The Honeymoon story is unique among the Australian mining industry, and is extremely important in understanding the hard sell behind ISL uranium mining technology in Australia in the early 1980’s and the current wide range of activities being undertaken across Australia.

There are several small uranium deposits found within the Honeymoon region. The first to be discovered were the East Kalkaroo and Yarramba deposits by exploration company Sedimentary Uranium, although they were too small for stand alone mines (Ackland, 1997). During November 1972 an exploration joint venture between Mines Administration (MINAD, a subsidiary of CSR Ltd) and Teton Exploration (an exploration company from the USA) discovered the Honeymoon deposit just 75 km north-west of Broken Hill (Ackland, 1997). There are known extensions to this deposit and satellites to the east (Bush, 1998). The Gould’s Dam deposit further to the west was discovered later in 1973 (Ackland, 1997). There was considerable exploration undertaken at the Honeymoon site during 1973 to 1979 with about 250 exploration bores drilled (MINAD, 1980), and as the uranium deposit was small and saturated, it was quickly realised to be uneconomic with conventional methods (Bush, 1998). The total uranium resource at all deposits and extensions was estimated to be about 4,600 tonnes of U₃O₈ (Ackland, 1997).

Subsequently, the experimental mining technique of In Situ Leaching was proposed to develop the deposit and extract the uranium (Bush, 1998). The first ISL experiments were a series of push-pull tests on a single well using ammonia bicarbonate and hydrogen peroxide (Dobrowolski, 1983a). The results, however, were not encouraging as the uranium concentrations were considered too low for economic recovery (Dobrowolski, 1983a). With encouraging results from a series of push-pull tests in 1979 which used sulphuric acid solutions, the Joint Venturers, Mines Administration Pty Ltd (MINAD, 25.5%; a subsidiary of CSR Ltd), Teton Australia (25.5%) and MIM Holdings Ltd (49%), agreed to develop the deposit as an ISL mine (Dobrowolski, 1983a).

A Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was released in November 1980 (MINAD, 1980), and the Supplement or Final EIS (FEIS) released in March 1981 (MINAD, 1981). Following SA government approval in May 1981, a 25 l/s pilot plant was built and four 5-spot wellfield patterns drilled (SCRA, 1997). An experimental field trial of In Situ Leaching was begun in 1982, using sulphuric acid and ferrous sulphate as an oxidiser. There were many noted problems with the trial, discussed in detail below. However, the environmental movement began to organise a targeted and highly successful campaign against the Honeymoon Project. In December 1981 it was decided that Australia’s first national occupation of a uranium mine should occur at Honeymoon in May 1982.

A national campaign was directed at the Honeymoon site, and between May 14 to 16, 1982, a 24 hour blockade of the site was conducted. It proved to be a pivotal point in the Honeymoon Project’s history.

The following year, in March 1983, the newly elected Labour government of South Australia, under the leadership of John Bannon, refused to upgrade the leases at both Beverley and Honeymoon to full mining leases, citing these reasons (Mudd, 1998d) :

many of the economic, social, biological, genetic, safety and environmental problems associated with the nuclear industry were unresolved;

endorsement of the Government's position by a wide range of community groups, including the Australian Democrats;

commitment to the Roxby Downs project;

community disquiet at the nature of the ISL process.

The Honeymoon project was thus stopped by the SA government for legitimate reasons, NOT THE THREE MINES POLICY. The Three Mines Policy was not formally adopted by the federal Labour Party until their 1984 National Conference (Smith, 1998).

The comments - sour-grapeish as they are - of the editors of the Register of Australian Mines on the apparent collapse of the Honeymoon project are worth quoting in full ⁽¹⁾ :

"Production: Honeymoon was advanced to the pilot stage following leaching trials in 1982, and became a target for the Campaign Against Nuclear Energy whose disciples gained the eye of the general press by going to the site and also claiming that leach testing had contaminated the groundwater. Though the then new State Labor Government found no evidence of this, it took the political move of deciding not to grant the partners a production licence, but made a token compromise of granting the partners a Retention Licence over the area.

"Comment: The decision was a victory for the vocal minority in the conservation movement, and while Honeymoon was being singled out because it was planning to apply a leaching technique, many have read this as a body blow to getting some of Australia's major uranium projects into operation. AAR's David Brunt commented that the project had proceeded to strict environmental conditions laid down by the SA and Canberra governments. In making the announcement, the SA Mines Department and Senator Peter Walsh both skirted the real politics behind the issue and made some amazing statements on the uranium marketplace and their responsibility to it ... this included the implication that Honeymoon was being halted to protect the future of Roxby Downs (which will have the same problems with the anti-league, even though it is the only project that can rescue SA from its prolonged economic mire) and Senator Walsh's statement that "economics alone dictate that new mining ventures at the present time would be unwise". As Australia's procrastination has already given other nations the edge on uranium marketing- aided by the effective, scaremongering campaign of the anti-uranium lobby - these sort of comments just add to the great Australian uranium marketing tragedy. The power of the public services to give government control over uranium projects has them enmeshed in a red tape that would be constrictive even in a more realistic political environment. The Honeymoon partners announced they would be seeking compensation from the SA Government" (3).

For the following 15 years, the Honeymoon pilot plant remained mothballed. In May 1997, Canadian company Southern Cross Resources Inc (SCR) purchased the project through their Australian subsidiary Southern Cross Resources Australia (SCRA) and agreement was reached between MIM and Sedimentary Holdings to consolidate the numerous small deposits into one project, including the Gould’s Dam deposit, 60 km to the west of Honeymoon. Sedimentary acquired a 35% shareholding in SCR as part of the agreement. The total uranium resource now approximately 6,800 tonnes of U₃O₈.

Having purchased the Honeymoon Project and re-established it as a potential new uranium mine, SCRA immediately prepared a Draft Declaration of Environmental Factors (DEF) for a new Field Leach Trial (FLT) at Honeymoon (SCRA, 1997). The DEF was finalised on October 31, 1997, and submitted to Mines & Energy Department (or MESA ) on November 5, 1997 (Bush, 1998). An application for a radioactive source material licence was submitted to the SA Health Commission, Radiation Protection Branch, in late November (Bush, 1998). A number of technical concerns were raised by various state and federal government departments after reviewing the Draft DEF and SCRA subsequently prepared a Final DEF as a response, submitted to MESA on February 4, 1998 (SCRA, 1998). Both DEF’s are a simply a re-presentation of the 1980 and 1981 DEIS and FEIS, with no new analyses or data from the current proposal or results from the 1982 field ISL trial.

A review of the two DEF’s by Mudd (1998g) has highlighted the following concerns :

by using available geochemical models (eg - PHREEQC by Parkhurst, 1996), it can be demonstrated that the chemistry presented in the DEF will increase the potential for precipitation of gypsum and other minerals;

although potassium concentrations are not included in the given water chemistry, by assuming a range of values to input to PHREEQC, it can be demonstrated that jarosite precipitation will remain a significant problem;

appears deliberately ambiguous concerning earlier work and avoids the issue of jarosite precipitation;

inadequate characterisation of the hydrogeology, with contradictions in the DEF concerning the hydraulic connections between the three aquifers noted;

misrepresents the reasons behind the 1983 SA government decision to refuse further approvals for the project;

concentrations of potentially toxic heavy metals are ignored, such as selenium, lead, cadmium, and others;

is dismissive of radiation concerns, especially radon emanation from leaching solutions;

problems with the complexity geology have been noted, especially since the fourth 5-spot pattern drilled for the pilot plant was not completed due to intersection of lower permeability clays and silts and little or no uranium mineralisation, yet such problems remain unresolved;

problems of silt building up in the bottom of bores and potential screen blockages are ignored;

no restoration of groundwater quality will be undertaken.

The SA government approved the new Field Trial of ISL on March 17, 1998 (Reuters, 1998a; UIC, 1998c). The new Field Trial began operation in April 1998, with SCR intending to gradually increase the throughput of the pilot plant to it’s design capacity of 115 tonnes per year U₃O₈ (Reuters, 1998b). Although the DEF’s argued that a new trial was warranted to enable input into the pending EIS, SCR were calmly talking about “production beginning at Honeymoon” (Reuters, 1998b), not evaluation of the deposit for ISL amenability or further refinements on leaching solution chemistry (such as to avoid jarosite precipitation). The rate of 115 tonnes per year is 25% of the projected full scale plant, and SCR plans to increase the production rate up to this level to the point where the Commonwealth and South Australian governments consider the new EIS. There is no approvals from the Commonwealth for sales contracts as the basis for export, nor export permits yet SCR are gradually increasing the production capacity of Honeymoon to levels in excess of some ISL uranium mines in the USA. This cannot be considered to be good faith corporate management and certainly relegates due environmental assessment processes and environmental management to a poor standard.

The new resource estimate for the Gould’s Dam deposit was announced by SCR in late-April, and the size of the deposit was almost an order of magnitude larger than previous estimates. Originally thought to contain 2,300 tonnes of U₃O₈, the new resource estimate for Gould’s Dam was now thought to contain 17,600 tonnes U₃O₈ at an average grade of 0.098% (Reuters, 1998c; UIC 1998d). A particularly high grade section of the deposit is planned as a stand alone pilot ISL trial upon the raising of $20 million funds by SCR (Reuters, 1998c; UIC 1998d). The proportion of the uranium that is extractable with ISL is uncertain, and so the actual productive capacity of the deposit may be significantly less.

It would appear that the current proposals, from an independent view, are merely repeating the old proposals for In Situ Leach mining of uranium from the Honeymoon deposits, and no literature appears to take into account much of the experience in the USA with ISL mining, especially acidic solution mining. Many of the environmental problems of the past appear destined to continue, and without public scrutiny.

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References :
Based on Section 6.3 of Mudd, 1998 and the ⁽¹⁾ Gulliver Honeymoon Dossier.

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Page last updated August 1, 1998.

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