SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSION

TO THE

SCOTTISH ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AGENCY

on the Second Consultation on the Decision by SEPA on the Application from UKAEA to Dispose of Radioactive Wastes from Dounreay, Caithness Scotland.

Concerning the proposal to reprocess spent nuclear fuel rods from Australia and subsequent wastes arising

This submission is made in response to the scottish Environment Protection Agency’s call for submissions on the Second Consultation on the Decision by SEPA on the Application from UKAEA to Dispose of Radioactive Wastes from Dounreay, Caithness Scotland.

February 1998

SUBMISSION TO THE SCOTTISH ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AGENCY

on the Second Consultation on the Decision by SEPA on the Application from UKAEA to Dispose of Radioactive Wastes from Dounreay, Caithness Scotland.

Jean McSorley

INTRODUCTION

This submission concerns the radioactive wastes which will arise from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from Australia at Dounreay. The contract will involve approximately 1,000 of the 1,600 fuel rods currently held in Australia. This submission questions whether Australia will be in a position to accept waste returns within the ten year timescale initiated under the latest arrangements covering foreign reprocessing contracts at Dounreay The submission also discusses the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation’s (ANSTO) approach to the radioactive waste materials – including spent fuel – which arise operation of the High-Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR) and associated facilities at the organisation’s Lucas Heights site in Sutherland Shire, Sydney. The intent of this submission is to inform SEPA in its consideration of the application from the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) concerning the disposal of radioactive waste from the Dounreay site.

In relation to the UKAEA’s application the following matters are considered throughout this submission:-

SUMMARY RESPONSES TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS

No (more) spent fuel should be accepted for reprocessing from Australia until there is a legally binding contract from Australia to accept return of the wastes arising within five years of the fuel leaving Australia. This is, at the very least, an essential aspect of any contract. There should be no caveats to this condition. The return of wastes within five years could be achieved using the ‘equivalence’ approach, where the same amount of radioactivity can be returned regardless of the origin of the ‘atoms’ in the waste (see page 11 for explanation). As ANSTO and related Australian government agencies have, over the past forty years, failed to determine and execute a spent fuel and waste management within Australia. It is not unreasonable to assume that the same attitude to waste returns will prevail in the coming decades. It is imperative, therefore, that pressure be applied to make Australia act on ensuring the waste return clauses are honoured. Reducing the time for return to five years through using the equivalence approach, will help in this process.

The move to send spent nuclear fuel overseas panders to the short term political ‘solution’ ANSTO is currently seeking – in fact it is essential that ANSTO is seen ‘solve’ its radioactive waste problem because of the organisation’s application to build a third nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights. The continued storage of radioactive waste and spent fuel at Lucas Heights is known to be unacceptable to the people of Sutherland (Environment Protection Agency, 1995). ANSTO knows that it will not readily find a solution to its problems within Australia. The proposal to site a low-level waste (LLW) and short-lived intermediate level waste dump (SL-ILW) dump, along with a store for long-lived-ILW (LL-ILW) and high level waste (HLW), is yet to be actively pursued in Australia. To date, all States within Australia have rejected the notion of playing host to such a facility (Panter, 1992). By moving the spent fuel offshore, however, ANSTO will give the impression of having solved one of its more contentious radioactive waste problems. Few Australian’s realise that there is a ‘return to sender’ clause for waste arising from UK reprocessing contracts.

Despite the differing views on radioactive waste and spent fuel management within Australia there is no overwhelming imperative for the spent nuclear fuel to be reprocessed overseas. There is no technical reason why the spent nuclear fuel should not stay in Australia. Not surprisingly, the idea of a reprocessing plant – particularly at Lucas Heights - has already proven to be politically unacceptable.

However reprocessing is not the only option for the spent fuel rods. ANSTO could investigate encapsulation of the rods, and then store them on-site, off-site or seek deep geological disposal. It could ‘condition’ the rods, a chemical dissolution process, and then use immobilisation technologies and store the resultant material on-site, off-site or seek disposal (although this option would probably also be unacceptable). There are clearly a number of technological responses to dealing with spent nuclear fuel other than reprocessing. Alternatives to reprocessing are also being developed in the US for the purpose of managing HEU spent nuclear fuel from research reactors (United States, Department of Environment, Final Environmental Impact Statement , 1996. Vol 1 2.2.2.7). Unfortunately, whilst ANSTO and Federal government officials have conceded that there is no technical reason why the fuel should could not remain here in Australia, no one is actually pursuing these alternatives to reprocessing (McSorley, 1997).

Most importantly the waste could be stored in state-of-the-art above ground dry stores - the only environmentally acceptable option. On a number of occasions ANSTO has claimed it has the wherewithal to store and/or reprocess the spent fuel itself albeit that this might be difficult to gain acceptance for within Australia. Thus, even if other technologies were not developed, Australia could still take advantage of the storage option already used in many countries rather than hurriedly pursuing reprocessing overseas.

The issue of spent nuclear fuel is a political and social problem. No political party wants to be seen to promote either reprocessing, storage or direct disposal within their term of office – either at the Lucas Heights site or somewhere else within Australia. The UK authorities have had enough experience of problems with siting radioactive waste dumps/stores to be aware of the sensitivity of these issues.

Perhaps the central issue for SEPA is, if they allow more spent fuel to be received by UKAEA, will Australia have a facility ready in time to receive the wastes returned? The answer is "highly unlikely." At present the relevant Federal government agencies are yet to embark even on the siting of the LLW and SL-ILW dump. The chosen site will also be the suggested location for the store for LL-ILW and HLW. The process of finding a site for the less radioactive materials may take many years - not an unreasonable assumption based on past experience within Australia and overseas. However, there is no doubt that ANSTO, which has prevaricated and obfuscated over its radioactive waste and spent fuel policy, has no one but itself to blame for its current predicament vis a vis waste problems.

It seems particularly unfair that the people of Scotland, or indeed any other country might be exposed to a potential risk through the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from a developed country – because the nuclear agency in that country has failed in its housekeeping tasks. However, Australia claims to have much expertise in the nuclear field. Australia holds the permanent regional seat on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ANSTO, one of Australia’s leading scientific organisations, has said that one of its aims is to have an "enhanced influence on nuclear practices in our region" – the Asia-Pacific (see ANSTO, Strategic Plan 1996). ANSTO has said it hopes to increase its knowledge and ability in improving radioactive waste management. The organisation coordinates the fifteen-nation Regional Cooperation Agreement of the IAEA. What is the response of ANSTO to its major nuclear waste problem? Ship it half way round the world, leave it there for at least a decade, and hope someone else can deal with the wastes which are returned.

SEPA must question government officials from both Britain and Australia, who will negotiate the contracts between the UKAEA and ANSTO, on exactly how Australia will honour any commitments regarding the return of radioactive wastes? Should Scotland allow itself to be used as a dumping ground (albeit in theory a temporary dumping ground) by a country which claims to have the technical ability to deal with its own radioactive waste? Why should any risk be incurred in Scotland because of political problems in Australia, or because of ANSTO’s sloth like approach to housekeeping?

These issues which should be central to SEPA, and the people of Scotland, in relation ot the UKAEA’s application and the proposal to accept more spent nuclear fuel from Australia.

NOTES AND COMMENTS ON AUSTRALIA’S RADIOACTVE WASTE AND SPENT FUEL POLICY 1990-1998.

In 1986, the need to make a shipment of spent fuel, or to deal with the matter in Australia by increasing storage capacity, was recognised in a statement made by then Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans (reported in SCRAM, 1990). Some Australian officials have claimed that as the highly enriched uranium (HEU) for the reactor was supplied by the US and UK it was always expected – and therefore always ‘policy’ – that the spent nuclear fuel rods would go either to the UK or the US. However, it has certainly not always been the expectation of the Australian Government, or ANSTO, that the fuel rods could, or should, go overseas. Despite this, nothing was done by the relevant authorities to put in place a program which would ensure Australia would have the necessary storage capacity, or the technical wherewithal, to handle all the spent fuel its nuclear activities would produce and thus avoid having to rely on overseas agencies to accept shipments. In relation to this ANSTO has stated that:

"At least 10 years additional spent fuel storage space at Lucas Heights could be provided with a limited level of expenditure (around $0.1m). The majority of this storage space would be storage under water. Further dry storage could then be provided with a higher level of expenditure." and "The United States Department of Energy policy currently allows the wastes from reprocessing "foreign" research reactor spent fuel to remain in the United States and therefore the matter of returned wastes from reprocessing HIFAR spent fuel does not arise." (ANSTO, 22/4/91).

However, ANSTO did know waste returns would be an issue with the UKAEA’s reprocessing contracts. It is worth noting that the shipment ANSTO subsequently made to Dounreay in 1995, of 114 fuel rods, cost approximately A$7 million (House of Representatives, 7/5/96). Current proposals put the cost of reprocessing approximately 1,000 fuel rods in the tens of millions. Later in 1991, ANSTO claimed that keeping the spent fuel at Lucas Heights would be the lowest cost option for spent nuclear management. ANSTO also wrote;

"There are no technical problems with the continued storage of spent fuel at Lucas Heights. Additional storage facilities can be constructed as required. However, permanent disposal would require another site in Australia." (ANSTO, 24/9/91)

In late 1992 ANSTO again wrote that there was no problem in storing the spent fuel at Lucas Heights and that the fuel could either be stored on site or sent overseas:

"There is no pressing need to choose one of the above options at this time, but both are viable. ANSTO has several more years of storage space available at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories and can readily add to this capacity as necessary. Technology for the long term dry storage of spent fuel is proven and widely available." (ANSTO, letter 6/10/1992)

Despite the growing inventory of fuel rods, increased storage capacity on site was not pursued. By early 1993, in a submission to the Research Reactor Review taking evidence on the ANSTO’s application to build a new reactor at Lucas Heights, ANSTO wrote

"There have been no problems associated with fuel storage and the existing facilities can be expanded as necessary, to accommodate all future quantities of spent fuel until they are shipped overseas for reprocessing or sent to a suitable national repository’ and "Spent fuel racks designed to use the fuel as irradiation sources are being replaced by racks in which the fuel can be spaced closer together and arranged in two tiers. The new arrangement can provide storage options such as the expansion of the dry underground facility will be installed if shipment overseas does not proceed" (emphasis added) (ANSTO, 1993, p.5-14).

The panel of the RRR challenged ANSTO over its capacity and intent in dealing the radioactive wastes at Lucas Heights, and asked the organisation to prove that it had longer terms plans to manage the situation on site if necessary. In response to this, during verbal evidence to the RRR, ANSTO stated:

"If we had to continue to store fuel for a longer period – and this would also apply to our new research reactor – we can very simply extend the present dry storage facility in our underground facility to drill more holes into the bedrock and effectively double up that existing provisions. We have been storing fuel there for, I would say, at least 25 years or so at this point in time without any sign of corrosion of the fuel and this is established international practice and we can continue to do that for many more decades (RRR Public Hearing, 1993:191).

Both the RRR panel and ANSTO acknowledged that such an issue would be of concern to the residents of Sutherland Shire, but nobody questioned the feasibility of it. That there has now been found to be corrosion of the fuel rods in the current storage site does not detract from the fact that ANSTO does have space at Lucas Heights to build more storage facilities – as evidenced by ANSTO’s application to build a new reactor and associated buildings in late 1997. The suggestion in early 1997 that ANSTO could build a reprocessing plant on site – along with waste storage facilities – also proves that the site has enough room for spent fuel storage which, coupled with expectation of a national nuclear ‘repository’, were once enough to convince the organisation that it had no concerns over waste management (ANSTO,1993:4.12-4.16). Whilst ANSTO’s 1993 paper did raise the possibility of having the spent fuel reprocessed overseas it said nothing of possible waste returns if the spent fuel was reprocessed in Scotland. In fact that matter was not raised until the RRR hearings when, in verbal evidence, ANSTO noted:

"One of the difficulties in the case of the United Kingdom, in particular, is that they require an option to return the waste which is separated from that fuel out of the United Kingdom, so that is one of the difficulties we have in returning our fuel to the United Kingdom. We are continuing discussion with the United Kingdom authorities to see ways in which this particular matter can be handled." (RRR Public hearing, 1993:193)

The RRR’s Final Report was, however, critical of ANSTO’s approach to radioactive waste. It noted that:

‘Its (the Review panel) attention was focussed by the easy optimism of those who believe Australia does not and will never have such a problem. Despite Australia’s modest presence in the nuclear world, it already has a high level waste problem. It would be no gift to future generations to leave it untackled.’ (RRR, 1993:216)

‘The spent fuel rods at Lucas Heights can only sensibly be treated as high level waste. World opinion is moving in the direction of favouring the conditioning and direct disposal of spent fuel rods in preference to reprocessing. In any case, maintenance of the view that reprocessing is the best option inevitably involves return to Australian of by-product high level liquid wastes, making a national high level waste repository an inescapable concomitant of having any kind of nuclear reactor. The pretence that spent fuel rods constitute an asset must stop." (emphasis added) (RRR, 1993:216)

The RRR also noted that "exporting an Australian problem is morally dubious." (RRR, 1993:212)

ANSTO challenged the view that the wastes returned from Dounreay will be HLW (a view shared by the UKAEA, but rejected by the US agencies which treat it as HLW). However, ANSTO and government agencies do concede that the long-lived ILW wastes which will be returned will have to have the same disposal route as HLW – that is in an above-ground, (remote?) dry-store and then disposal in a deep geological repository. ANSTO knows the problems associated with the wastes are not diminished by changing its categorisation to long-lived ILW (Under the National Health and Medical Research guidelines such wastes are known as Category S). In the five years since the RRR, ANSTO has done nothing to address the issue of radioactive waste in general or the spent nuclear fuel and/or waste returns in particular.

At this point it is perhaps worth considering the views of the residents of Sutherland Shire, particularly in relation to on-site storage of radioactive wastes, as their views affect ANSTO’s behaviour (through political pressure). The people of Sutherland Shire have, in common with many communities which host nuclear plants, mixed views on the presence of the Lucas Heights facility. There is, however, consensus on the point that no one wants the radioactive wastes produced at the site to remain there (Canberra Times, 1992, Curtin, 1992, Fries, 1992 and Reuters, 1992)

However, the local environment group, along with a number of local and national politicians, have also expressed their opposition to spent fuel being sent overseas – they believe it is Australia’s responsibility to deal with all the radioactive wastes created in Australia. In the past Sutherland Shire Council has actually sought to challenge continued waste storage at the site. Early in 1992, the Council won a court case against ANSTO, preventing it from bringing wastes to the site for packaging and storage (Land and Environment Court of NSW Record of Hearing 5/2/1992 ref. 40215/91). The judge hearing that case noted that whilst each State government had said that a national nuclear dump should be found, that they (the States) were not willing to host it.

The court’s decision led to the Federal Government changing the laws governing ANSTO, removing once and for all any powers that a State court might have over what the Federal Government considers is purely a Federal agency (Panter, 1992 and McSorley, 1992). Naturally this did nothing to allay the concerns of residents who now feel somewhat powerless in influencing ANSTO’s activities.

A further concern for residents, which has only recently come to light, is the finding that some of the spent nuclear fuel rods are corroding. Currently the majority of the spent nuclear fuel rods are stored in stainless steel tubes which are embedded in the sandstone rock in the Lucas Heights site. It is believed the water entered the stainless steel tubes through the seals the IAEA place over them for safeguard (non-proliferation) purposes. The ingress of water must have taken place prior to 1990, the year a shed was constructed over the storage area. Discovery of the problem is particularly disconcerting to local residents, as claims have been made by ANSTO since 1990 that there is absolutely no problem with the rods (ANSTO 1993:Att. D:5.14). Indeed, so favourable were the reports from ANSTO, and the IAEA, on the fuel storage at Lucas Heights, that the US DOE makes special mention of this when discussing storage options in its policy documents on spent fuel returns (US DOE EIS, 1996:Appendix F:80-81).

Despite the problems ANSTO might now be currently experiencing on site, it does not mean that it could not radically improve the situation by building a dedicated above-ground dry store. However, given the organisations past record it is hardly surprising that the local people do not feel they can entirely trust ANSTO (or the IAEA as overseers) to look after the spent fuel in the best way possible.

ANSTO’s has not been keep to explain its policy on the return of nuclear waste from spent fuel reprocessing.. At a Public Forum hosted by Sutherland Shire Council on 21 October last year, a trade union representative from the site spoke on the issue of reprocessing. He was keen, he said, to assure the people at the meeting that there would be no reprocessing at the site (quite why this should be a bad thing for Australia, but a good thing for Scotland, was not explained). However, that same union representative claimed that "there will be no wastes returned from reprocessing." Does this mean that no waste will be returned to Lucas Heights, or to Australia? When challenged on this neither ANSTO nor the person in question would reply.

It is clear that those who are concerned over the willingness and ability of both ANSTO (and the UKAEA) to enforce the ‘return of waste’ clauses should press for a clear-cut answer on the issue. It is no longer tenable for the nuclear industry to hide behind the smokescreen of ‘commercial in confidence’ reprocessing contracts. The people of Scotland have every right to know exactly what the contracts states. Unfortunately there are good reasons for being suspicious about the intentions of ANSTO has, since its creation had a very erratic and unprofessional approach to spent nuclear fuel management.

For example, in early 1993 - around the same as the Research Reactor Review - a paper was presented in the US concerning a application by the fifteen-nation Edlow Group (which included Australia) to have spent nuclear fuel sent back to the US. The Edlow Group claimed that the US was responsible for the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel which it had supplied for their research reactors. The paper challenged the then policy of the US government, which was not to accept the return of HEU fuel from overseas operators. The paper gave information on Cogema’s refusal to reprocess for research reactors, and also touched on the role of the UKAEA in possible reprocessing options. Importantly, that it stated that both Australia and the IAEA have no "nuclear waste program" (Egan, 1993, p. 8).

The representation made in 1993 is relevant still as some five years later Australia does not have a workable program on nuclear waste – a matter which clearly relates to possible waste returns from reprocessing. The lack of action on ‘domestic’ responses to the country’s growing spent fuel stockpile since 1993 underscores Australia’s inability to act in a timely and appropriate manner on such issues. By 1993, Australia had already expressed a reluctance to send spent fuel back to the UK because of the problem of wastes returns, but still made no effort to deal with this problem within Australia. ANSTO’s policy – such as it is – appears to be to back itself into a corner in the expectation of sending its spent fuel overseas – all without a proper policy for subsequent waste arising from domestic operations and overseas reprocessing.

It is also fair to ask just how honest was ANSTO being in early 1993, when it claimed there was storage space available for many years for spent fuel at Lucas Heights? Was ANSTO lying, or was it just being incompetent? For, despite assurances to the contrary, by late 1993 ANSTO was asking the US DOE to take an "urgent relief shipment" of spent nuclear fuel, claiming that they desperately needed to move spent fuel off-site, or face the possible closure of the reactor (McSorley and Pearson, 1993 and US DOE, 1993). How was it that ANSTO got things so wrong? ANSTO’s submission to the RRR, claiming everything was under control, was made in March 1993. The request for an urgent relief shipment to the US was made in October 1993. However, ANSTO was not to make a shipment of spent fuel until April 1996, and then to the UK. Since that shipment in 1996 ANSTO has – again - failed to make any effort to build further dry store facilities at Lucas Heights. What does this indicate for planning for the return of wastes from reprocessing?

It would be wrong, however, to only criticise ANSTO’s in managing Australia’s radioactive waste problem. Federal government agencies have also failed to insist on a clear policy direction and action on this issue. In June 1994 the Federal Minister for Industry, Science and Technology wrote that:

"However, you would be aware that there is a lead time of at least three years to design and construct new dry storage capacity (at Lucas Heights). Hence if there is to be no shipment during 1994 or guarantee during 1994 that shipments will be made soon after, there will have to be a decision early in 1995 on the need for new capacity so that there can be certainty of sufficient capacity in 1998." (emphasis added) (Letter, 7/6/94).

Once again, absolutely nothing was done by the overseeing Federal agencies to make this new storage capacity become a reality. In September 1994, a memo leaked from the Australian Government delegation attending the South Pacific Forum, revealed that Australia was pressuring Pacific Islands not to implement a ban the movement of radioactive waste (under the Basel Convention) in the region. One of the reasons given for this is that Australia expected it would have to accept the return of waste arising from reprocessing of its spent nuclear fuel. This was the first indication that the idea of having the rods reprocessed in the UK was back on the agenda.

In late 1995 the proposal to send a shipment of 114 fuel rods to the UK was finally made public. According to ANSTO, the main reason for the shipment was that the UAKEA was seeking reprocessing contracts so that it could continued to operate the MTR reprocessing plant at Dounreay (ANSTO, Public Environment Review, 1995:7). However, ANTO did add that it needed to make a shipment in 1996 because, even the organisation wanted to have more storage room on-site, it would take 2-3 years to complete the necessary processes and build the store. Again, since that time nothing has happened – instead of tackling the spent fuel problem ANSTO have proposed to a) send all its spent fuel overseas and b) build another reactor – the spent fuel from which it has no policy for dealing with!!

In late 1995 the Federal Environment Protection Agency (EPA) also published a document on the proposed spent fuel shipment. In discussing the alternatives to the shipment it noted (EPA, 1995:7)

Direct disposal in Australia. Direct disposal in Australia of spent research reactor fuel would raise significant policy and technical problems such as operation of deep geological repositories

(NOTE: ANSTO is the main technical adviser to the Federal agencies on nuclear matters).

Storage at Lucas Heights. Storage at Lucas Heights of HIFAR spent fuel has been safely carried out on site for over thirty years. However, continued accumulation of spent fuel at Lucas Heights defers the problem of eventual disposal, and invites opposition from local residents and local government. (emphasis added)

Storage elsewhere in Australia. Storage of spent fuel elements elsewhere in Australia is not at present a viable option environmentally and again only defers permanent disposal of HIFAR spent fuel.

The EPA’s views are contradictory – on the one hand claiming that direct disposal presents a problem (point 1) whilst also stating that storage of fuel elements in Australia only defers permanent disposal (point 3) – as if they had that option ready to implement. The only ‘safe’ option and feasible option appears to be on-site storage at Lucas Heights (point 2) – something the EPA acknowledges is politically untenable. The EPA failed to address the return of waste arising from reprocessing, even though it knew that waste would be returned from overseas if reprocessing went ahead. As the RRR had already noted "it would be no gift to future generations to leave it (spent fuel) untackled" (RRR, 1993 p. 216) yet ANSTO’s PER expressly noted that:

"the returned wastes will be of intermediate level radioactivity and will therefore represent only an increment on the other Australian holdings of international level radioactive wastes for which a national storage/disposal facility will need to be developed over that twenty five year timescale and this would be a matter for future Government policy determination. The environmental impact will need to be assessed at that time as part of the wider proposal."(emphasis added) (ANSTO, 1995, PER:15).

By early 1996, the US Department of Energy (US DOE) had published its Final Environmental Impact Statement. There are a number of matters raised in the DOE’s EIS which are directly relevant to ANSTO, its approach to spent nuclear fuel and the matters of waste returns. In a letter to the DOE, ANSTO notes that:

"Australia is one of those countries without a nuclear power industry that is not in a position to readily take back reprocessing wastes. We would therefore look for any wastes to be accepted by the US for storage and ultimate disposal" (US DOE, Vol.3).

The same point is made in a letter to the US from the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries and Energy – the department overseeing the LLW and SL-ILW dump and co-located LL-ILW and HLW store proposal. It is also worth noting that the US DOE also touched on the issue of ‘equivalence’, in terms of the amount of spent fuel they will take from Australia:

"It is the amount of US origin material that is of concern to the United States, and not the precise atoms or molecules which must be accounted." (DOE, EIS, Vol. 3 . No. 164, para.14 – responses)

This point should be of particular interest in Scotland. The SEPA papers on the application from the UKAEA on waste disposal from Dounreay (SEPA, 1997, Vol. 1:74) states that the wastes from reprocessing must be returned within 10 years of them arising.

However, it is accepted by the nuclear industry that the actual accounting for individual, ‘national’ atoms is irrelevant. Amounts of radioactive material – whether it be uranium, plutonium or wastes – are dealt with in terms of ‘equivalence’. If, therefore, Australia sends 2,000,000 curies of radioactivity in spent fuel to the UK, then the UKAEA will be expected to return 2,000,000 curies to Australia. Why should the UKAEA be able to wait until it produces the wastes directly from the Australian spent fuel before it can return the wastes? To show good faith, Australia could agree to accept the radioactive equivalent in wastes within three-five years of the spent fuel being sent overseas (giving ANSTO time to build a store, but minimising the time for return). Allowing the current situation to prevail will not put pressure on the UKAEA to get rid of the wastes, nor will it force Australia into acting on waste returns. There are no technical barriers to this ‘swap’ taking place.

Such a move will also put pressure on the Australian government to act on this matter. In April 1996, when the Australian Senate Committee on Radioactive Wastes reported, its chairman Senator Grant Chapman, noted "there is an urgent need for a Commonwealth Government decision on a national storage facility." (Senator Chapman, Media Release, 1996). The committee recommended that the storage facility take low, intermediate and high level waste – the latter being Category S wastes (Senate Select Committee, 1996). In fact, on waste returns from reprocessing it has already being implied there might already be an available facility within Australia. In reply to a question in the Senate in May 1996, the Minister for Industry, Science and Tourism noted that:

"In view of the considerable time before a facility for the returned waste from Dounreay, no review of potential storage sites has as yet been conducted. The storage of Category S wastes at Woomera has demonstrated that it is possible to safely store this category of radioactive in existing structures. However, if there is no suitable existing building, a purpose built facility will be required." (emphasis added).

To date, no public announcements have been made on the recommendations contained in the Senate’s report on radioactive waste – although the announcement to build a new reactor is putting pressure on the government to tackle the problem. A closed meeting of State and Commonwealth officials on 25th November 1997 discussed the issue of radioactive waste. It is believed ANSTO attended in an advisory capacity, but Sutherland Shire Council was refused permission to attend as an observer body.

One further document which SEPA should take note of is ANSTO’s ‘Radioactive Waste Management Policy’, Preliminary Environmental Review. This was, supposedly, published in May 1996. However, the local Council and community groups, who regularly attend meetings with ANSTO, were not given copies until mid-1997 (the relevant chapter on spent nuclear fuel is attached). In that documents ANSTO claims it will:

None of the above was discussed with either the people of Sutherland Shire, with the Pacific Island nations, with the Scottish public, or within the Australian Parliament. In short, it is ANSTO’s plan, and presumably one in which the UKAEA has also had a hand. The documents does not acknowledge that the US refuses to accept that is it under any contractual arrangements to take back the fuel rods it has supplied over the past forty years. Thus, ANSTO may yet seek to have all of its spent nuclear fuel stockpile sent to Dounreay.

KEEPING THE SPENT FUEL IN AUSTRALIA – PROLIFERATION AND DIRECT DISPOSAL CONCERNS

On this issue there have been two major concerns raised by ANSTO. Firstly, that it is not possible to directly condition the wastes without some form of chemical processing. Secondly, that there are proliferation concerns if the spent fuel stays in Australia. As these claims may have some influence on SEPA’s decision they are commented on below.

Direct Disposal

The RRR did raise this as an option (RRR, 1993:212), pointing out that opinion was shifting in favour of direct disposal of fuel rods. The preferred option in the US for managing spent nuclear fuel from research reactors is to pursue direct disposal without reprocessing or chemical conditioning it possible (Management Option No. 1, US DOE, EIS, 1996). Given that ANSTO claim has on-site at Lucas Heights to store large amounts of radioactive waste, why is the organisation so insistent on sending the spent fuel overseas now? Why not wait to see what progress is made in the US on this matter?

Alternately, the US EIS also lists (US DOE Volume 1, 2.2.2.7, p.2.22-2.23) a range of conditioning or encapsulation techniques which could be applied to the spent nuclear fuel rods, some of which are already in use. Indeed the issue of ‘conditioning’ (semi-reprocessing or direct encapsulation) has not been completely dismissed within Australia. The head of the Australian Safeguards Office (ASO) had said that there are known techniques which could be applied here to avoid criticality of the fuel in a repository (McSorley, 1997, p.16-18). In a meeting with environmental and residents groups at Lucas Heights last year, the author of this submission raised the issue of criticality and spent fuel disposal with one of the senior scientists responsible for managing the spent fuel. The response to whether criticality was a problem for HIFAR spent fuel vis a vis direct disposal was a most definite "no." The current Federal government is also aware that conditioning the waste here in Australia is technically feasible, if not politically acceptable. Minister’s have already written to members of the public explaining these possibilities (Science and Technology Minister, 1997). That the conditioning/reprocessing option was abandoned on the same day that Sutherland Shire was told it would not host the massively unpopular second international airport for Sydney, nor would it have reprocessing plant - but would get a new reactor - indicates the political, rather than scientific or technical, nature of this debate in Australia.

The above matters are raised without preference being given to any of these options. The author believes above-ground dry-storage at the site of origin of radioactive wastes is the only acceptable environmental option at present. However, it is important that SEPA knows of the varying views there are on this topic, within ANSTO, the ASO and the US DOE.

Proliferation

In many respects this is an issue which should not be of concern to either SEPA or the UKAEA. Whilst ANSTO has used the proliferation ‘card’ in its dealings with the US DOE, this has not been raised as a central issue in its proposals to send spent fuel to Scotland. Accepting HEU spent fuel rods from countries it supplied is part of the US government’s non-proliferation policy. For the US is it important to be seen to play its part in minimising the amount of weapons-useable nuclear materials held by other countries (US DOE 1996, Vol 3- p.1.0-1-1.12). The effectiveness of such a policy will not be debated here.

However, this issue may be raised at some time in the future as a reason why spent nuclear fuel should be sent to Dounreay – despite the fact that Australia claims to have impeccable non-proliferation credentials. Whether Australia should send spent fuel to Dounreay, instead of the US – and the proliferation implications of such a move – was first raised when Australia applied for an urgent relief shipment of spent fuel to the US DOE in 1993 (McSorley and Pearson, 1993, US DOE, 1993). Given that the US DOE subsequently refused to accede to ANSTO’s request (and has still yet to take any spent fuel from Australia) gives some indication as to how it views the matter

In a letter to Greenpeace (ANSTO, 11/1/96) it is claimed that the IAEA classification of HEU spent fuel would prevent it from being dealt with in Australia because – in its current form – it has the potential to be weapons useable (subject to reprocessing presumably) (ANSTO, 1995:p.5-7) . However, when this point was raised with the head of the ASO last year a different response was forthcoming. In short, the ASO believes that there are conditioning techniques which could be used here which would render the spent fuel harmless and that the necessary safeguard measures would then be applied at the relevant storage or disposal site (McSorley,1997:16-18). The option of blending down the spent fuel, possibly with depleted uranium (McSorley 1997 p. 16-18, US DOE 1996, Vol 1:2.23-2.24) has not been entirely dismissed. Techniques to reduce the content of uranium-235 in the fuel to 5% prior to direct disposal are available.

RADIOACTIVE WASTE DUMP – WHERE IN AUSTRALIA?

This is a long and complicated tale. All that really needs to be stated here is that two consultation papers, concerning the environmental and social criteria for a dump-site, have already been circulated and commented on in Australia. The third discussion paper has been finished and is waiting Ministerial clearance before publication. When it is published it is expected that the ‘region’ where the dump might be sited will also be named and the actual site itself will then, in theory, be determined through consultation with all the relevant stakeholders. Federal Government officials have also said that it is likely the issue of waste returns from reprocessing will be taken up at the same time, possibly for discussion on the Category S waste store which it is hoped will be co-located at the –dump-site. One potential problem in getting the dump accepted is that ANSTO, (which annually produces 90% of the radioactivity contained in Commonwealth nuclear wastes) will also be the major technical adviser to the on the siting issue.

However, as has been noted, all State governments have expressly refused to allow their state to become the location for the country’s national nuclear dump. In the meantime a document from the Senate Science and Technology Research Reference Library (Panter, 1992) is supplied to inform SEPA further on the situation in Australia (outlined in Appendix 1).

Jean McSorley

12th February 1998

Contact details:

22 Burfitt Street,

Leichhardt, Sydney,

NSW, 2040

Australia.

Tel (Home) +61 2 9658 3265 or mob 0417662720

APPENDIX 1. – Information on miscellaneous documents attached.

1. Greenpeace Australia, (1992) ‘The Politics of Radioactive Wastes – A Greenpeace Response to the National Health and Medical Research Council’s discussion paper on ‘ A Radioactive Waste Repository for Australia, Methods for Choosing the Right Site.

Background information on the moves that previous Federal Governments have made on radioactive waste issues. Particularly relevant to the relationship between the States and Federal government on this issue and therefore to the proposal concerning the return of wastes from reprocessing.

2. Greenpeace Australia’s Response to the Draft Code of Practise and Associated Guidelines for the Near-Surface Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (1992).

More detailed consideration of some of the points concerning the categories of radioactive waste and the methods to be applied to each. Relevant to whether the categorisation and subsequent disposal/storage options would be acceptable to stakeholders, e.g. Aboriginal groups, state governments etc.

3. Reprocessing Australian spent nuclear fuel at Dounreay –

ANSTO’s radioactive waste boomerang.

Short briefing paper on the shipment of spent nuclear fuel sent to Dounreay in1996.

REFERENCES (* denotes paper, or relevant pages, sent)

*ANSTO, letter to Greenpeace Australia, 22 April 1991.

*ANSTO, letter to Greenpeace Australia, 24 September 1991.

*ANSTO, letter to Greenpeace Australia, 6 October 1992.

ANSTO (1993), Submission to the Research Reactor Review, Attachment D (*p. 5.14-15, 5.17).

ANSTO (1993) Submission to the Research Reactor Review, (*p 4.12-4.16)

ANSTO, (1995) Submission to the Senate Select Committee on Radioactive Waste. (*p5-7).

*ANSTO, (1995) Transport of HIFAR Spent Fuel from Lucas Heights Research Establishment to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Establishment, Dounreay Scotland For Reprocessing, Public Environment Report. P 7, 13, 19

ANSTO, letter to Greenpeace Australia, 11 January 1996.

ANSTO, (1996) Strategic Plan, 1996/1997- 1999/2000.

ANSTO (1996) ANSTO’s Radioactive Waste Management Policy Preliminary Environmental Review, ANSTO/E728.(*p.69-84)

*Canberra Times, ‘Take N-waste elsewhere, NSW tells Feds’ 6 February 1992.

* Curtin, J "Ban on Lucas Heights nuclear dump hailed as resident’s victory’ Sydney Morning Herald, 6 February 1992.

* Egan, J.R (1993) ‘Report of the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel Project, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge. A speech presented at Waste Management ’93, Tuscon, Arizona (2nd March 1993)

*Environment Protection Agency (Australia, Commonwealth) (1995) A Proposal to Transport Spent HIFAR Fuel Elements from Lucas Heights, Sydney to Dounreay, Scotland for Reprocessing, Environmental Assessment Report.

*Fries, P. "Concern at the Core", Australian Financial Review, 23/9/97,

*Industry, Science and Technology Minister to Greenpeace Australia, 7 June 1994.

*House of Representatives, 26 July 1996, Minister for Industry Science and Tourism, response to question from the House of Representatives on 21 May 1996 (Question No. 219).

*McSorley, J. and Pearson, B. (1993) Response to Environmental Assessment of Urgent Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor HEU Spent Fuel, US Department of Energy, for Greenpeace Australia.

*McSorley, J (1997) Report on Meetings in Canberra 11-15th August, (current situation and follow-up Work on the new reactor proposed for Lucas Heights, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management), Report to Sutherland Shire Council.

*Panter, R (1992) ‘Radioactive Waste Disposal in Australia’, Department of the Parliamentary Library.

Research Reactor Review, Transcript of Public Hearings, 9 March 1993, Sydney.

Research Reactor Review, (1993) ‘Future Reaction’ Report of the Research Reactor Review, Australian Government Publishing Service. (*pages 211-216).’

Reuters, ‘Courts halts Australian radioactive waste burial.’ Newsnet, 5 February 1992.

Science and Technology Minister, letter 25 July 1997.

*Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace, ‘Australian Contract Sought’, SCRAM Bulletin Oct/November 1990.

Senate Select Committee on the Dangers of Radioactive Waste, (1996) ‘No Time to Waste, Senate Printing Unit, Parliament House, Canberra. (*p. XV-XX)

*Senate Select Committee on the Dangers of Radioactive Waste, Press Release, 29 April 1996.

*Smith, G (1997) Briefing note to the Mayor re. Safety Review Committee Activities Regarding ANSTO Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Rod Storage Problems, Chief Environmental Science Officer, Sutherland Shire Council, 2/9/97.

US Department of Energy, (1993) Environmental Assessment of Urgent Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (Predecisional Draft), DOE/EA-0912, Washington. (*p.1.1-1.4).

US Department of Energy, (1996) Public Comments and Department of Energy Responses Part 2- Organisations and Foreign Entities, Final Environmental Impact Statement on Proposed Nuclear Weapon’s Non Proliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. (*US DOE response to ANSTO letter of June 1995 – see Commentator No. 164).

US Department of Energy, (1996) Public Comments and Department of Energy Responses Part 1, Overview, Governments, and Native American Groups, Final Environmental Impact Statement on Proposed Nuclear Weapon’s Non Proliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. (*p 1.0-1-1.12).

US Department of Energy (1996) Final Environmental Impact Statement on Proposed Nuclear Weapon’s Non Proliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. (*p 2.22-2.25).
Many thanks to Jean McSorley for supplying this article to SEA-US Inc.
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