nuclear weapons state. Moreover both North and South Korea use the Japanese plutonium program as a justification and incitement for their own nuclear programs and their flirtations with nuclear weapons.

The most sensitive stages in the nuclear fuel cycle are enrichment and reprocessing; little if any expertise on these technologies will be gained from a new reactor.

The government wants to foster openness and transparency in the nuclear programs of other countries, so where is the openness and transparency in Australia? In 1992, the federal ALP government passed the ANSTO Amendment Act, which makes ANSTO immune from NSW environment laws. The process leading up to the September 1997 announcement on a new reactor is another example of the lack of transparency and public accountability in Australia. A senior government source interviewed by ABC radio (March 29, 1998) said "The government decided to starve the opponents of oxygen, so that they could dictate the manner of the debate that would follow the announcement. Because they couldn't win it on rational grounds .... they decided, right, we'll play the game and in the lead up to the announcement catch them totally unawares, catch them completely off-guard and starve them of oxygen until then. No leaks, don't write letters arguing the point, just keep them in the dark completely."

Another aspect of the monitoring role concerns the monitoring of Australian uranium. Australia should not be exporting uranium in the first place. The IAEA safeguards system is the main barrier to the use of Australian uranium in nuclear weapons, but the safeguards system has many faults and limitations. There are also strong environmental and health and safety arguments against nuclear power.

Apart from monitoring, thee is the promotion of Australian uranium. The Lucas Heights research reactor provides a ticket into the international nuclear club, and thus provides opportunities for Australian scientists and diplomats to shore up Australian uranium sales. This is openly acknowledged. Apart from directly promoting Australian uranium, the diplomats and scientists also pursue indirect strategies to increase uranium demand: they promote nuclear power, and they make some efforts to improve the international safeguards system (without going so far as to conflict with other objectives such as toadying to the US and its nuclear war-fighting machine).

As well as monitoring overseas nuclear programs, the Australian government hopes to influence them. "If you want to have influence, you usually have to get your hands dirty", a hairy-chested foreign affairs bureaucrat (recruited from ANSTO) said in 1993. And that means operating a nuclear research reactor in Australia.

The key is Australia's seat on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This seat is said to be dependent on the operation of a research reactor, although there is no iron-clad guarantee that it will be lost without a reactor, nor that it will be maintained with a new reactor. The make-up of the Board of Governors is determined by the existing Board.

As for the significance of the IAEA position, the foreign affairs bureaucrat put the issue thus: "Our role on the (IAEA) Board of Governors is central to our ability to influence the direction of the nuclear industry and the control of nuclear weapons. It is the only body in the world which looks at those issues on a week to week basis and that is fundamental."

But does the IAEA position really give Australia leverage, does it really make Australia one of the "countries that count"? Concrete examples are few and far between.

One of the few examples given is Australia's role in "forcing" North Korea to end its covert weapons program and to conclude a nuclear safeguards agreement in the early 1990s. We are told that without the seat on the IAEA (and without a reactor to shore up that position), Australia would have had no involvement in the North Korean saga.

However, the North Korean situation would not have unfolded any differently without Australian involvement. Moreover the "agreement" involves a multi-billion dollar technology transfer to North Korea, including the funding and construction of two nuclear power reactors which will produce far more plutonium than the existing small reactors ever could. The then ALP government contributed some millions of dollars towards that ridiculous deal, and avoided public or parliamentary scrutiny of its manoeuvrings insofar as it was able.

Another example provided by the foreign affairs bureaucrats followed the Chernobyl disaster, after which there was an emergency meeting of the IAEA's Board of Governors. Australia took to that meeting a resolution to set up a process of negotiating some new nuclear safety conventions. Big deal. What the technocrats fail to mention is that for many years Australia was also encouraging Indonesia to build nuclear power reactors on earthquake-prone Java; so much for nuclear safety.

The pattern seems to be that whenever there is a disaster or a public outrage (for example over weapons testing), there is a race to see who can be first to put up a vacuous resolution at an IAEA meeting. The rest of the time, however, Australia, like so many other countries, promotes the spread of the nuclear industry in all sorts of dangerous and irresponsible ways.

And while the underfunded safeguards section of the IAEA struggles vainly to determine whether or not signatory countries are pursuing covert weapons programs, the IAEA also continues with its main function, which is to promote nuclear technology. And the technologies it promotes, while ostensibly for civil purposes, can easily be used for weapons production: 90% of nuclear technologies are "dual-use", to use the industry euphemism.

As nuclear campaigner Jean McSorley writes, "it would not be a bad thing if Australia were in there pushing for stricter safeguards, a separation of promotion and watch-dog activities and stringent safety laws. If Australia did that it would, more than likely, lose its Board of Governors seat. So, Australia has to be part of the promotional stakes to keep within the upper echelons of the IAEA."

Past and present Australian governments have also pushed hard to secure the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, and to conclude the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Superficially these appear to be admirable goals, but they are not. Both entrench the division between the nuclear "haves" - the five declared weapons states - and the "have-nots".

During negotiations on both issues, Australia should have been pushing for complete, verified disarmament by all nuclear weapons states within a specified timeframe. Instead, Australian governments have been far more concerned to shore up the US alliance and Australia's position under the US nuclear umbrella.

This involves the search for technical fixes to discourage or prevent covert weapons programs, such as video surveillance. This is useful work, so far as it goes, but I am unaware of work, but I am unaware of any safeguards work that depends on the operation of a reactor. For example, the Australian Safeguards Office places great emphasis on environmental sampling (isotopic fingerprinting) - small samples (e.g. of soil) can provide remarkably detailed knowledge on past and present nuclear activities. Environmental sampling uses ANSTO's tandem accelerator, not HIFAR. Similarly, video surveillance research does not require a reactor.

In a nutshell, Australia has little influence on the international scene, with or without a nuclear reactor. What influence Australia does have is used primarily to pursue imperialist objectives and, as a grubby little add-on, to pursue the commercial objectives of the uranium industry.

In 1993 Jean McSorley concluded an article on the "national interest" aspects of the Lucas Heights reactor with these words: "There are those naive, cynical or ignorant enough to think that Australia's role in the nuclear industry enhances its international standing. That's not true. This country should stand alongside the weapons states and others who have contaminated this planet, and be charged with aiding and abetting criminal activities."

If the government really wanted to pursue the national interest, rather than the interests of the nuclear industry and the interests of US and Australian imperialism, then it would get serious about nuclear disarmament.

One positive step would be to close the Lucas Heights reactor without replacement. That in itself would have a powerful symbolic effect - an advanced industrial country deciding that life is indeed possible without a nuclear reactor.

The closure of the Lucas Heights reactor should be tied to the development and export of non-reactor alternatives for medical and scientific applications. There are numerous alternative technologies - such as cyclotrons and spallation sources - and they are withering on the vine because of preferential funding for reactor technology.

This strategy is anything but a panacea: those countries with weapons ambitions would be the least likely to switch to alternative technologies. But it would help stem the gradual and often unintentional drift of many countries towards a weapons capability. And it would expose those countries that do have a military agenda behind their civil nuclear programs.

The Australian Safeguards Office has said that safeguards issues (more generally the national interest issues) would not alone carry the case for a new reactor. Given the weakness of the medical and scientific arguments put forward for a new reactor, it can only be concluded that HIFAR should be shut down without replacement.