470 Pancontinental Mining Ltd See current profile on ERA, also the ERA, Ranger, Peko Wallsend and EZ dossiers.
Although it lays claim to one of the world's largest untapped deposits of uranium, Pancontinental Mining saw its hopes of exploiting Jabiluka drastically recede during most of the 1980s. As a result, it turned its attention to other minerals, as well as oil and natural gas. Its success in this area (in early 1985 it turned in its first-ever profit, of L1.38M for the first six months of 1984) (1) is fairly remarkable, showing (perhaps) that while there is little life after uranium mining, there is quite a lot instead of it. Pancon is active in both Canada and Australia, although by far the greater part of its investments has been in Australia. It has gold and silver properties in Ontario, but two of these are on a care and maintenance basis, while the third (Pan-Empire gold mill) was, in 1986, on lease to Teck (2).
One other Canadian venture which has been on indefinite hold is its 40% JV with the James Bay Development Corporation and Cominco (20%) in the Otish mountains of Quebec, where a significant uranium anomaly was first announced in early 1978 (3) and drilling was under-way a little later (4). In 1979, Pancon proposed a further drilling programme (5), but little more was heard about the programme thereafter.
Nor has much more been heard about Pancon's interest in solar energy: in 1977, the Australian National University announced that its solar energy research programme would have to be suspended, due to lack of finance, but that Pancon and a "United States company" (most likely Getty Oil) were involved in negotiations to continue the work (6).
A 1982 field programme at the Turee Creek uranium prospect, in Western Australia's Angelo River area, seemed to have ended without any new mineralisation of significance being discovered (7).
In the field of oil and gas, however, Pancon's Canadian explorations have yielded encouraging results; especially through Pancontinental Oil Ltd (46.7% owned), set up to explore for oil, specifically in Canada where it has located large reserves in the Louise area of British Colombia, and several commercially viable wells in Alberta (8).
Although Pancontinental was originally an Australian company - Barker Holdings Ltd (established in 1961) - the firm came under considerable Canadian influence in 1971, when it converted to a mining body and was renamed (9). The company chairman, Tony Grey - by far the most dominant figure in all of Pancon's history so far - is a Canadian national, and lawyer by profession. During the first five years of Pancon's history, Grey's personal holding in the company was variously estimated at 30% (10), "a large part of 51%" of the total shares (11), and as the sixth largest shareholding, with 314,000 shares in 1976 (9). However, in late 1976, Grey appears to have off-loaded most of his shares. From this date onwards, it becomes very difficult - if not impossible - to determine exactly how much of Pancontinental's equity is controlled by Australian interests. In 1977, the top 20 shareholders owned 68% of the quoted shares but, of these, half were nominee companies, and a third of them were either wholly-owned subsidiaries of non-Australian companies, or public subsidiaries of overseas companies (12) . No wonder the Multinational Monitor in 1981 stated that actual ownership was "obscured" by proxy holdings (13).
Until the early 1980s, the British Consolidated Goldfields (CGF) group held a substantial proportion of Pancon's shares - 19% of the total in 1977 (14). However, CGF - or rather its Australian subsidiary Renison Goldfields Consolidated (RGC) - sold this stake to an unidentified buyer in early 1983 (15).
Since then, Pancon has increased its capital on at least two occasions, making major share placements with institutional investors (16), in order to finance its acquisitions in the 1980s. This was the result of a decision made by Tony Grey in 1979 - in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island "accident" - to diversify into oil and gas (17), although Grey tried to present the picture of a "growing pro-uranium consensus throughout [Australia]," at his annual general meeting that year (18).
Pancon's most dramatic new venture has probably been its Paddington gold mine and mill, sited on old gold diggings around the Paddington Consols mine in the Kalgoorlie "golden mile", which ceased operations in 1903 when Whittaker Wright, chair of the "ultimate holding company" (19), was arrested in London and charged with fraud (19). Finance for Paddington was raised by the novel (probably unique, for Australia) method of raising a loan in the form of gold bullion worth L17.5 million, provided by the Westpac Banking Corporation: Pancon sold the gold on the market to raise the necessary cash (20). Initial feasibility studies on the Paddington prospect were carried out by Davy-McKee Pacific, with assistance from Australian Anglo-American (21), while United Goldfields Corporation holds a 12.5% net interest on a half square kilometre area within the mining lease (22). By mid-1985 the mine was ahead of schedule, and predicted by Tony Grey to become Australia's fifth largest gold producer (23). A year later, Pancon was expanding to other leases around the mine, and Paddington had become the company's "central money spinner" (24, 32). By then, Pancon had entered a 32.5% JV with Delta Gold NL (25) for mining, processing, and transporting gold from another property, the Last Chance deposit, also along the "golden mile", at Kanowna (26, 2).
After failing to gain a stake in Robe River (it lost to Peko Wallsend) (27) in 1984, Pancon took a stake in the important Central Queensland Coal Associates consortium, put together by BHP in its reorganisation of the assets of Utah International (see BHP for further details) (28). An initial 2% stake (29) was later increased to 5% (26). It also took 5% of the Gregory Coal JV in Queensland (98).
By 1986 Pancon was also 51% owner of the Lady Loretta zinc-lead-silver deposit in Queensland, half of which had been sold to Pancon in 1985 by MIM (2, 30). The same year, Pancon bought out Elf Aquitaine Triako's share in the mine (31). Later it sold 49% to Outokumpu Oy (24), and acquired 50% of the Thalanga mine (98) which opened in 1990 (99) - it has been predicted that this will become the world's largest single source of magnesia (100).
In 1983, Pancon was being dubbed a "Cinderella" of the Australian mining world (33). Barely three years later, it was expanding rapidly into gold (with another discovery in the Kalgoorlie region, at Lake Gladys, and one at Croydon in north Queensland) (26); together with Outokumpu it was exploring for base metals in large parts of Tasmania and Queensland, near Mount Isa and Rockhampton (34) - where, at Kunwarra in 1986 it located the Thalanga deposit (Pancontinental has 40% of the JV, with Queensland Metals Corp at 50%, and Radex Heraclith AG of Austria at 10%) (35).
Its 50/50 partnership with Degussa, set up in 1985 (25, 36), was looking for platinum at Yilgarn and in the Kimberleys, Western Australia (WA), and two locations in Papua New Guinea (35), while the company had identified two small deposits of tantalum at Mount Farmer (Murchison district of WA) and in the Pilbara, WA (26).
Between 1980 and 1985, Pancontinental Petroleum had drilled 30 exploration holes, and held a 10% interest in the Tintaburra oil fields; it was also involved in discussions on laying a gas pipeline to Darwin and the Gove Peninsula in northern Australia (37).
Little wonder that Tony Grey could claim 1985 as "one of the most important in the Pancontinental group's history" (38) and the Mining Journal could predict that, so long as Pancon didn't need to raise further cash by borrowing, the prognosis for the rest of the 1980s and beyond was "most favourable" (24).
By 1986, Pancon had proposed to the Sri Lankan government that it should have exclusive mineral exploitation rights to the entire country's resources, in collaboration with the state Mining and Mineral Development Corporation (39).
Of course, it is the Jabiluka uranium deposit with which Pancon is most indelibly associated. Discovered a decade and a half ago, and originally known as "7e", it was renamed after the Oenpelli Aboriginal name for "lagoon" (38). The original deposit, containing 3,850 tons U3O8, is situated 15 miles north of Ranger, on a roughly 500-800m strip. However, in the 1970s, Pancontinental discovered a much larger lode, which it was then conjectured could stretch under the escarpment at Jabiluka and the Kakadu National Park (stage one). Archaelogical and art sites were identified as occurring within only one kilometre of this deposit (40).
With an estimated 200,000 tonnes of U3O8 in two orebodies, grading up to 8 lb per tonne (41), requiring an investment of at least US$525 million (42), holding in situ reserves of 175,000 tons of U3O8 (35), it is undoubtedly one of the world's biggest uranium lodes. Annual production was set at 4500 tonnes of uranium oxide in 1982, the year the mine was given the go-ahead, with a possible doubling of output under the "right market conditions" (41). Mine life was estimated at around 25 years, producing uranium worth some A$18 billion (œ10,500,000,000) as well as 12,000kg of gold (41) . The company would employ some 1600 workers during the three-year construction phase, and about 900 in the estimated quarter century of the mine's life thereafter (43).
Under the Jabiluka agreement with Getty Oil the Australian company had to put up 65% of the production financing, and the American company the remaining 35%. Getty would also be required to lend Pancon its 65%, or act as guarantor if Pancon wished to borrow elsewhere. "To all intents and purposes," said Tony Grey at the time, "Getty will provide or cause to be provided 100% of the financing requirements for Jabiluka" (44). This "privileged" financial position (45) soon made Pancon "the most promising of all uranium companies," according to Sydney brokers Lamplough and Malcom (45). Getty would also be a potential purchaser of yellowcake - as the Jabiluka agreement specifies that Getty can purchase all or part of the mine's production - "so that the company has an assured market" (46).
Pancon initially went after European, Japanese, Korean and US utilities in its search for contracts - nearly two dozen letters "expressing interest" in contracts, having been received by the end of 1977 (47). Within two years, however, doubt was being expressed about Pancon's ability to match prices and production from Saskatchewan, and even South Africa (48). Indeed, Tony Grey - always one of the most conspicuous, if not flamboyant, of Australian mining magnates - was claiming by 1982 that Australia could make up deficiencies in supply occasioned by any UN boycott of Namibia (49). By the early 1980s, as the massive downswing in uranium prices began to bite, Pancon was less optimistic: a 1982 report by the Northern Territory Department of Mines and Energy threw doubt on Pancon's earnings ability, and the company's share price took a tumble (51).
In 1980, Pancon appointed Nichimen Co of Japan as its sole agent for sales of Jabiluka uranium to Japan: the company was intending to import about 500 tonnes of yellowcake for Japanese power utilities from 1985 onwards (52).
Two years later, however, Grey's main stratagem appeared to be to obtain contracts in Britain and, the following year, the CEGB "indicated" that it would purchase at least 1950 tonnes of U3O8 between 1987 and 1997, under a base contract worth US$ 130 million: a possible substitute for the Rossing contract (7). Pancon's attitude to the Aboriginal people of Arnhemland was, in the early stages of its attempt to mine Jabiluka, cavalier to say the best. The Federal Australian Inquiry into uranium (known variously as the Ranger Inquiry and the Fox Commission) was in no doubt that, while it did not proscribe the Jabiluka project, all uranium development should be sequential, and Jabiluka should be the subject of a separate environmental impact study (EIS). The commission was unable to decide, from evidence available, just what its environmental - and therefore human - impacts would be: in particular, Fox wanted further studies on the effects of release of contaminated waters from a putative mine into the Magela Creek river system (53).
Grey's reaction to the Fox Reports was typical: "The Commission presented an extreme environmental viewpoint," he declared, "and we trust the government will provide the balance and give the nod to any uranium company ready to start" (54). By this time, it is possible Pancon had already started illegal drilling on the Jabiluka site (55). Between October 1976 and May 1977, Pancon worked on a draft EIS, which was based on the original 15 square kilometre deposit, although the newly-discovered deposit covered seven times as large an area (56).
The EIS was quickly and fiercely attacked - by the well-known Aboriginal protagonist, H C Coombs, who pointed out that Pancon had made no approach to Aboriginal peoples (57), and who called the EIS a "travesty" which "exhibited profound ignorance of the Aboriginal people, a complete disregard for the recorded evidence of the impacts of other large-scale mining projects ... and a contemptuous indifference to preferences of the Aboriginal people concerned". Coombs claimed that the company had done "nothing to assemble the data on which any serious assessment of the social impacts must be based", nor to assist Aboriginal people to understand what was happening (58, 59). Coombs was determined that approval for Jabiluka should not be granted until the Northern Land Council (NLC) had the benefit of an independent agency which could carry out a complete survey, and adequately assess their opinions and needs: if the EIS was accepted, said Coombs, it was inevitable that the spiritual foundation of Aboriginal life would be destroyed (59). Other criticisms centred on the exorbitant price being charged by the company for a copy of its "public" report (no less than A$21), and its complete failure to evaluate any long-term biological, social or worker, safety hazards (60).
By May 1978, the Federal Australian government was in no mood to countenance its anti-uranium critics: it passed six bills in late May defining "immediate" protection for the environment once uranium mining started, nuclear safeguards for export of uranium products, and land rights claim procedures for Aboriginal communities (61). Just prior to this, the company had been given permission to commence investigatory drilling to "enable early completion of its EIS" - this included drilling at Hades Flat "for an alternative tailings dam site" and extension of the Arnhem Highway to Jabiluka. The move was greeted with outrage by opposition (ALP) members. Tom Uren MP declared the decision "a complete violation of the Second Report of the Ranger Inquiry" in particular, since no Aboriginal land claims had been heard: the Department of Aboriginal Affairs had merely been "instructed" to contact the traditional owners near the site, to determine which areas needed special protection (62). The Financial Review - not the most radical of Australian dailies - commented that the government seemed "quite prepared to over-ride the Northern Land Council" (63). By May 16th, Pancon said that its EIS and engineering studies were ''sufficiently advanced" to allow construction to begin (65) . By which time, the NLC was declaring itself completely opposed to Pancon's intentions (66).
Three months later, the Federal Australian government gave the final go-ahead to mining in Arnhemland, as road gangers and miners stood poised, at both the Ranger and Pancon sites, to start work as soon as the go-ahead was given (67).
Opposition from Aboriginal groups, especially the NLC, stalled a mining agreement in 1978, and permission to extend the Arnhemland highway was withdrawn (68). Trying to fend off the very great criticism of Jabiluka by Aboriginal traditional owners, Grey disingenuously stated that he had no plans to approach the NLC over terms and conditions, as "they have had quite a traumatic experience with the Ranger negotiations" (70). By the end of the year, the NLC was stating clearly that no go-ahead would be given to the mine, until Aborigines had obtained working experience from Ranger and Narbalek (71); for NLC chair Galarrwuy Yunupingu this meant "no development at Pancontinental at all" (72). At his company's 1978 AGM, Tony Grey put on his usual brave face, albeit tinged with disdain. In the face of about forty anti-uranium demonstrators, he warned that the Canadian uranium industry would secure the niche in world markets which Pancon might have occupied, but that "all being well", Jabiluka should open in 1979 (73).
Within a few months, Pancon had sprung a surprise on its opposition. In an attempt to overcome the majority of objections to its draft EIS, it proposed an underground mine, to reduce the amount of earth moved, decrease disturbance in land use, eliminate schist and sandstone waste dumps, keep facilities well away from Magela Creek and areas of Aboriginal significance, reduce the size of the tailings pond, simplify water management, avoid releases of contaminated water into Magela Creek, and reduce radon emissions (74).
But, by the end of 1979, Pancon was still having problems. The NLC was still firmly opposed to Jabiluka - underground, overground or wobbling free. Since the new EIS was significantly different from the draft, the NCL wanted the whole public submission procedure reopened (75). The Aboriginal claim to land at Jabiluka had still not been heard by the Aboriginal Land Commissioner (76) and the Environment Minister in the federal government, in August, said the company would have to meet further conditions before approval of the final EIS could be granted (76).
Two years later, Pancon finally sat down with the NLC and traditional owners, to try to hammer out a mining agreement. At a meeting at Djarr Djarr (the Pancon camp east of Darwin) about 250 Aboriginal women, men and children, looked at what the company was offering: a lump sum of around A$7 million, royalties worth 4.25% of annual turnover, no Aboriginal equity in the project, no seats on the board: instead Pancon tendered a "research committee" to offer "appropriate information" to Aboriginal communities, and help with their paperwork (77, 78).
A number of officers of the NLC, and other Aborigines, expressed considerable displeasure at the proposals, and threatened to resign if they were implemented (78).
Finally, on March 1st 1982, a draft agreement was signed between the NLC and Pancon (79), followed, two weeks later, by conditional governmental approval (the condition being that the draft agreement be fully signed) (80). At the same time, the Aboriginal Land Commissioner, J Toohey, granted much of the land at Jabiluka to an Aboriginal Land Trust (81). The NLC declared itself well satisfied with the final Pancon agreement. ("Because of the fairness of the negotiations and the careful and delicate way in which they have been handled ... the NLC is proud to have been a part of them," said NLC chair, Gerry Blitner) (82).
The final approval still left open the question of Texaco/Getty's 35% share in Jabiluka - a share which violates Australian guidelines on foreign investment providing a minimum of 75% domestic ownership in uranium projects (83). And the agreement with the NLC - heavily criticised by the ALP, the anti-uranium movement, and many Aborigines - established an anomalous precedent. For the first time, "sacred sites" became part of a legally enforceable contract, without any definition of what they constituted, and the NLC agreed not to "create" such sites without Pancon's approval. That a white mining company should have any hand in determining the existence, or viability, of a spiritual site struck many people as bizarre and quite unacceptable (81).
From then onwards, it was mostly downhill for Pancon at Jabiluka. Mid-1982 saw the mine's economic viability severely questioned, in the light of likely costs and the Federal government's minimum floor price for U308 (A$30/lb) (84). Then the ALP, under Bob Hawke, came to power in March 1983. The ALP "three mines" policy effectively sounded the death-knell for Jabiluka (85, 33). Both Jabiluka and the Koongarra (see Denison and Noranda) uranium deposits were incorporated into stage two of the Kakadu National Park, much to the ire of Tony Grey (who cited Justice Toohey, the Aboriginal Land Claims Commissioner as supporting the project) (86), and of the Northern Territory government (87).
The Northern Land Council was also opposed to the measure, although opinion within the traditional communities had become sharply divided: some Aboriginal elders, like Toby Gangali, wanting Pancon's project moth-balled for future possible exploitation (88); Galarrwuy Yunupingu, the NLC chair, demanding compensation for loss of income and jobs (88), and Big Bill Neidjie adamantly opposed to all such "progress" (89). At a meeting of 300 traditional owners, in late November 1983, there was a clear demand that, if stage two of the park went ahead, Aboriginal custodians should control its access (90).
In the process, Getty and Pancon had lost A$50 million - the cost of its evaluation and feasibility studies (91) - and potential income of around US$230 million (at a government floor price of A$35/lb) (90).
Ironically, what had been one of the better-negotiated uranium agreements, ever made between indigenous land-holders and a mining company, was torpedoed by a government which then went on to endorse and support a flagrantly pro-uranium policy which has since merited no support from the Aboriginal people. The Roxby Downs uranium mine followed (see Western Mining Corp) then the export of Australian uranium to France, and the encroachment of CRA on Karlamilyi land in Rudall River.
Pancon's reputation with Aboriginal people, in the light of the Jabiluka negotiations, while not unsullied - let alone unselfish - stands in marked contrast to that of most other Australian mining companies, especially CRA, WMC and Peko Wallsend. The Department of Aboriginal Affairs itself, in the 1970s, noted how co-operative Pancon had been in dealings with Aboriginal owners in Arnhemland. This was, perhaps naively, ascribed to the fact that its Jabiluka partner, Getty Oil, has had long experience negotiating with Native Americans, while the Jabiluka deposit lies within the Arnhemland Aboriginal Reserve (9). The company has also been involved in several other projects on Aboriginal land and, while Tony Grey can hardly be called a "Friend of Aboriginal People," his style of corporate management (combined, possibly, with the diversity of institutional interests in Pancon, which militate against any one body gaining boardroom control) has been to tread lightly and wield a fairly small stick.
During the 1970s, Pancon entered a JV with Buka Minerals and Western Nuclear (Aus) Ltd, at the Sleisbeck uranium deposit south of Jabiluka (12). In 1976, the company also entered a uranium JV with UG (Urangesellschaft of Australia Pty Ltd), Getty Development Company, and the Stevens/Craven/Chomley family interests of Adelaide - a short-lived venture which was terminated the following year (9). In 1971, it participated in the Ormac JV on two prospects within the Arnhemland reserve: one, south of Goulborn Island, the other, north-west of Oenpelli (92). While Aboriginal progress associations were directly involved in the JV, the traditional owners of the land refused permission for further work on the main Exploration Licence area (No. 130) in the late 1970s, and in recent years no apparent developments have occurred in this region.
It is also known that, in 1971, Pancon entered into a JV with IMC's Australian subsidiary to explore within Arnhemland Aboriginal Reserve (93). This lease appears to have soon been discontinued.
The company's main dealings with Aboriginal people in recent years have centred on the development of the Palm Valley gas fields in the Amadeus Basin of the Northern Territory. Pancon has a 3% interest in this project with the majority interests held by Magellan Petroleum, Flinders Petroleum and Charles Davis Ltd (8). Initial exploration in the field was, in fact, carried out by Geophysical Services Inc, a subsidiary of the huge Texas Instruments electronics corporation (94). According to the Central Land Council (CLC), the main Aboriginal body in the region, Pancon and Magellan both exceeded the minimum necessary to satisfy Aboriginal demands: paying the Land Council to hire an anthropologist, and changing their plans a number of times to avoid sacred sites although they delayed signing an agreement drawn up by the CLC (94). Within two years, a satisfactory agreement had been concluded, laying down conditions for sacred site protection, environmental safeguards, and employment of local people. The CLC singled out Pancontinental for its "co-operative spirit", especially on Aboriginal land west of Alice Springs at the former Haasts Bluff reserve, land of the Arrernte and Luritja people (95). Aborigines were being paid A$40 per day for their participation in the exploration teams, and traditional owners had been appointed to advise the location of sacred sites (94).
Part of Pancontinental's ultimate ownership changed in 1988, with the securing by Alan Bond (see Bond Corp) of control over the Bell Group in that year. (Alan Bond had bought out more than 80% of the group by August 1988 (96), with the Adelaide Steamship company Adsteam - securing an 11.44% stake in Bell Resources.) The dramatic take-over of Bell by Bond, from the Holmes a Court stable, followed the collapse of the Holmes a Court empire after the stockmarket crash in October 1987 (97).
In 1986 Pancon entered a JV with Jason Mining to explore in East Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) (101).
Throughout 1989-91, Tony Grey kept up the pressure on public opinion, and the government, to allow the opening of the Jabiluka mine. At the same time, the company neatly side-stepped continuing Aboriginal fears - a proposed road through part of the World Heritage Site of Kakadu Stage 1 and Stage 2 was diverted to the satisfaction of the Northern Land Council (102). It also managed to enlist its most prominent Aboriginal critic, Big Bill Neidjie, to its side (103).
Summer 1990 saw the company claiming that Jabiluka was in fact "a gold mine" and therefore should not be covered by the ALP "three mines" limitation policy (never mind that the gold is sitting under 200,000 tons of uranium!) (104). Tony Grey was also moving around potential markets for Jabiluka uranium (rather like Australian pro-uranium forces had done in the late 1970s), delivering himself of strident, but vague, promises that "major utilities" in Europe, Japan and South Korea, would be interested in purchasing a future mine's output (105).
Between late that year and early 1991 - as Pancon suffered an A$83.7 million loss (106) both the ownership of Pancontinental and that of the Jabiluka project changed dramatically:
North Broken Hill Peko (NBH) raised its holding in Pancon from 12% to 13.8% (107).
Cogema lifted its holding to 15% from 13.5% (ibid).
Degussa secured 14% of Pancon (108).
Pancon sold its stake in Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt (part of UCEC-Union Miniere), and the huge Belgian company, together with Cie Royal Asturienne des Mines SA, and Permanent Trustees Ltd, took 14% in the Australian company (109, 110).
Another 10% of Pancon was, by now, in "friendly hands" according to Grey (109), while RWE of Germany held 6%.
Finally, after some months of discussions, North Broken Hill Peko arranged in mid-1991 to purchase Pancon's 65% stake in Jabiluka (111). Grey was confident that the mine could be in production within three-and-a-half years (112). Peter Wade of NBH was less sanguine, seeing development as "years away" (113).
One thing was certain: with NBH now controlling ERA, and thus the Ranger mine, its acquisition of Jabiluka opened the way for the two mines to be amalgamated, even though this prospect was firmly rejected by Prime Minister Hawke within days of the Jabiluka deal going through (114).
Further reading: "Planning Jabiluka Ventilation", from E&MJ 10/84 p69.
Contact: WISE-Glen Aplin, PO Box 87, Glen Aplin, 4381, Australia.
NLC, PO Box 3046, Darwin, NT 5794, Australia.
CLC, PO Box 3321, Alice Springs, NT 5730, Australia.
SOURCE: "The Gulliver File - Mines, people and land: a global battleground" by Roger Moody.
Published in 1992 by Minewatch, 218 Liverpool Road, London Nl ILE, UK, and WISE-Glen Aplin, Po Box 87, Glen Aplin Q 4381, Australia.
Distribution: Sales to bookshops: Pluto Press, 345 Archway Road, London N 6 5AA, UK. Sales to the mining industry and libraries: Uitgeverij Jan van Arkel, A. Numankade 17, 357t KP Utrecht, the Netherlands.
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